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Abstract 
 
This puzzle is at the core of my dissertation: the coexistence of movements 
demanding change and establishing a form of order. Contemporary scholars do not 
include “governance” in the definition of what social movements do, as they 
consensually define social movements and contentious politics as non-state actors 
engaging in activities that challenge existing forms of economic, political, and/or cultural 
order (McAdam: 1988; 1996; Tarrow: 1998; Aminzade, et al: 2001; McAdam, et al: 
2001). These studies focus on how opportunity structures are relatively "open" or 
"closed," but cannot tell us the ways movements develop when they see an opening, nor 
the sorts of organizational or institutional forms a movement adopts upon pursuing an 
opening. They also, typically, focus on movements such as the U.S. Civil Rights 
Movement or Environmental Movement that sought inclusion for previously 
marginalized communities into the exercise of formal, official power relations. 
Discussions of social movement-led counter-orders and service administration would 
explain these developments as part of a revolutionary situation, dual power, or 
breakdown of state authority (Tilly: 1977; Sirianni: 1983). Yet movements that govern are 
not revolutionary, because they seek recognition by state authority in their right to 
administer services like education and security, normally the prerogative of their 
governments, but as they see fit. I demonstrate this new form of social movement 
resistance – what I call self-governmental – through a case study of the Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Brazilian Landless Workers Movement or MST) and their 
variable success in governing agrarian reform, educational, and economic policy. Besides 
postulating this alternative mode of resistance, I develop a new social movement theory 
to explain successful mobilization and institutionalization that is rooted in the concept of 
strategy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Horseback Riding and Health Care 
 
My leg was cut open in the Brazilian countryside. I was horseback riding in the 
agreste region of Pernambuco state, led by two members of the Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless Workers Movement or MST) who were 
showing me the entirety of the ranch they had occupied just two months before I arrived. 
While navigating a steep, rocky incline on my not-so-trusty-steed, I managed to scrape up 
against a brush-covered, barbed-wire fence that was hidden from view. I pulled the 
weight of the horse away from the fence to see blood running down my leg. Fear set in. I 
looked up, not greeted by worried looks, but by laughs from my MST escorts. Pointing at 
my leg and smiling, they joked, “oxi, agora você tem uma lembrança! (Oh man, looks 
like you got a souvenir)!” I laughed along with them, trying to show that I was not scared 
s*%$-less. I was in the middle of nowhere and miles away from any kind of city. Where 
were the doctors, hospitals, and medicine? What would I do if my leg got infected? 
After the ride, I went to one movement member’s tent in the “acampamento 
(encampment).” This encampment was like a dozen others I had visited, and lived in, 
during my two years of fieldwork in Brazil. The smell of cooking beans and meat floated 
between the hundred or so black tarp tents lumped together in an area no larger than a 
football field. A few mangy horses and run-down cars moved women, children, and men 
to work, movement meetings, and church. A red MST flag – not the Brazilian – flew 
above everything. In addition to its color, its imagery of a working man and woman 
served as a reminder of the movement's socialist identity. Below the flag, people moved 
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with determination, in spite of the mud that made walking difficult. Some were on their 
way to harvest, while others were organizing other land occupations at different sites. 
One “brigade” – a term used by the MST to denote a certain kind of group - of members 
was leaving to repair buildings at a movement-run school. Some members were attending 
classes to learn about the movement's history. At night, people told stories, played music, 
and drank. The hustle and bustle made me think of Tocqueville's description of township 
life in Democracy in America, with the MST version fueled by Marxism, samba, and 
cachaça. 
The political significance of the encampment is hard to capture. Juridically, the 
encampment exists in a kind of “limbo.” According to the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 
and the Estatuo da Terra (Rural Land Statute) that inaugurated official Brazilian agrarian 
reform policy in 1964, land not serving a “social function1” can be expropriated by the 
government for redistribution. Despite this legal backing, only 67 cases of de jure 
redistribution took place between 1964 and 1985 (INCRA: 2010). Because of the virtual 
non-existence of agrarian reform pre-1985, yet the existence of the legal mechanism 
sanctioning it, the MST considers land occupations a means to do what the government 
won't. In occupations of hundreds, sometimes thousands, of people organized by the MST, 
the movement targets the land of large ranchers, farmers, companies, and sometimes even 
the government. The movement claims that the landowner is breaking the law. The 
encampment that follows the occupation functions as a means to re-appropriate land and 
indicate what the government ought to expropriate. In this movement-led “agrarian 
                                                 
1 I discuss the political and environmental conditions of social function further in Chapter 
3 of this dissertation. 
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reform from below,” hundreds of squatters build a community from scratch, fearful of 
police and landowner evictions, while they wait de jure recognition. 
A strict juridical understanding of the encampment, despite giving us a formal, 
governmental view of agrarian reform, misses the organizational and deeper political 
complexity of the relationships that the MST engenders in areas destined for agrarian 
reform. For example, as I was sitting in the tent after my horseback riding adventure, a 
woman entered and brought me ointment, iodine, and bandages. She was a member of the 
“setor de saúde (health sector),” who in addition to bringing the medical items, checked 
on me over the next couple days. A week later, while I was visiting a movement-run 
training school for early childhood educators, I met someone else who was also a 
member of the movement's health care sector, not of any particular encampment, but 
nationally. I was surprised by what she told me: she said that on every encampment there 
is either a single person or a team in charge of treating people who have accidents or 
helping find medical attention if required, that the movement works in partnership with 
Brazilian and Cuban universities to train members to become doctors, and that special 
courses at various movement-run schools teach people how to use traditional herbs and 
medicines in opposition to corporate, for-profit health care. 
What had seemed at first to be chance on-the-spot care for my wound was 
actually part of regularized activity. The care I received was not only standard, but also 
characteristic of movement practices on the local, regional, and national levels. The 
movement, for lack of a better description, was “taking” a service that is typically 
provided by government. In “taking” it, they also delivered the service. But in delivery, 
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they alter how it was administered in terms of content and methods of provision. I was 
beginning to see a pattern: the ways the movement provided health care was much the 
same as how they conducted land occupations and formed encampments. It was as if the 
movement occupied land and health care. Or rather, in both health care and agrarian 
reform, the movement challenged standard practices that dictated the design and 
implementation of service provision. 
The MST receives the most recognition for their land occupations. Images of 
these actions fill the pages of Sebastião Salgado's 1997 book Terra and have inspired 
scores of ally groups (known as the Friends of the MST) throughout Europe and the 
United States. Besides this trademark tactic and their immense size – present in 24 of 
Brazil's 26 states and claiming one million and a half adherents – the MST's struggle for 
agrarian reform includes more than land redistribution to encompass the implementation 
of an alternative educational program, development of a peasant-centered approach to 
health care, and promotion of communal and/or peasant agricultural production 
techniques. 
This dissertation analyzes land occupations and agrarian reform, yet it also 
broadens how we understand social movement resistance in ways other than coordinating 
demand-making practices to government. I argue that the MST showcases a kind of 
social movement resistance – what I call self-governmental – that has neither been 
previously described nor explained. In this dissertation, I analyze the nature of self-
governmental resistance, through a case study of the MST, and explain how it 
successfully develops. I explain, evaluate, and interpret this form of resistance in what I 
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call “policy areas.” Throughout this dissertation, I use “policy” and “policy area” 
interchangeably. When I analyze policy areas, I am referring to the de facto practices, 
ideas, and laws involving the delivery of a service that is typically considered the 
prerogative of government. I compare movement efforts in policy areas where I find 
different levels of success – agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production – in 
order to understand how the MST has developed. 
I believe that the focus on land occupations, while central to the movement's 
activities, has diverted attention from what the MST teaches us about social movement 
resistance in general. In English, Ondetti's Land, Protest, and Politics: The Landless 
Movement and the Struggle for Agrarian Reform in Brazil (2009), is the first social 
scientific analysis of the movement, followed by Wolford's This Land Is Ours Now: 
Social Mobilization and the Meanings of Land in Brazil (2010). Both, despite the chasm 
that divides them methodologically, focus on land occupations and territory. Two other 
descriptive accounts, Wolford and Wright's To Inherit the Earth: The Landless Movement 
and the Struggle for a New Brazil (2003) and Branford and Rocha's Cutting the Wire: The 
Story of the Landless Movement in Brazil (2002), document the history of the MST since 
its late 1970s inception. Fernandes' work in Portuguese, A Formação do MST no Brasil, 
(The Formation of the MST in Brazil (2000)), is likewise a necessary staple in the 
movement literature, especially for geographers. Multiple other studies and theses, 
mostly in Portuguese, document movement practices in particular settlements and 
encampments, as well as efforts in education, cooperative formation, and health care. 
What has eluded these studies is a conceptual focus on the nature of the MST's resistance 
6 
 
and the evaluation of their success. My dissertation fills these gaps in the literature. 
I intend for the conclusions and concepts generated from my case study of the 
MST to be applicable to cases in other countries throughout Latin America. From the 
Zapatistas in southern Mexico to the Piqueteros in Argentina, different social movements 
on the continent show forms of resistance that require new conceptual frameworks. Like 
the MST, they contest the design and implementation of services, such as health care and 
education, which we normally associate with government. They also contest – in 
demands, as well as in practice – the institution of private property by occupying land and 
creating collectively-owned and administered cooperatives. 
Self-governmental resistance, with the MST as the most illustrative but not the 
only case, is more than street protests, marches, and organizations.
2
 It includes alternative 
rules and procedures, or rather, modes of conduct. It is the consistent, coordinated 
resistance to state power – whose precise definition I explain later in this chapter and 
more in the next – and private property. Self-governmental contention neither showcases 
a mode of resistance that is geared towards occupying, or replacing, a government, nor a 
form rooted in seeking inclusion within already-existing structures. Self-governmental 
resistance divides state power through vying for control of different policy areas normally 
the prerogative of government. My focus on this new form of contention, in its organized, 
collective, and sustained challenge to state power and private property, makes us rethink 
                                                 
2 I say institutions rather than organizations to differentiate myself from other social 
movement theorists, such as John Lofland, who conceives of organizations as offices, 
or rather, as the places where you find movement staff answering telephones and doing 
paperwork (1996). Institutions, for me, do not have this sense of concrete place, but 
rather include offices, as well as the movement’s rules and ideas they encourage their 
members to adopt. 
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the meaning of resistance and the typical roles assigned to movements in “civil society.” 
My case study of the MST shows us how this is done. 
 
1.1 What's the MST? 
When I try to think of a concept that captures my experience with MST health 
care, I keep coming back to the same notion: governance. It seems as if the movement 
has adopted certain order and stability-providing functions, mainly for the collective 
benefit of their own members. Concerning health care, the movement's work with Cuba is 
regular, as is their emphasis on the use of traditional herbs and medicines, group-
managed mode of administration, and demands for further government resources. The 
encampment, likewise, is a system of well-conceived administration, order, and discipline 
that exists in the effort to practice a movement-centered version of agrarian reform. 
Health care and agrarian reform are by no means the only regularized, systematized, or 
rather, as I develop throughout this dissertation – institutionalized – services designed and 
implemented by the MST. Children attend schools, businesses are organized, and security 
is provided – not by state authorities who we would expect to provide these services, but 
by a social movement. 
Order, stability, institutionalization – these are words we normally do not 
associate with social movements. I mean, governance is the last thing typically 
considered integral to social movement action. Living in the United States, the idea of a 
social movement conjures up images of the Civil Rights Movement demanding 
integration and equality in disruptive activities like marches and sit-ins. Similarly, for 
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those who live in former Soviet states, one may think of mass demonstrations against 
one-party states in the late eighties. People in Latin America probably associate 
movement action to mass protests during the transition from authoritarian rule. Such 
typical cases of social movement resistance feature mass, collective, and disruptive action. 
Just as important, we are told that movements are found in “civil society,” normally 
conceived of as organizations “between” family and government, without profit-making 
or criminal aspirations. This negative definition of civil society exclusively assigns social 
movements the role of “demand-makers” – not “demand-implementers.” It also lumps 
together “state” and “government” as two potential sites for governance, or rather, order-
providing activities. Such an understanding of movements does not include governance 
within their standard practices. 
By providing services, the MST forces us to ask two questions: (1) are they a 
social movement? and (2) what is the nature of their relationship to the government and 
the state? At first, I thought they took on service provision because the Brazilian 
government could not deliver. This makes sense: MST actions take place in 
predominately rural areas where state authority is often thought to exist precariously. The 
group also arose during the late 1970s when the then-military government was breaking 
down and losing control. In this understanding, the MST would not be a movement, but 
something like a mutual-benefit society, like the Amish in North America. 
The problem with this portrayal is that the MST challenges the Brazilian 
government over who has authority concerning service provision and how it is exercised. 
For example, conflict between the government and the movement has developed 
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concerning the administration and execution of agrarian reform policy, e.g. how to 
expropriate land and which land to redistribute. Land occupations trigger reactions from 
the police, judges, and bureaucrats in various ministries. Far from existing “outside the 
state,” the MST's form of resistance touches precisely on policy areas that are the concern 
of government. Educational struggles, likewise, have continued through the present day. 
As recently as 2010, the Ministerio Público (Public Ministry, a governmental institution 
that is something like the “Public Defender”) in Rio Grande do Sul shut movement 
schools for supposedly endangering children.
3
 Regular conflicts show continued and 
collective resistance, qualities incompatible with mutual-benefit societies and religious 
groups. 
These dynamics also rule out other rival, non-social movement conceptions for 
the MST. For instance, they are not a political party (they never run candidates in 
elections), a proto-state (they have never laid claim to exclusive authority over land), or a 
business (they do not prioritize profit-making). And while the MST coordinates protests 
and marches – typical of social movements around the globe – it is their organized 
contention concerning certain policy areas that shows what I find to be a new form of 
social movement resistance. The MST is a social movement. What is different is their 
mode of contention. 
Comparing the trajectory of different social movement leaders and their plans 
with the MST accentuates their different styles of resistance. Various Civil Rights 
Movement leaders, e.g. Jesse Jackson Sr or John Lewis, after years of coordinating 
                                                 
3 In 2012, the decision was overturned and movement education in certain schools was 
allowed to continue. 
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protests and marches, entered government. They became included in the exercise of state 
power through joining political parties and organizing voters, not activists. In “Letter 
from Birmingham Jail,” for example, Martin Luther King Jr. references the importance of 
direct-action, not for seizing governmental institutions to refashion society, but for 
“integration.4” Sit-ins, after all, did not seek to occupy state power or destroy private 
property, but to ensure the equal participation of African-Americans within existing social, 
political, and economic structures in the United States. Literally and figuratively, the 
movement sought a place “at the counter” for people who had been previously excluded. 
From their leader's trajectory to the nature of sit-ins and marches, we can see that the U.S. 
Civil Rights Movement sought reform of dominant, status quo social, political, and 
economic structures. 
In a different fashion, leaders of other kinds of movements that we can catalogue 
as revolutionary remained mostly outside the exercise of formal government until taking 
or occupying power. While it is true that the Bolsheviks ran candidates in elections, this 
was not the end of the movement. Lenin's own writings on dual power
5
 show a strategic 
orientation intended to replace already-existing governmental authority in its entirety. 
Likewise, Castro remained outside of government until the movement he led, the July 
26
th
 Movement, took state power and assumed control of government in its entirety. 
Castro's plans were apparent – not in terms of ideology, but with respect to state power 
and private property – when one full year before taking power, revolutionary forces 
                                                 
4 See “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” April 16, 1963, 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/frequentdocs/birmingham.pdf. 
5 See “The Dual Power” from Pravda No.28, April9, 1917. Lenin Collected Works, 
Progress Publishers, 1964, Moscow, volume 24, pages38-41. 
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issued “Ley No. 3 sobre Derecho de los Campesinos a la Tierra (Law Number 3 over the 
Peasant Right to Land),” which established guidelines for all of Cuba's peasants and land 
(Pino Santos: 1999). Both the Bolsheviks, the July 26
th
 Movement, as well as other 
revolutionary movements such as Nicaragua's Sandinistas, planned to take state power, as 
is evident in their strategic plans. Their movements would develop external to existing 
governments, seek to occupy state power, and dismantle private property. 
The MST, since the movement's inception in the late 1970s, has followed a 
different path. First, their leaders have not chosen to participate within government in the 
same way as movements like the U.S. Civil Rights Movement. With the exception of a 
few politicians from Rio Grande do Sul – the late Adão Pretto and the current Dionilso 
Marcon – most movement leaders and activists work outside government.6 João Pedro 
Stédile, has been central to the movement's direção nacional, (national directorate), since 
the movement's origins, and has never held any kind of political office. Countless other 
regional and state-level leaders have spent decades with no political party affiliation and 
outside of formal government, focusing on MST plans and projects. I met many of them, 
whose names can be found in movement documents on cooperatives, strategy, education, 
etc., that were published in the 1980s and 1990s. They have spent their time developing 
movement practices, strategies, and identity. There are essentially no signs that the 
                                                 
6 It is also worth noting that Rio Grande do Sul seems a little exceptional with respect to 
movement members becoming involved in government, not only nationally, but also 
locally. In the municipality of Pontão, for example, the mayor and city council people 
are all movement members. This municipality, however, does not show a trend. In fact, 
Pontão is the only municipality that was established due to the creation of agrarian 
reform settlements, which led to a population increase in the area in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The vast majority of the people in this area are MST. 
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movement's leadership or members have aspirations to gain formal political power 
through the ballot box. 
So, is the MST a revolutionary movement? The seemingly exclusive nature of the 
MST's leadership and membership would seem to indicate a grand design to take state 
power. At a quick glance, this seems like a valid claim. Any visit to a movement 
encampment or settlement, or conversation with leadership, quickly reveals how 
Marxism-Leninism is the guiding philosophy. Small movement-led groups that 
administer health care, education, or security in encampments, also, often take 
revolutionary movement leader's names like Lenin and Che Guevara for identification. 
While doing my fieldwork, I became aware of the late Marxist revolutionary leader, 
Carlos Marighella, who advocated armed urban guerrilla struggle in Brazil and who died 
trying it in 1969. I first learned about Marighella during visits to MST-run schools, where 
students in the morning often would sing the movement's hymn and then conduct their 
“mística” (a kind of prayer or ritual that typically begins movement activities and features 
an event or historical figure deemed important to the movement). And it was Marighella, 
the martyr-revolutionary, and not then-President Lula, who was the periodic subject of 
student homage in various “mística.” If Leninism and homage to revolutionary leaders 
are sufficient, then the MST shows strong signs of revolutionary movement activity. 
Unfortunately for the sake of coming to a quick and easy definition, the MST is 
not revolutionary. First, there is no armed struggle. I do not think that revolutionary 
struggles necessarily feature the use of weapons in their resistance efforts, yet twentieth 
century revolutionary movements – including Castro's July 26th Movement, the 
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Bolsheviks, Nicaragua's Sandanistas, and the failed attempt of Peru's Sendero Luminoso 
(Shining Path) – all involved armed contention as a central tactic. The MST, however, has 
no weapons. I lived for months in various MST encampments and settlements, across the 
country, and never came across a gun (except a few for hunting). I heard stories of gun 
fights, but due to petty disputes between members. Organized armed contention is a tactic 
that draws stark divisions between movement and government. The regular and 
coordinated brandishing of the means to end life is an extreme existential marker 
delimiting membership. The MST does not perform its form of resistance in this way. 
Additionally, its degree of interaction with the Brazilian government, as I will discuss 
later, is a central element of the movement's strategy. In fact, the movement has integral 
plans to use resources and seek official recognition. Thus, the absence of weapons and 
the objective of using government indicate a kind of movement that resists in ways other 
than those exhibited by revolutionary struggles. 
If revolutionary movements strive to establish dual power for taking state power, 
and reform movements seek inclusion and integration, then the MST represents a form of 
struggle that divides and separates state power and abolishes private property. The 
administration of education, in both encampments and settlements, shows a form of 
resistance over how education is provided. The movement claims control over 
pedagogical content, as well as who teaches the students. MST health care similarly lays 
claim to this particular service, coordinating a challenge to how provision takes place and 
who delivers it. Likewise, the movement's mass land occupations directly challenge both 
land tenure and who has the authority to redistribute land. Occupations are a bottom-up, 
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grassroots version of conducting agrarian reform policy in terms of how to indicate the 
land that ought to be expropriated. Agrarian reform, regardless of country, involves the 
re-appropriation of land and the alteration of labor relations concerning food production 
and/or raw material extraction. Despite the Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma 
Agrária's (National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform or INCRA) history of 
local-level involvement, state-led agrarian reform consistently privileges expert 
knowledge and private property. The MST, in conducting land occupations and 
promoting communal land ownership patterns, redefines what agrarian reform is by 
contesting how agrarian reform is conducted and by whom. 
The MST does not aim to take state power by occupying government, as 
revolutionary movements attempt, but by dividing it. Despite this crucial difference, 
many observers get it wrong. One of my interviews with Gilberto Thums, who at the time 
led the charge in Rio Grande do Sul's Public Ministry to close schools under movement 
direction, swore that the MST was planning guerrilla warfare “similar to what happened 
in Vietnam” (Interview, Porto Alegre-RS, 3-15-2011). Likewise, the Brazilian center-right 
periodical, Veja, published a report on the movement's schools, equating their 
pedagogical content to Fundamentalist Islamic “Madrassas.”7 Similar suspicions led the 
United States Consulate to investigate the movement on numerous occasions, which 
became known through a Wikileaks report while I was doing my field research.
8
 From 
                                                 
7 See “Madraçais do MST” http://veja.abril.com.br/080904/p_046.html. 
8 See http://wikileaks.org/Brazil-Cablegate-how-the-US-sees.html and 
http://www.snh2011.anpuh.org/resources/anais/14/1296843706_ARQUIVO_WELCH
WikileaksImprensaMstMim2010_ANPUH2011.pdf. I was told by individuals who in 
the past were frequently interviewed by the consulate that U.S. representatives want to 
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my observations, the nature of MST resistance challenges such naïve classifications. 
MST resistance also calls our attention to the need to analytically separate 
government from state in social movement theory. From any introductory Political 
Science textbook, we know that state and government are not the same, despite common 
usage. Governments are the actual institutions, or units, that exercise state power – often 
claiming sovereignty – while the state is an “abstraction.” I discuss and explore the nature 
of this abstraction more in the next chapter. For our purposes here, I use James Scott's 
understanding from Seeing Like a State (1998). Specifically, I understand this abstraction 
we call “the state” as a collection of different power relations. I include within this 
collection the centralization of decision-making authority, homogenization of culture, and 
subordination of social actors to governmental elites. The state is power, or rather, an 
array of different kinds of power that has emerged historically. Through these powers, 
governments and their institutions dictate the terms of policy. In this dissertation, I am not 
concerned with the historical patterns of state formation, or with the question of whether 
certain states have developed differently. Instead, my study focuses on how different 
contemporary movements like the MST call our attention to a new form of contesting 
state power. They also organize their resistance through opposing the institution of 
private property, which many Latin American governments – with the exception of Cuba 
– also defend, promote, and institutionalize. 
Theorists tend to equate state power with government, and in the process, blind us 
to manifestations of social movement resistance other than marches and protests. 
                                                                                                                                                 
know if the MST is “planning another Cuba.” 
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Government is not considered the executor of certain powers, but rather an “entity,” or 
thing that social actors confront. Recent efforts to breakdown this “black box” emphasize 
how social processes and relations crisscross “public” and “private” (Keck and Abers: 
2009; Keck and Hochstetler: 2007). Despite such scholarly interventions, persistent 
references to the “public sphere,” “public goods,” and “society,” constantly re-inscribe 
common conceptions of state/society hierarchies, roles, and relations because there is no 
discussion of power. The simple use of “public” implies assumptions about government, 
with certain roles and relationships reserved for “social” actors. Rather than presuming 
these qualities of government, we need to see how they are constituted. I locate their 
constitution not only in how they relate with non-governmental actors, but just as 
importantly, in how they are challenged by coordinated social movement resistance. 
The MST does not allow us to confuse state with government. Both revolutionary 
and reform movements, however, allow us to conflate them. Revolutionary movements 
trouble the distinction between state and government by establishing parallel 
governmental organizations with the potential to organize social, political, and economic 
relationships in ways that defy the constitutive elements of state power. Worker councils 
in the early days of the Soviet Union, for example, decentralized authority by including 
people into executive decision-making roles and opening governance to democratic 
deliberation.
9
 Despite these practices, the kind of governance first seen in dual power 
contained designs to embrace centralization, homogenization, and the subordination of 
                                                 
9 See Serge, Victor. Year One of the Russian Revolution. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston 
(1972) and Rabinowitch, Alexander. "The Evolution of Local Soviets in Petrograd, 
November 1917-June 1918: The Case of the First City District Soviet." Slavic Review 
46, no. 1 (1987): 20-37. The Paris Commune's organization was also similar. 
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non-governmental actors, often by a single political party. 
Self-governmental resistance divides state power. By defying separate institutions 
and their control over specific services – education, agrarian reform, health care, etc. – 
the nature of MST resistance neither simply improves the delivery of a service through 
including previously excluded people (reform movements), nor replaces one government 
with another to harness state power in its entirety (revolutionary movements). 
Governments and state power are opposed differently in reform and revolutionary 
struggle, yet the state emerges unchallenged in both. In fact, both revolutionary and 
reform movements actually reproduce state power rather than oppose it. Movements like 
the MST claim certain policy areas in their coordinated challenges, splintering 
institutions where state authority is exercised. Their coordinated challenge of state 
authority in distinct policy areas denies how state power homogenizes identification, 
centralizes authority, and subordinates social actors. How this takes place in different 
policy areas is the subject of each of this dissertation's subsequent chapters. 
State power, as exercised by government, finds opposition in movements vying 
for control over the design and implementation of certain policies. Authority in separate 
policy areas – e.g. education, health care, security, land reform – and not the government 
in its entirety are the sites of movement contention. MST resistance does not intend to 
manage all of Brazilian society, or even the practices of all participants within a certain 
policy area. In this sense, the movement divides state power. In self-governmental 
resistance, movements provide order for their members in the delivery of a certain service 
in accordance with their identity and culture. The movement promotes in each service an 
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alternative mode of identification – its “self” – over the form promoted bygovernment, 
establishing a barrier between it and singular, often national, ways of identification. The 
MST reveals a social movement that does not fit either of the kinds of movements 
previously documented, reform or revolutionary. Rather, the way that the movement 
engages in resistance shows the development of a new mode of social movement 
contention. This dissertation focuses on further developing the nature of this new mode of 
resistance, explaining how it has developed, and evaluating its success. 
The last thirty years have also seen the development of a series of social 
movements in Latin America with qualities similar to those revealed by the MST. In 
Mexico, the EZLN (the Zapatistas or the Zapatista Army of National Liberation) has jails 
where movement dissidents are kept if they break movement-created rules, rather than 
those established by government. Such movement-centered attempts at security are often 
in accordance with local, indigenous norms. While this is a way of providing order, jails 
also constitute a form of defiance by challenging state-promoted identities and culture. 
Other movements, such as CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Identities of Ecuador), 
contain member organizations that use state agencies to implement movement-
administered bilingual education curricula in indigenous-run schools. Like the MST's 
practices in education and agricultural production, CONAIE resistance institutionalizes 
contention over whom and how policy areas are governed. Additionally, the Rondas 
Campesinas adjudicate conflicts and mediate punishment through their own courts in the 
Peruvian countryside, posing an alternative mode of administering justice. 
These movements, like their respective governments, provide security, health care, 
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and education. What makes them different is the way they design and implement these 
services. MST schools for high school age members have classes ranging from how to 
start medicinal herb gardens to seminars on historical materialism. Students learn how to 
care for their crops and how they are members of a common socio-economic class in 
opposition to large landowners and multinational corporations such as Monsanto. EZLN 
autonomous schools and CONAIE bilingual education teach students about the centuries 
of oppression that indigenous people have faced, the prior struggles led by individuals 
such as Emilio Zapata, and their rights.
10
 Educational contention, as these movements 
show, is over who and how the service is designed and implemented. None of these 
movements seek to implement their educational vision over all people within their 
respective countries. 
Movements, such as those in the Andes, as well as the MST, have neither 
established dual bases of power, nor sought inclusion into already-existing governmental 
relations. The form of their resistance is different. Instead of taking state power in its 
entirety, self-governmental resistance divides state power through challenging 
governments over the design and control of various – and separate – policies. While 
challenging state power, they also contest private property. In their opposition to 
                                                 
10 It is also worth mentioning that people can leave these movements, despite disciplinary 
mechanisms. For example, various Zapatista villages left the movement after the 1995 
decision not to accept any state resources, only to return years later after having 
benefited from state agricultural subsidies. MST members that do not agree with 
tactics such as camping on the sides of roads after they have been evicted from land 
they attempted to occupy, either develop other landless movements such as the MLST 
(Movimento de Libertação dos Sem Terra), ally with labor unions seeking agrarian 
reform, or go back to living on large farms or in cities. The point is that there are 
always exit options for members. 
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individual proprietorship, they contest the manner that resources are distributed, 
administered, and regulated. This makes their form of resistance akin to revolutionary 
movements. Their approach to state power, however, makes them different. This 
dissertation takes the phenomena of self-governmental resistance, and through a case 
study of the MST, deepens our understanding of its dynamics, development, and causes. 
 
1.2 Revised Concepts: Institutionalization and Strategy 
During my fieldwork, I became intrigued by the MST's organization. Gaining 
access, for example, presented various obstacles. Early meetings with movement leaders, 
at least from my perspective, seemed more like interviews – of me – to find if I really 
was a PhD student and not a spy. And once “on site” with the movement, a selected 
leader usually ensured that I was doing my stated objective. Surveillance did not entail 
control over my research, as various members spoke frankly with me about movement 
weaknesses and problems. Regardless, from their central offices in São Paulo to remote 
settlements in Amazonian state of Pará, internal networks of movement activists and 
leaders both helped me find the people I needed to interview and locate settlements, 
encampments, schools, and cooperatives. On the one hand, I felt like I was under constant 
watch. On the other hand, without this organization, I would not have been able to locate 
the places and people I needed for my project. 
How I gained access shows a well-organized movement. It also reveals an internal 
structure, with certain established rules, procedures, and practices. As I came to find out, 
it also characterizes the MST's efforts to govern separate policy areas. In the three policy 
21 
 
areas I select and analyze in this dissertation's subsequent chapters – agrarian reform, 
education, and agricultural production, – I locate such movement-centered rules and 
practices that simultaneously stabilize an alternative, movement-centered form of order 
while disrupting the status quo, dominant economic, political, and cultural versions. 
These regularized, organized, and systematized ways, or rules and practices, comprise the 
outcome, or dependent variable, that I explain over the course of this dissertation. They 
reveal, what I call, the movement's institutionalization of contention. The 
institutionalization of self-governmental resistance is distinct from reform and 
revolutionary contention, yet the same in so far as all movements regularize and stabilize 
the ways they challenge dominant, status quo social, political, and/or economic structures. 
The concept of institutionalization in the field of social movement studies has 
previously been under-explored. Tarrow, as I elaborate in Chapter 2, sees the unfolding of 
social movement resistance as “paradoxical” because destabilizing activities requires 
some sense of stability. The actions around confronting the paradox is described by 
others in the academic literature as professionalization (Staggenborg: 1988) or 
deradicalization (Piven and Cloward: 1979), but it is Tarrow who initially introduces the 
notion of institutionalization (Tarrow: 1998). Institutionalization, in other studies, is 
synonymous with a decline in coordinated collective action (Kriesi, et al: 1995). Most 
understandings of institutionalization contain the assumption that in stabilizing their 
challenge to authorities, movements, in the process, demobilize. I agree that actions 
become regularized and standardized, but I do not necessarily believe that resistance 
stops as regularized activity increases. Revolutionary struggles, specifically, show a 
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pattern of systematization that does not always lead to domestication. In fact, existing 
studies that link demobilization with the regularization of contention actually focus 
almost exclusively on reform movements. Regardless of how contention declines among 
movements that engage in reform-style contention, they also show regular, systematized 
rules and practices that coordinate their challenges to status quo, dominant powers. Thus, 
all forms of social movement resistance institutionalize contention. The ways they do so, 
however, vary between reform, revolutionary, and also, as I elaborate throughout this 
dissertation, self-governmental collective action. 
While the majority of this dissertation is concerned with the dynamics of how 
self-governmental resistance institutionalizes, I devote the last chapter to a study of 
reform and revolutionary movement institutionalization. In-depth studies of each, 
respectively, will have to wait a book-length treatment of the subject. This dissertation is 
almost exclusively dedicated to exploring the institutionalization of self-governmental 
resistance because of the novelty of the concept. How movements compare in terms of 
their different modes of institutionalization is broached, but not fully explored, in the 
conclusion. 
My reason for evoking the language of institutionalization in a study of resistance 
is meant to correct the overemphasis in the popular imagination and academic literature 
on the false dichotomy between resistance and order. In a certain way, my research 
speaks to an old question that has always plagued research on collective action. The name 
of one of the dominant political parties in Mexico – el Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI)– captures the contradictory 
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nature, as well as the strategic dilemma, that movements face when attempting to 
stabilize resistance. How, after all, is a revolution “institutionalized?” In Mexico, and 
many other countries like the former Soviet Union, a political party often resulted. For 
others, typically reform-style movements, they formed interest groups or individually 
sought political office. In Latin America today, however, social movements such as the 
MST remain movements while institutionalizing self-governmental resistance. In this 
sense, my focus on institutionalization is an attempt to answer an old question that is 
posed once again by new forms of contention. 
The MST's resistance also draws our attention to the need for a different causal 
account. The dominant school of social movement theory – Political Process Theory – 
and its major concept – Political Opportunity Structure – focus on protest cycle origins.11 
The focus in this theory is on disruptive, demand-making actions, and their changes over 
time. Centering research on elite allies, general governmental attributes like facilitation or 
repression, and pre-existing social networks, these theorists attempt to explain the 
preconditions for coordinated resistance. There are many other works on social 
movements, including in-depth studies on culture and emotions,
12
 organizations,
13
 as well 
                                                 
11 See McAdam, Doug, Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930-
1970. University of Chicago Press (2010). Tarrow, Sidney, Power in movement: Social 
movements, collective action and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(1994). 
12 See Johnston, Hank, and Bert Klandermans, eds. Social movements and culture. Vol. 4. 
U of Minnesota Press (1995). Alvarez, Sonia E., Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar, 
eds. Cultures of politics/politics of cultures: re-visioning Latin American social 
movements. Boulder, CO: Westview Press (1998). Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, 
and Francesca Polletta, eds. Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements. 
University of Chicago Press (2009). 
13 See Zald, Mayer N., and John D. McCarthy. "Social movement industries: Competition 
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as research on language or “frames.14” Most of these studies reveal new concepts and 
themes to complement the formal, government-centered approach found in Political 
Process Theory. 
One concept omitted from much research is strategy. Many existing studies poorly 
explore and apply it to social movement resistance. Jaspers (2006) and Maney, et al (2012) 
emphasize a focus on social context, time, culture, goals, emotions, dilemmas, symbols, 
and interactions. Rational choice theorists (Lichbach: 1995) and game theorists (Osborne: 
2000; Binmore: 2007) avoid this wide ranging set of factors by focusing on individual 
actors and utility maximization. My approach attempts to forge a third, middle-way 
between the former studies' seemingly endless range of concepts and the rationalist's 
narrow reductionism. My intention is to provide a way to conceive of strategy that is rich 
and dense, while allowing for measurement and analysis. 
My thinking concerning strategy originates from my experiences with the MST. 
Reading through movement documents with titles like “como se organizam os assentados 
(how to organize settlers),” and “o que escola queremos (what kind of school we want),” 
made me realize that the movement leadership spent decades formulating plans. They 
created documents intended, primarily, for other movement leaders and members to read 
and study. The documents show a concern over how to organize members, assign roles, 
and search out allies. An early document – “quem é quem na luta pela terra (who is who 
                                                                                                                                                 
and cooperation among movement organizations." (1979). Davis, Gerald F., ed. Social 
movements and organization theory. Cambridge University Press (2005). 
14 Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. "Framing processes and social movements: An 
overview and assessment." Annual review of sociology (2000): 611-639. Oliver, 
Pamela E., and Hank Johnston. "What a good idea! Ideologies and frames in social 
movement research." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 5, no. 1 (2000): 37-54. 
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in the struggle for land)” – elaborates on who are the subjects in the struggle for agrarian 
reform and what are their roles and attributes, as well as the reasons for the struggle. 
Within that document and others, tactics, objectives, plans, and identities are described 
and explored. 
We can locate within these documents the central elements that constitute my 
understanding of strategy. I define strategy as a guiding plan that temporally and logically 
precedes all actions. The plan contains a movement's objectives and the ways to engage 
with targets and allies as well as the movement's own self-understanding or identity 
through which it inculcates the reasons for engaging in collective action. Strategy is about 
plans to mobilize people, ideas, and resources. Especially with respect to resources, it is 
only with an understanding of a movement's strategic orientation that we can discern the 
role that resources play in social movement contention. For example, land and credits are 
resources for the MST, not because of some kind of innate “resource-ness” they embody, 
but because of the identity the movement inculcates into its membership. People are 
taught that they are “landless workers” who deserve land and public policies. The way 
people see themselves and their targets are mobilized through the movement's work on 
creating, promoting, and teaching certain kinds of identity. 
Personally, I find strategy interesting. But after obtaining various “cadernos 
(notebooks),” I was surprised to find discussions of the concept quite boring. Indeed, they 
read like cookbooks. Twenty pages of classroom organization and lesson planning on 
how to teach Portuguese, Math, Spanish, and other subjects is the opposite of flashy, 
dramatic land occupations. I came to realize, however, that the two are intricately 
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connected. Or rather, without a plan, there is no action. The dull intricacies of classroom 
planning also contained a very radical idea: that the movement could organize education 
itself. This is part of what I came to realize as the MST's larger direct-action strategy. Yet 
they do not limit their plans to their own decision-making and implementation objectives. 
They also, concerning how to access materials and ideas, create plans to use, or what I 
describe as instrumentalize, governmental actors and resources. 
After surveying different strategic plans used by all three kinds of movements, I 
break social movement strategic action down into three subcategories: direct-action, 
mediated, and instrumental. I take standard uses of strategy, especially with respect to 
movement contention, as falling within one of these three broad camps. For example, I 
classify what some would call electoral strategies as mediated plans.  Forming coalitions 
and alliances is illustrative of instrumentalization. Orchestrated efforts for taking state 
power are also one example of what I call direct-action strategic planning. The tactics that 
originate from these strategies is mutable and can change, above all because each of these 
three subcategories includes various modes of interacting with targets and allies. 
What drives movements to change between general subcategories is largely 
outside the scope of this dissertation, even though I focus on some aspects of change with 
respect to the MST in the conclusion of each chapter and in the final chapter. Also, 
because my conceptualization is so encompassing, non-strategic action is next to 
impossible to conceive. For a movement to act without regard to identity or plans is 
tantamount to chaos, or spontaneity, which actually would lead us to conclude that what 
we are observing is not a movement. It is for this reason that I believe my theory of 
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strategy potentially applies to all forms of collective action. Given space and time 
constraints, I only focus on self-governmental resistance. 
My intention is to provide a way to conceive of strategy that is rich and dense, 
while allowing for measurement and analysis. I prove over the course of this dissertation 
that the main causal explanation for self-governmental resistance is strategic planning. 
More than contextual factors such as elite allies and state capacity, the strength of 
strategic plans – which contain the elements of coherence, consistency, and preparation 
that I measure and take as my independent variables – explain both the kinds of 
institutionalized resistance we see and their levels of success. This dissertation's 
subsequent chapters are dedicated to exploring how strategic planning, more than other 
explanations, leads to successful self-governmental contention. My theory concerning 
strategy, furthermore, potentially applies to all kinds of movements. An application of my 
theory of strategy to the other modes of institutionalizing resistance – reform and 
revolutionary – is the concern of the dissertation's conclusion, where I dissect strategy's 
explanatory potential with respect to movements such as the Zapatistas, the Sandinistas, 
and recent indigenous mobilizations in Ecuador and Bolivia. 
My study of the MST shows how their particular strategic combination – direct-
action and instrumentalization – is new. In fact, as I show in each chapter, this has been 
learned by the movement's leaders who perceived weaknesses, failures, and successes in 
past movements. In the case of the MST, movement leaders researched and interviewed 
leaders of prior agrarian reform movements (Stédile and Fernandes: 1999). This means 
that strategy is situated in a historical context that changes over time. It also means that 
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what explains the specificity of these struggles to Latin America is not neoliberal 
adjustment or state strength – contextual factors – but rather historically contingent 
strategic plans. In this dissertation, I prove how strategic planning – specifically for the 
MST, a combination of direct-action and instrumental plans – led to different levels of 
self-governmental resistance. Tilly's discussion of the modular nature of collective action 
that focuses on how the knowledge of tactics such as sit-ins and strikes can travel from 
country to country, or movement to movement, shows the transferable nature of tactics, 
but not strategy (2004). Strategy, especially because it involves identities and ways of 
engaging targets that previous actors also confronted, e.g. large landowners or 
government, is far more grounded in country and/or region-specific contexts. After all, 
the U.S. Civil Rights Movement does not carry nearly the same weight for the MST as do 
the Peasant Leagues or the Cuban Revolution. 
While all theorists recognize that social movements are not riots or mobs, 
specifically because they are not “spontaneous,” they do not tell us much concerning how 
to think about social movement resistance that is “non-spontaneous.” I chose the concept 
of institutionalization because a social movement's resistance creates sets of rules, 
procedures, and modes of identification, which extend beyond any particular organization 
or protest. It is the nature of strategy and its strength that causes movement success in 
institutionalization because action requires planning. If movements are in fact 
coordinated, and persistent, they demand well-formulated plans of action. This is the 
rationale for my use of institutionalization and strategy in this dissertation. 
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1.3 My Case Study Approach 
I adopt the case study approach throughout this dissertation, as well as qualitative 
methodology, given the thick concepts and new practices of resistance I explore. My 
project deals with concepts that Political Science as a discipline has spent relatively little 
time, especially of late, exploring. In particular, I am referring to private property, the 
state, government, and resistance. They are what could perhaps be referred to as 
“contentious” concepts, for the fact that there is no definitive definition that is readily 
accepted by everyone in the discipline. They also are difficult to measure and dense in 
terms of meaning. To develop their meaning and implications in any study requires 
adequate and ample attention that quantitative, more statistical research, bypasses. 
My use of the case study method is meant to develop and explain a new mode of 
contention – self-governmental resistance. The case study and qualitative methods in 
general grant social science access to such new developments, allowing us the 
opportunity to pick apart their meanings, test existing theories against them, and develop 
tentative hypotheses. In fact, only qualitative methods and case studies allow us to get 
close to innovative dynamics and empirics. There is no material for research in Political 
Science without someone doing the work, which means representing and finding the data, 
often with living people in the field. 
The way I design each chapter also warrants a brief description. Besides the 
elaboration of my theory and concepts in the next chapter, as well as the comparative 
focus of the conclusion, each subsequent chapter follows the same structure. Specifically, 
after providing a simple introduction in the first couple pages, the second part of each 
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empirical chapter focuses on the dynamics of state power, private property, and each 
individual policy area. This section is followed by a generalized description of the MST's 
institutionalized resistance with respect to each policy area. I write this section with the 
goal of presenting the general contours of the movement's project. In that section, I do not 
explain the causes or evaluate the movement's success. The last section in each chapter 
features explanation and evaluation. Also, both the third and fourth sections feature a 
discussion of identity. The difference is that in the third section, I discuss the movement's 
intended form of identification promoted in their strategic plans, while in the fourth 
section of each chapter, I evaluate how their efforts actually play out. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND CASE SELECTION 
 
The Paradox of Social Movement Resistance 
 
In emphasizing the ways that movements destabilize through collective actions 
such as marches, sit-ins, and traffic blockades, observers and most academics (McAdam: 
1996; Tilly: 2004; Snow, et al: 2008) fail to acknowledge the centrality of order-creating 
activities in social movement resistance. Noticing order where others see only disorder, 
Tarrow claims that movements like the United States Civil Rights Movement 
“institutionalized” contention that challenged the already-existing social, political, and 
economic order of segregation. For example, in networks of allies, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and churches, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States 
systematized demand-making modes of conduct expressed in lobbying efforts, legislative 
changes, and protest. In developing stability through regularizing resistance to state 
power and promoting integration and equality, the movement, simultaneously, led a 
destabilizing campaign, e.g., from the standpoint of status quo authorities. For Tarrow, in 
what he calls the “paradox of disruptive resistance,” such practices show how movements 
regularize action in an oppositional, alternative kind of order (1998). Put another way: 
social movements simultaneously construct and deconstruct order in institutionalizing 
resistance.
15
 
Despite this insight, Tarrow, like other social movement scholars, under-develops 
the nature of state power and collective action. He neglects an extended discussion of 
                                                 
15 Riots and wartime desertions (Scott, 1990), also count as resistance, but not of the 
social movement variety. Although collective, these lack relatively consistent order or 
stability. 
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different kinds of social movement resistance and how they respectively contest formal, 
dominant authorities. Theorists that recognize continuity, define movement contention as 
“episodic,” rather than “sporadic,” with “government as a claimant (Aminzade, et al: 
2001; McAdam, et al: 2001).” While drawing our attention to how movement contention 
involves “government,” they mistakenly conflate it with “the state.” And without 
differentiating the nature of the resistance to and involvement with such central elements 
of social movement studies, government and state remain inadequately explored in the 
academic literature.
 
 
This dissertation fills this lacuna concerning state, government, and social 
movements by making three points. First, after describing two kinds of resistance – 
reformist and revolutionary – I elaborate on the nature of a third, new form represented 
by various Latin American social movements such as the Zapatistas in southern Mexico, 
indigenous groups in the Andes, and the Landless Workers' Movement (MST) in Brazil. I 
call the third mode self-governmental, defined as the continuous opposition to state 
power and private property through institutionalizing movement control over certain 
policy areas within which members cultivate a movement-centered mode of identification. 
In a case study of the MST, I take Tarrow's initial discussion of institutionalization, 
deepening the concept's application with respect to this previously unexplored form of 
resistance.
16
 Second, I show how self-governmental resistance challenges theorists' over-
                                                 
16 I disagree with a prominent use in social movement studies (e.g. Piven and Cloward: 
1979; McCarthy and Zald: 1977) that takes institutionalization to mean pacification. 
My use of the concept of institutions comes from the idea that all institutions share 
common defining qualities, like general rules and procedures that constrain, enable, 
and regularize action (e.g. North: 1990 or Helmke and Levitsky: 2004). I see no reason 
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simplified understandings of state power and government. I differentiate state power from 
government to develop both for future research. Third, I formulate a theory, rooted in an 
understanding of strategy, to explain the successful institutionalization of self-
governmental resistance. I test this theory against rivals in each of this dissertation's 
chapters. Self-governmental resistance, I show, is special to Latin American struggles 
because movements have learned strategic orientations from prior movements in their 
respective countries and/or the region. 
This dissertation illustrates the nature of self-governmental social movement 
resistance through a case study of the MST. I document the movement's alternative, 
oppositional manner of governing members – specifically by contesting private property 
and state power – in the policy areas of agrarian reform, education, and agricultural 
production. My case study is driven by the following question: how can a social 
movement successfully develop a self-governmental mode of institutionalizing resistance? 
 
2.1 The State, Private Property, and Strategy in Self-Governmental Resistance 
Self-governmental resistance draws our attention to the different meanings of 
state, government, and governance. Theories of state power, in Political Science and 
social movement theory, have been abandoned to institutional studies that isolate 
governmental units such as individual bureaucracies or that focus on general attributes 
like repression or facilitation.
17
 My focus on state power comes from a belief that as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
why regularization automatically entails conservative trends. 
17 For institutionalist studies, see Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast, eds. 
Positive theories of congressional institutions. University of Michigan Press (1995). 
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discipline we “have thrown the baby out with the bath water.” Or in other words, that in 
the turn to government and institutions, we have neglected the state, the nature of its 
power, and how resistance develops with respect to it. Skocpol's concern in the mid-
1980s that Marxist theorists attribute overly general qualities to the state is premised on 
the idea of states as territorial units, like we see them on a map (1985). How I understand 
the state relaxes abstract territoriality, focusing on certain kinds of power. 
To understand state power, and just as importantly, to give us a way to conceive of 
it as distinct from government, I turn to James Scott. In Seeing Like a State, Scott walks 
us through various “experiments,” from urban planning to the giving of last names, 
revealing a bundle of powers that together form the state (1998). I specify them as the 
centralization of decision-making authority, homogenization of cultures, and 
subordination of social actors to governmental elites in a hierarchical administrative 
division of labor. Centralization, while similar to subordination, differs in so far as it 
entails a tendency to decrease the number of decision-makers and concentrate executive 
power, e.g. locating the power to expropriate land ultimately in the hands of a president. 
Subordination focuses on roles, or rather, how state power rests on establishing stark 
distinctions – state and society, public and private – that immediately situates certain 
actors in a passive role, e.g. police as representative of legitimate coercion versus citizens 
who lack this capacity. Homogenization involves the promotion of a singular, unified 
mode of identification, usually through encouraging certain practices, e.g. creating 
nationalism through the pledge of allegiance. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Tilly, Charles, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. War 
making and state making as organized crime. Cambridge University Press (1985). 
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When discussing the state, we are really referring to the co-existence of these 
different powers. And we – as researchers, policy-makers, and citizens – produce unity in 
speaking of the state as if it were cohesive and singular. In fact, there is no “the” state, as 
no empirical entity “is” it. Anything can “perform state” – centralize decision-making, 
homogenize culture, and create unequal administrative roles, e.g. a king, a republic, or 
even the mafia or a social movement.
18
 Government differs because it refers to concrete 
units and organizations that make decisions concerning how to provide order. 
Governments make decisions, states do not. They represent state power and govern in 
accordance with it. The ways that order is provided – including the design of policies and 
the modes of implementation – is governance.19 Because governance involves “providing 
order,” any actor, e.g. a movement, a business, etc., may govern in accordance with state 
power, or against it. Governance is not always exercised by government. 
Social movement self-governmental contention calls our attention to these 
                                                 
18 On the difference between state and government, see Nettl, John P. 'The state as a 
conceptual variable.' World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations 
(1968): 559-592. On state power see Mitchell, Timothy. 'Society, economy and the 
state effect.' The anthropology of the state: A reader 9 (2006): 169. Foucault, Michel, 
Michel Senellart, and François Ewald, eds. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at 
the College de France 1977--1978. Vol. 4. Macmillan (2009). Foucault, Michel, 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. The Foucault effect: Studies in 
governmentality. University of Chicago Press (1991). 
19 Scholars of governance note the centrality of decision-making to the concept. Rosenau 
defines the term as control and steering mechanisms (1995). Schmitter discusses 
governance in his study of the European Union as rule-setting and decision 
implementation (2000), while others include public good provision (Ronit and 
Schneider 1999, Pathberg 2004, Bevir 2007). Theorists of participatory democracy 
emphasize governance in light of decentralized collective decision-making (Arvitzer 
2006, Wampler 2007). 
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conceptual differentiations. In providing order for its members – as well as discipline20 – 
movements like the MST contest private property, governing in ways that challenge state 
power and the Brazilian government. This mode of governance differs from others, e.g. 
corporate, state, etc. It also illustrates a form of institutionalizing resistance that differs 
from reform and revolution. The movements that exemplify self-governmental contention 
replace the state/society division with movement-led administration within certain 
services. In their opposition to state power in certain policy areas, self-governmental 
movements institutionalize resistance by decentralizing decision-making authority, 
equalizing administrative roles, and enabling the expression of local and regional 
movement member needs and beliefs. Reform-style movements desire inclusion into state 
power, revolutionary movements want to occupy it, and self-governmental movements, 
divide it. Each chapter in this dissertation analyzes and explains how the MST 
institutionalizes self-governmental contention, in varying levels of success in different 
policy areas. 
As summarized in the table below, movements vary according to their relationship 
with state power and private property. Revolutionary and self-governmental movements 
both challenge private property, while reformist movements leave it unaltered or demand 
                                                 
20 This could be considered a form of governmentality, borrowing Foucault's terminology. 
As far as I know, however, Foucault never equated the term with resistance. Appadurai 
does attempt this, yet under-specifies the dynamics of “governmentality from below” 
and how it comprises a distinct form of movement contention. For governmentality, 
see Foucault, Michel, Michel Senellart, and François Ewald, eds. Security, Territory, 
Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978. Vol. 4. Macmillan (2009). 
Foucault, Michel, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. The 
Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality. University of Chicago Press (1991). 
Appadurai, Arjun. "Deep democracy: urban governmentality and the horizon of 
politics." Environment and Urbanization 13, no. 2 (2001): 23-43. 
  
37 
it. Also, reform and revolutionary resistance both initially confront, yet, as I discuss later 
in this chapter, reproduce, state power. Self-governmental movements, however, 
consistently challenge state power as well as private property. Like revolutionary 
movements, self-governmental struggles challenge private property by demanding and 
exercising cooperative ownership and administration of resources, e.g. in land use and 
economic production. They also contest state power in their struggle to control particular 
services, e.g. education, rather than claim state power overall, like revolutionary 
movements. 
Table 1: Kinds of Movements, Defining Qualities, and Examples 
Kind Reform Revolutionary Self-Governmental 
Definition Initially challenges 
state power, yet later 
reproduces it. Seeks 
inclusion and 
incorporation into 
government. Ignores 
or promotes private 
property. 
Initially challenges state 
power, yet later reproduces it. 
Seeks parallel governments 
and excludes already-existing 
ones. Demands and abolishes 
private property. 
Continuously challenges state 
power. Governs particular services 
and does not desire a dual 
government. Demands and 
abolishes private property. 
Examples United States Civil 
Rights Movement, 
LGBT Movement, 
Environmental 
Movements, Anti-
Nuclear Movement. 
(Late) Confederación 
Identidades Indigenas 
de Ecuador 
(Confederation of 
Indigenous Identities 
of Ecuador or 
CONAIE), Cocalereo-
MAS. 
Bolsheviks, Early 20
th
 
Century Fascists (e.g. Italian 
and German), Sendero 
Luminoso (Shining Path), 
July 26
th
 Movement, 
Sandinistas. 
MST, Rondas Campesinas (Peasant 
Leagues), Zapatistas, Piqueteros, 
(Early) Confederación Identidades 
Indigenas de Ecuador 
(Confederation of Indigenous 
Identities of Ecuador or CONAIE). 
 
The “self” in self-governmental resistance comes from movement efforts to 
localize needs, beliefs, and practices. The MST, the best case of self-governmental 
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contention, makes constant efforts to create a uniform movement identity through 
symbols, songs, and rituals. The identity promoted by the movement acts as a bulwark 
against identifying with state-promoted forms of identification, separating the movement 
from state forms of order and governance. Like Wolford's recent work that shows how 
multiple identities coexist within the MST (2010), I also find diversity in movement 
identification across the policy areas where the MST mobilizes its members. My analysis 
differs, because I locate identity creation as a contributing factor – or proximate cause – 
in my theory of strategic action. As I will discuss later, identities are derived from 
different strategies, which ultimately cause successful movement institutionalization. The 
identities cultivated in self-governmental resistance, unlike state-centered versions 
displayed in reform and revolutionary contention, remain grounded in opposing state 
forms of control and identification. 
To explain the dependent variable – successful self-governmental 
institutionalization – I develop a theory rooted in strategy. In this dissertation, I consider 
the MST a “pathway case study (Gerring: 2007),” meaning that I generate and test 
hypotheses for my theory to indicate “paths” for future research. The conclusion of this 
dissertation, through preliminary comparisons between revolutionary, reform, and other 
self-governmental movements, reveals some of these future paths. In my theory, I break 
strategy into two components that I measure and treat as independent variables: (1) the 
level of consistently iterated and coherently formulated movement objectives and (2) 
level of preparation of knowledge, or “know-how,” concerning targets and action. I 
measure the strength of these two components within three subcategories of strategic 
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action – direct-action, mediated, and instrumental. As I further discuss later in this 
chapter, the three modes of institutionalizing resistance result from different strategic 
combinations, e.g. instrumental with direct-action strategies lead to self-governmental 
movements, direct-action with low levels of mediation strategies lead to revolutionary 
resistance, and mediation and direct-action strategies, shifting to mediation, lead to 
reform-style contention. Successful institutionalization depends on the level of strength of 
the components in each sub-category and the coherence of movement-centered identities. 
The table below highlights the effects of strategic strength on the institutionalization of 
resistance, listing the kinds of movements according to the three strategic combinations. 
Table 2: Strategic Components, their Effects, and Combinations 
Strategic 
Components 
Effect of Component Strength on Level of 
Institutionalization 
Strategic Combinations and Kind 
of Movement Institutionalization 
Consistency 
and Coherence 
of Objectives 
A consistent iteration of movement objectives to 
movement members and opponents solidifies 
movement goals and identity. Rules and 
procedures can thus be communicated with greater 
ease because of common themes. Coherent 
elaboration of objectives in plans makes goals and 
opponents easy to understand for leaders and 
members, facilitating the regularization of action. 
The combination of mediated 
strategies with direct-action, and 
the tendency to shift towards 
mediation, leads to reform-style 
movements. 
The combination of instrumental 
strategies with direct-action, leads 
to self-governmental movements. 
Preparation of 
Knowledge 
High levels of preparation and knowledge 
acquisition assist movements to create plans on 
how to implement objectives and promote their 
self identity. Strong plan preparation allows the 
movement to acquire knowledge of opponent's 
strengths and weaknesses, facilitating successful 
interaction between movements, targets, and allies. 
The combination of mediated 
strategies with direct-action, as 
well as the tendency to shift 
towards direct-action, leads to 
revolutionary movements. 
 
Strategic components qualify as independent variables existing apart from 
movement actions. I define strategy as a guiding plan that temporally and logically 
precedes all actions. It contains a movement's objectives, ways to engage targets and 
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allies, and own self-understanding, or identity. Strategy is about plans to mobilize people, 
ideas, and resources. In my project, I divide the wide-ranging examples of “resources” as 
used in Resource Mobilization Theory (Edwards and McCarthy: 2008) between my 
independent and dependent variables. For example, elements such as materials, identity, 
and knowledge fall into how I understand strategy, while organizational form and 
structure are better conceived of as components of institutionalization. 
Strategy exists logically and temporally prior to resistance, given that no action 
springs spontaneously from contextual factors like state strength, elites, or the economy. 
Resources, both in their ideational and material forms, are only intelligible through 
movement-centered identities and strategic orientation. This characterization establishes 
the independence of strategy and its parts – coherence, consistency, and preparation – 
from their causal effects – institutionalization, or self-governmental institutionalization, 
the particular focus of this dissertation. The learned nature of strategy, as well as its 
connection to identity, entails an understanding of the concept that is historical and 
contextual. Also, this theory potentially applies to all movements. My pathway case study 
of the MST allows me to fine tune the concepts and mechanisms at work in this theory 
through applying it to the best-fitting case. 
How do self-governmental movements continuously contest state power while 
others reproduce it? Why do some movements confront private property and others 
ignore it? What makes movements like the Zapatistas and the Bolsheviks different in 
certain respects yet similar in others? Could movements, such as the U.S. Civil Rights 
Movement, have developed like Castro's July 26
th
 Movement? In this dissertation, I 
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answer these questions by describing the self-governmental mode of institutionalizing 
social movement resistance, explaining the nature of state power, and developing a theory 
of strategy to explain successful institutionalization. I use a case study of the Brazilian 
MST to develop my theory and concepts. 
My theory explores the explanatory potential of agency by analyzing different 
subcategories of strategy – direct-action, mediated, and instrumental – and the strength of 
certain components – coherence, consistency, and preparation. Selecting on the 
dependent variable in choosing the MST allows me to conceptually deepen the meaning 
of self-governmental resistance. I document the MST's efforts in institutionalizing 
resistance in three policy areas – agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production 
– that constitute this dissertation's subsequent chapters. Observing the movement's efforts 
in these areas shows variation in success. Explaining variation allows for the opportunity 
to measure the effect of my independent variables within my case and develop my theory 
for application to other movements. 
 
2.2 State Power as Problem for Movements and the Self-Governmental Answer 
We can derive from existing studies on social movement resistance two modes of 
institutionalization – reformist and revolutionary. Some scholars focus on forms of 
resistance similar to the United States Civil Rights Movement in groups such as the Pro-
Choice and Welfare Rights Movements (Piven and Cloward: 1977; Staggenborg: 1988). 
Kriesi, et al. deepen our understanding of reformist contention, describing it as conflict 
through “established procedures,” where groups “are integrated into political networks in 
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the administrative and the parliamentary arenas ... abandon[ing] the challenging of 
authorities by unconventional means (1995, 6).” Standardized, institutionalized 
“procedures” leave state power in tact. In fact, resistance is for inclusion through 
organizing, for example, voter registration efforts complimented by direct-action tactics 
like demonstrations and marches. Reformist movements challenge state power and 
governments, influencing the latter to include marginalized actors and practices into their 
dynamics. Contesting private property does not occur – the sit-ins of the Civil Rights 
Movement sought to assure that everyone had access, i.e. have a seat at the counter. Even 
movements organized during transitional periods, e.g. the pro-democracy movement 
during the fall of the Soviet Union, pushed for the embrace, not prohibition, of private 
property. 
The nature of resistance in revolutionary contention institutionalizes differently. 
This second mode of collective action includes practices such as promoting proto-tax 
systems, public goods administration, as well as exercising territorial and population 
control at the expense of already-existing governmental authority. Tilly considers such 
practices constitutive of multiple poles of sovereignty, or parallel governance, which are 
integral to “revolutionary situations (1978).21” Unlike reform, this form of resistance 
demands and/or abolishes private property through, for example, promoting extensive 
land redistribution efforts and forming democratically managed production cooperatives. 
Revolutionary movements differ from their reformist counterparts by institutionalizing 
                                                 
21 Examples include worker councils of the Russian and early twentieth century German 
revolutions that arose independent of and in opposition to their governments (Sirianni: 
1983). 
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rules that divide and exclude – rather than integrate with – governments that wield state 
power. They initially pose a counter-order in opposition to state power. Revolutionary 
movements take state power and wield it. 
Comparing these two modes of resistance reveals one shared problem: the 
reproduction of state power. Reform-style movements, from the current environmental 
movement to the anti-nuclear movement, challenged state power without contesting its 
defining elements – centralization, homogeneity, and social subordination. Revolutionary 
movements differ because of their focus on establishing dual power and governance. Yet, 
they too reproduce state power through demanding and centralizing decision-making 
authority in some actor like a political party that arrogates power over policy, 
subordinating non-party actors in an unequal administrative division of labor, and 
promoting singular, or homogenizing, modes of identification and culture. 
Reproducing state power does not mean that reform and revolutionary struggles 
fail their members; social, political, and economic changes have occurred in terms of 
policy, access to material goods, as well as empowerment. The problem is that 
governments have used state power to exclude actors from administrative roles, decision-
making authority, and alternative cultural practices. By reproducing state power, reform 
and revolutionary actors betray general principles of equality, close pathways to form 
alternative modes of identification, and allow for status quo, decision-making procedures 
to persist. Both reform and revolutionary modes of movement contention have led 
struggles that contradict their central reasons for resistance. Centralizing authority, 
homogenizing cultural practices, and establishing unequal administrative roles constitutes 
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state power as exercised by governments. They also reappear in reform and revolutionary 
resistance. 
In this dissertation, I identify how the institutionalization of self-governmental 
resistance defies classification as either reformist or revolutionary by consistently 
challenging both the institution of private property and the exercise of state power. Such 
movements, with the Brazilian MST as the best case, challenge the state-form of 
governance by developing and implementing alternative rules and procedures that enable 
and constrain, i.e. institutionalize, member conduct against the central elements of state 
power. Self-governmental resistance builds “publics” not a singular “public,” vying for 
control of certain areas or policies. To challenge the state form of governance within 
particular policy areas, self-governance institutionalizes the qualities of decentralization, 
heterogeneity, and equality in service provision. 
Consider the MST's resistance in education. By documenting best practices and 
writing tomes for dissemination in regularly held movement-led training seminars, 
“dialogue” exceeds a random conversation between two people; an institution is born 
when, as a regularly established procedure, MST teachers learn to refuse to refer to 
students as “alunos22” but as “educandos” when teaching about the movement's history 
through songs and rituals. Rooting decision-making for educational policy design and 
implementation in equality occurs by accessing local knowledges and needs, as well as 
                                                 
22 I was told by one movement teacher how “alumno,” often used to refer to students in 
non-MST schools, is derived from Latin and means “without light.” This presupposes 
that the teacher, or expert, “gives light,” or knowledge, to the student. To counter this 
hierarchy and create equality, the movement refers to students as “educandos” and 
teachers as “educadores.” 
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sharing experiences through dialogue with students. Focusing on shared, lived 
experiences focuses on diverse, local conditions, institutionalizing heterogeneous – not 
homogenous – cultural practices. An educational, “one-size fits all system” is not 
imposed on movement students. Implementation by “nucleos (small groups),” in each 
school assures decentralized decision-making procedures that involve teachers, students, 
and parents. If students fail, they repeat grades or take supplemental classes to discipline 
inadequate performance. Teachers individually assess and monitor student performance 
in “pareceres (opinions)”, to evaluate their progress against movement goals found in 
each school's “Projeto Político Pedagógico (Pedagogical Policy Plan).” 
State educational policy cultivates a singular cultural form of national identity, 
centralizes decisions over curriculum, and subordinates social actors to government. In 
Brazil, pedagogical guidelines and requirements are centralized by state and federal 
institutions, with little to no involvement of students in exercising decision-making 
authority. In the past and currently, dual instruction – known in Portuguese as “sistema 
dual de ensino” – privileged urban over rural areas in terms of resources and pedagogy 
(Nagel: 2001; MEC: 2010). In the early 20
th
 century, a national curriculum was forced 
through the country, resulting in school closings where instruction was in languages other 
than Portuguese (de Souza: 2008). Despite the decentralizing impetus of the 1996 Lei de 
Diretrizes de Base (Law of Basic Directives or LBD), national instruction remains 
promoted in Article 26.
23
 The LBD recognizes rural education – where the MST inserts 
                                                 
23 Article 26: “Curriculum for elementary and secondary education must have a common 
national base that will be completed in each system and place of instruction. This 
national common base, at completion, in each system and place of instruction, may 
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its project – as “distinct” and “particular,” yet requires that it “complements” dominant 
norms. Chapter 4 in this dissertation further details the nature of the MST's educational 
resistance. This comparison outlines how the MST's project opposes the Brazilian 
government's version delivered via state power. The table lays out the central differences 
between the kind of governance institutionalized by movements and governments. 
Table 3: Modes of Institutionalizing Governance: State v. Self-Governmental 
Movements 
 
State Self-Governmental Movements 
Centralizes Decision-making Authority in Unitary 
Institutions 
Decentralizing Decision-making Authority by 
Incorporating New Actors 
Homogenizes Culture through Promoting Singular 
Modes of Identification and a Unified Public. 
Creates Heterogeneous Publics and Encourages 
Local and Regional Modes of Identification and 
Conduct 
Establishes an Unequal Administrative Division of 
Labor, with Governmental Elites Endowed with 
Policy Decision-making Prerogative and Executive 
Power 
Equalizes Roles and Endows Social Actors with 
Executive Decision-making Ability concerning 
Policy Design and Administration 
 
Self-governmental resistance directly challenges the state manner of service 
implementation, design, and execution. While every kind of social movement confronts 
state power, they do so in different ways: reformist movements improve it, revolutionary 
groups occupy it, and self-governmental movements divide it, vying for the control of 
certain policy areas. What sets self-governmental actors apart from reformist and 
revolutionary movements is their institutionalization of resistance according to an 
alternative mode of conduct in policies usually executed by their respective governments. 
They regularize practices that oppose centralized authority, the homogenization of 
                                                                                                                                                 
allow for a diversified part, given regional and local social qualities, particularly 
dealing with culture, economy and client.” For more on the history of rural education, 
see Edla Soares, Parecer 36/2001. 
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cultural practices, and instantiation of unequal role relations. They also directly confront 
private property by creating rules and procedures that emphasize redistribution and 
collective, cooperative management. 
 
2.3 Strategy as Explanation for Movement Institutionalization 
Academic studies and common perceptions of movements tend to focus on their 
disruptive acts like protests and demonstrations, neglecting the systematized rules and 
practices constitutive of their resistance. Tarrow draws our attention to how social 
movement resistance is the simultaneous construction and deconstruction of order by 
institutionalizing opposition to state power as exercised by their respective governments. 
Prior studies divide movements that confront Tarrow's paradox into two camps – 
revolutionary and reformist. In this dissertation, I analyze and explain the development of 
a third kind – self-governmental. 
The rationale for conducting a case study of the MST is meant to test an often 
neglected concept in social movement theory – strategy. My case study is a version of the 
crucial case study method, what Gerring specifies as a “pathway case study (2007).24” I 
clarify the effect of strategy by focusing on how variation in my outcome – successful 
self-governmental institutionalization in agrarian reform, education, and agricultural 
production policies – is dependent on change in my independent variables – consistent 
and coherently elaborated objectives and knowledge preparation. As I show later in this 
                                                 
24 “[When] we have reason to presume that a causal factor of interest is strongly 
associated with an outcome, holding other factors constant ... a crucial case serves not 
to confirm or disconfirm a causal hypothesis (because that hypothesis is already well 
established) but rather to clarify a hypothesis (Gerring: 2007, 238).” 
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chapter, existing social movement theories fail to account for the successful 
institutionalization of self-governmental resistance. This problem leads me to elaborate a 
new theory. 
In this section, I explain how the three modes of institutionalizing resistance result 
from the combination of different subcategories – direct-action, instrumental, and 
mediated. The different kinds of movements – reform, revolutionary, and self-
governmental – result from distinct combinations of these subcategories. The components 
of knowledge preparation and coherently and consistently setting objectives are included 
in each of the three subcategories. In this section, I lay out the reasoning behind how 
different combinations in variable magnitudes or strengths explain successful movement 
institutionalization rather than contextual factors such as state strength, neoliberal 
adjustment, or elite allies. 
Strategies are historical and learned. For example, MST leaders researched past 
agrarian reform movements in Brazil, as well as prior movements and organizations from 
Cuba to Israel (Fernandes and Stedile: 1999; MST: 2001). Similarly, Zapatista leaders in 
southern Mexico received training from Catholic Church allies and Maoist organizers, 
learning from theories and past struggles in adapting them (Harvey: 1998; Barmeyer: 
2003). Like Tilly's “repertories of contention (2004),” strategies are “modular” or 
adaptable. Unlike repertoires, strategies have historical and contextual roots that make 
learning, adapting, and altering slower. Tilly's theory of tactics is time-less; my concept 
of strategy is historically-embedded. The role I assign to leaders is similar to Popkin's 
understanding of “political entrepreneurs (1979),” yet differs because ways to provide 
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incentives are learned from prior struggles. 
The origins of strategies explain the “newness” of self-governmental resistance, 
specifically in Latin America. Movements such as the MST have drawn on, changed, and 
developed prior forms of struggle to avoid past problems. For instance, one reason why 
we see a lack of revolutionary movements currently can be explained by contemporary 
movements adopting a strategic shift away from armed struggle. In fact, in one discussion 
with an MST leader in the national direction, I was told how the “classic, old style of 
agrarian reform cannot happen today as it occurred in the past” (Interview: MST Sector 
of Production, 11-8-2010). This “old style” of agrarian reform is a reference to Cuba, 
where a movement sought power and executed the mass redistribution of land through 
raising arms against the government. “Objective conditions” for Marxists, or “political 
opportunities” for social movement theorists, does not explain such self-governmental 
movement development.  Even for revolutionary movements, strategy was key given that 
struggles often began in the worst possible situations, e.g. Castro's July 26
th
 Movement 
began with a dozen ship-wrecked militants. The cause for self-governmental resistance 
(and reason for a decline in revolutionary contention), lies more with the movements, and 
in particular, the strategic orientations decided upon by leaders and members. 
The rationale for selecting strategy as my explanation is rooted in the idea that 
action arises first from a guiding plan. Setting objectives temporally and logically 
precedes all actions.
25
 In reconstructing movement plans, we can locate their objectives, 
                                                 
25 My concept breaks from prior understandings – particularly rational choice and game 
theorists – who uniformly adopt the heuristic of individual utility maximization to 
predict behavior (Osborne: 2000; Binmore: 2007). I also specify more than Jaspers 
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their identities, as well as their knowledge concerning how to engage targets. Social 
movement resistance – in all its varieties – is sustained, not spontaneous, collective 
action. 
I identify three sub-categories of strategy – direct-action, mediated, and 
instrumental – which in certain combinations, lead to the institutionalization of reform, 
revolutionary, or self-governmental resistance. In direct-action strategies, movements 
craft their own objectives and lead resistance themselves, retaining decision-making 
autonomy concerning the collection and preparation of knowledge. Differing from direct-
action, mediated strategies require another actor other than the movement to implement 
objectives. The delegation of decision-making power to an outside, non-movement actor 
removes the burden of assembling people and resources to execute an objective, while at 
the same time, takes autonomy away from movements in terms of implementation. Like 
mediated strategies, instrumental strategies rely on outside actors. Unlike mediated 
strategies, however, movements do not delegate decision-making power. In this kind of 
strategy, movements locate actors that they use for their own objectives and who are 
indispensable to their plan. Partners may not support, or even oppose, the movement's 
ultimate goals. In instrumental strategies, movements navigate the ever-present agonistic 
quality of these relationships and the risk that the coalition falls apart. Design and 
decision-making resides with the movement, yet execution incorporates another actor. 
Sub-categories in certain combinations explain why we see different kinds of 
movement institutionalization. For example, reformist movements such as the pro-choice 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2006) and Maney, et al (2012), who focus on time, culture, goals, emotions, dilemmas, 
and interactions. 
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movement in the United States combine direct-action and mediated strategies in their 
organizing around Supreme Court cases (Staggenborg: 1991). This movement changed 
the exercise of state power in the United States by including a typically excluded group 
into the political process – women – and challenging the state's centralization of decision-
making concerning reproductive rights.
26
 Unlike reform-style movements and their shift 
to mediation, revolutionary and self-governmental contention shows a persistence of 
direct-action. Some movements, like Castro's July 26
th
 Movement and Peru's Sendero 
Luminoso (Shining Path), also sought to overthrow their respective governments and 
abolish private property. 
Self-governmental movements, as opposed to both reform and revolutionary 
resistance, combine instrumental strategies with direct-action while neglecting mediated 
strategies. The pursuit of these two kinds of strategies explains why they do not develop 
as reformist or revolutionary: revolutionary movements jettison instrumental strategies all 
together, and while reform movements establish partnerships and coalitions, they 
ultimately favor mediation. The Rondas Campesinas (Peasant Leagues), a self-
governmental example other than the MST, used certain ideas and acquired knowledge 
from the Peruvian government – specifically bureaucracy, hierarchy, and participatory 
democracy – to implement an alternative criminal justice system that resisted state power 
by equalizing access, decentralizing decision-making, and enabling the development of 
regional, local cultural practices (Starn: 1992). Their instrumentalist strategy was rooted 
in acquiring and using ideational resources combined with direct-action plans to 
                                                 
26 While direct-action persists in reformist movements, it gives way to mediated strategies 
through delegating decision-making to non-movement, often governmental, actors. 
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institutionalize a form of resistance that challenged the exercise of state power by the 
Peruvian government. Complementing their opposition to state power, they contest 
private property in cooperative, communal decision-making and administrating resources. 
We can visualize these different strategic combinations in a Venn diagram: 
Figure 1: Kinds of Social Movements and their Constitutive Strategies 
 
Each circle in the diagram represents a particular mode of institutionalizing 
resistance, which is constituted by different strategic combinations. Revolutionary 
movements abolish private property, initially challenge but ultimately reproduce state 
power, and engage primarily in direct-action strategies. They never follow instrumentalist 
strategies and only minimally plan mediation. Reformist movements contain all three 
kinds of strategies, despite gradually privileging mediation. Also, like revolutionary 
movements – but in different ways – reformist movements reproduce state power through 
seeking inclusion and leaving intact, or demanding the creation of, private property. 
Instrumental and direct-action strategies characterize self-governmental movements, 
which contest private property and state power through implementing alternatives that 
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oppose the centralization of authority, homogenization of culture, and establishment of 
unequal administrative roles. 
My theory of strategy is agentic and tells a causal story. This, however, does not 
mean that strategy is endogenous to my outcome – variation in successful 
institutionalization. Because strategy is rooted in a plan that precedes the manifestation of 
action, my independent variables of consistency, coherence, and preparation are separate 
from my outcome. 
 
2.4 Measurement and Hypotheses 
The strength of a movement's plans in each sub-category – direct-action, 
mediation, and instrumentalization – is measured according to the level of: (1) their 
preparation of knowledge and (2) the consistency and coherence of their objectives. The 
strength of a movement's identity, and the role it plays in promoting successful 
institutionalized resistance, is derivative of the strength of these independent variables. 
Consistently iterating objectives to movement members and opponents solidifies 
commitment to goals and identity. Such a formulation of strategic plans leads to similar 
qualities in a movement's identity, which facilitates rule creation. Also, a coherent 
elaboration of objectives in plans makes goals and opponents easy to understand for 
leaders and members, aiding the regularization of action by promoting a common identity. 
High levels of preparation and knowledge acquisition assists movements in the creation 
of plans detailing how to implement objectives. Strong preparation allows a movement to 
understand their own, and their opponents, strengths and weaknesses. 
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The indicators I select to measure preparation and coherence include the quality 
of time invested in pursuing objectives and the frequency that targets are mentioned by 
movement leaders and members in documents and interviews. The quality of time 
invested focuses on the content of specific iterations concerning a target or goal. 
Frequency is the number of times a target or goal is mentioned, without regard to content. 
Both more quality time spent on plans and higher frequency of iterations means higher 
strategic strength. The data I use to assess strategic strength comes from movement 
documents and texts, information from interviews conducted from two years of field 
research, and direct observations from participatory observation. 
Problems for my theory would occur if we were to see the institutionalization of 
social movement resistance, specifically of the self-governmental variety, without the 
central elements of strategic planning listed above. In particular, my theory would be 
compromised if sustained, successful movement action originated from plans where 
identities were poorly conceived or in conflict with one another, if objectives were not 
repeated often in plans, and/or if movements did not privilege coherence in formulating 
their objectives. Observing the institutionalization of movement resistance upon noting 
these issues with strategy would spell problems for how I conceive of the causal nature of 
strategic planning. In the same way, movement resistance ought not to spring from 
contextual factors such as the presence or absence of elite allies, variable levels of state 
strength, or changes in the economy. 
I use counter-factual analysis to evaluate my analysis of strategic strength. Given 
a small population of cases with multiple potential explanatory factors, reconstructing 
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alternative scenarios is necessary in qualitative research (Fearon: 1991). Throughout my 
case study of the MST, I test rival explanations against my theory of strategy, applying 
“what-if” scenarios concerning levels of strategic strength to assess if changes affect my 
dependent variable. For instance, if I measure low strategic strength in the development 
of a direct-action plan, I imagine what would have happened had the movement spent 
more time in acquiring knowledge, developing more consistent and coherent objectives, 
and/or forming elite alliances. I find that successful implementation of self-governance 
directly involves how MST leaders strategize in each policy area. Alternative 
explanations would propose that the development of resistance would occur according to 
variations in state strength, the presence/absence of elite allies, or the incentive structures 
provided by movement leaders. My use of counter-factual analysis disproves these other 
potential explanations, showing how strategy – specifically variation in strength – 
explains successful self-governmental resistance. 
From the indicators I select to measure strategic strength, I derive specific 
hypotheses. First, Hypothesis 1: Certain combinations of strategic action lead to 
different modes of movement institutionalization. This means that for self-governmental 
resistance, we will see direct-action and instrumental strategic planning without mediated 
strategies. If however, plans change, then the kind of movement concomitantly changes 
as well. I also stipulate that there will be various levels of successful institutionalization. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2: Increases in the iterations in movement plans of specific 
targets and goals, as well as in the time spent researching and documenting targets and 
goals, results in greater strategic strength and thus a higher potential for successful 
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institutionalization. If, on the other hand, we see a decrease in iterations and quality time, 
then we ought to notice a decrease in the successful institutionalization. Furthermore, the 
two components of strategic action – preparation of knowledge and consistent, coherent 
objectives – operate independently of one another. Thus, Hypothesis 3: If a low level of 
preparation exists with high levels of consist and coherent objective formation or vice 
versa, then we see a level of institutionalization lower than if both indicators were high, 
yet higher than if both were low. 
I measure successful institutionalization of self-governmental resistance in a 
certain policy area by counting and comparing the percentage of instances and members 
mobilized by the MST with the potential number of sites and participants. Certain 
academic discussions of resources, including organizational design and form, fall into 
this area (Edwards and McCarthy: 2008). Thus rather than a cause, resources – as 
discussed in the literature – are an effect of strategic planning. I locate the total number of 
participants and their percentages in governmental and movement documents of 
particular policy areas, as well as by triangulating these sources with interviews, 
newspapers, and participatory observation. If, for example, I am analyzing the 
movement's efforts in education, I count the number of movement schools and students. 
Numbers and percentages of instances and people provide a measure we can use to 
evaluate variation in success rates. 
 
2.5 Rival Explanations 
Even though my theory of strategy potentially explains the three kinds of 
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resistance listed above, I focus on the successful institutionalization of self-governmental 
resistance. In this section, I address dominant social movement theorists' – cultural, 
structural and agentic – expectations and show their shortcomings. Alternative, rival 
explanations suggest various hypotheses that I test my theory against in each chapter of 
this dissertation. 
 
Political Process Theory and Political Opportunity Structure 
Studies that adhere to Political Process Theory and deploy the concept of Political 
Opportunity Structure (Kriesi, et al: 1995; McAdam, et al: 1996; McAdam: 1999; Tarrow: 
1998; McAdam, et al: 2001; Yashar: 2005; Ondetti: 2008) focus on the emergence and/or 
trajectory of mobilization. Explanations center on a government's – particularly agents – 
propensity to favor, oppose, and/or repress. If I were to apply such a contextual 
explanation to my outcome of successful institutionalized resistance, I would have an 
explanation based on the degree of access and potential facilitation. Access to 
government resources and a low penchant for repression would lead to successful 
institutionalization for movements, including self-governmental ones. 
While we are given a potential explanatory variable to test – elite proclivity to 
assist movements – variation in MST success rates in different policy areas reveals trends 
that disprove the explanatory potential of these theories. For example, we see an absence 
of movement initiatives to implement educational initiatives in certain states that have 
elite support, e.g. Paraná (2002-2010). Also, the movement had success in agrarian 
reform policy during the 1990s when confronting Fernando Enrique Cardoso's openly 
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hostile government. Lastly, a consistently low level of successful implementation of the 
movement's vision for agricultural production is uniform in all states, despite variation in 
governments. An oppositional government in Rio Grande do Sul (2006-2010) openly 
opposed the MST's objectives, yet as I will show, only partially explains movement 
decline.
27
 In short, variations in elite facilitation and repression do not correspond to 
variations in movement rates of successful institutionalization. 
 
Neoliberal Adjustment 
Similar theories that rely on contextual factors target neoliberal transformation, 
noting how changes in political economy impact movement resistance.
28
 Like Political 
Process Theorists, these scholars discuss the effect of contextual relationships, e.g. cuts in 
state expenditures or decentralizing policies, on social movement activity. Causal links 
from scholars that focus on neoliberal changes include how decreases in resources or 
decentralized governance provide openings for movements to mobilize. 
In Brazil, we do not see cuts to state spending – especially in areas where the 
MST is active – but increases over the last thirty years. Changes in success rates also 
show variations that budget and policy changes cannot explain, e.g. similar neoliberal 
                                                 
27 McAdam, et al's (2001) Dynamics of Contention also attempts to reappraise agency. I 
understand my theory of strategy as a continuation of their insights, enveloping and 
adding greater depth to certain concepts they use, e.g. “brokerage.” 
28 Yashar discusses the emergence of indigenous movements in the Andes, noting how 
budget cuts limited social control and allowed for mobilization (2005). Essays in 
Leitner, et al's edited volume, Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers, feature 
discussions on how movements changed demands and roles in response to neoliberal 
policies (2007). Partha Chatterjee documents movements that redesign neoliberal 
projects (2004). 
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cuts and policy decentralization in the states of Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo and 
different outcomes in each state concerning the MST's success in governing educational 
and agricultural production. Theorists that discuss neoliberal transformation also draw 
our attention to the delegation of decision-making authority to social actors, potentially 
co-opting resistance. The MST's self-governing project, however, contests state power, 
conflicts with governmental dictates, and draws opposition. Like theorists who focus on 
facilitation or repression, explanations that discuss policy change, co-optation, and 
budget decreases do not explain self-governmental resistance. 
 
Cultural Approaches 
Cultural approaches describe alternative modes of movement resistance, often in 
opposition to forms of conduct encouraged by state power and governmental elites.
29
 
These studies draw our attention to how cultural resistance is central to movement 
contention, specifically through proliferating different rules and procedures that organize 
people's lives. They lack a more detailed analysis of the state that would allow us to 
isolate the constitutive nature of self-governmental resistance. Cultural studies provide 
numerous case studies concerning movements in various countries that challenge status 
quo conceptions of rights and institutional formations but leave out generalizable ways to 
                                                 
29 Some movements disrupt and redefine the standard meanings of democracy and 
citizenship (Alvarez, et al: 1998). Others see movements “claiming the right to have 
rights,” which means the creation of rights (e.g. autonomy) that exceed the juridical 
conception of citizenship (Dagnino: 1994). Scherer-Warren notes how movements 
were founded on principles opposed to conventional politics (1987). Urban 
movements at the end of Brazil's military regime managed public goods because the 
military gave them a stake in provision (Cardoso: 1992). 
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understand state power. 
 
Agentic Accounts 
The theories I have discussed give primacy, in different ways, to contextual 
factors. Similar to my focus on strategy, and thus agency, other accounts give movements 
themselves center stage.
30
 Some – particularly rational choice – would explain successful 
movement institutionalization rates according to incentives for mobilization. In fact, one 
major enticement for joining the movement is achieving access to land, which is 
expensive, especially for families in poverty. The movement itself is a kind of incentive, 
acting as a mediator and facilitator for land acquisition through pressuring governments 
to expropriate and redistribute. Yet according to this reasoning, the MST's ability to 
provide land incentives fails to account for variation. Specifically, the number of land 
occupations and encampments – central elements to the MST's alternative agrarian 
reform project as opposed to the state-led version – varies despite the movement's ability 
to present land acquisition as an enticement to join. 
My theory of strategy makes analytical distinctions between three categories, each 
with measurable components to explain strength and variation. Some movements use 
partners and alliances – sometimes even governments and representatives of state power 
– in instrumental strategies, while others delegate decision-making autonomy to a non-
                                                 
30 Rational choice accounts (e.g. Olson: 1965; Popkin: 1979; Lichbach: 1994) predict that 
the provision of material incentives by leaders, particularly selective incentives, leads 
to mobilization. Resource mobilization tends to focus on the amount and kind of 
funding, professionalization, and kinds of constituencies (McCarthy and Zald: 1977; 
Jenkins: 1983). 
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movement actor, or in other words, adopt a mediated strategy. Or in a direct action 
strategy, neither with partners nor through non-movement representatives, a movement 
will map out its practices with itself as the primary actor. The form of resistance that I 
describe and explain in this dissertation – self-governmental – combines only direct-
action and instrumental strategic plans. 
 
2.6 Case Selection and Research Design 
This dissertation explains the development of self-governmental resistance. My 
dependent variable is the successful institutionalization of self-governmental resistance, 
which I measure as the percentage of spaces and members involved, e.g the number of 
actual cooperatives and the number of participating MST members out of the potential 
totals in the policy area of agricultural production. My explanatory variable – strategy – 
is evaluated in terms of the consistency and coherence of objectives and the level of 
prepared knowledge for implementation. 
Various MST qualities make it an ideal “pathway” case. Its presence in 24 of 
Brazil's 26 states, with more than one and a half million members, is unparalleled in Latin 
America. Its territorial presence allows us to compare its development across different 
states to assess the potential impact of different governments – ally and oppositional – at 
the federal and state level. Its extensive involvement in multiple policy areas mirrors its 
size and offers the chance to see variations in success.
31
 These qualities allow me to test 
                                                 
31 Movement areas, or sectors, and years created: formação (training, 1988); educação 
(education, 1988); frente de massa (mobilization, 1989); finanças (finance, 1989); 
projetos (projects, 1989); produção, cooperação, meio ambiente (production, 
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hypotheses derived from the literature concerning elites, neoliberalism, and incentives, as 
well as my theory of strategy. 
While the MST is valuable for its size, history, and involvement in multiple policy 
areas, these qualities also make comparison difficult. To simplify, I focus on the 
movement in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, and São Paulo. These three states 
were selected because the MST is firmly established in each.
32
 Aside from stability, each 
state has similar levels of inequality, kinds of agricultural production, and land use (IGBE: 
2006; 2007; CIA Factbook: 2012). Each state also has similar agricultural and land use 
patterns, thus making their rural areas – where the MST bases its operations – 
economically similar. Trends in agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production 
show the same patterns in Brazil overall. 
My study is theoretical, and a version of a crucial or “pathway case,” because the 
hypotheses developed are meant for further application (Lijphart: 1971; Odell: 2001; 
Gerring: 2007). I use the case study method because of limitations to large-n, statistical 
studies, specifically in developing and deploying “thick”concepts such as strategy, state 
power, and institutionalization (Coppedge: 1999). I focus on three areas to explain the 
MST's success in implementing self-governance: agrarian reform, education, and 
agricultural production policy. These areas show variation on the dependent variable, as 
agrarian reform displays the highest level of success, followed by educational policy, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
cooperation, environment, 1992); relações internacionais (international relations, 
1993); direitos humanos, (human rights, 1995); communicação (communications, 
1997); saúde (health,1998), cultura (culture, 2000); gênero (gender, 2000); jovens 
(youth, 2006) (Carter and Martins: 2010). 
32 The movement expanded to the north of Brazil in the mid-1990s, where it has difficulty. 
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agricultural production policy, in that order. The following table lists the indicators I use 
to classify the movement's strength in each area. 
Table 4: Different Levels of MST Institutionalization 
 Agrarian Reform Education Agricultural Production 
High ~50% people mobilized, 
thousands of encampments 
and settlements under 
control 
  
Medium  ~40% of students in certain 
areas under control, thousands 
of schools (not under control) 
with >50 sites under control 
 
Low   <50 sites under control, 5% - 
15% of potential adherents 
participating 
 
Agrarian Reform 
In Brazil, the centerpiece of agrarian reform policy is the settlement, which is 
composed of redistributed land and social programs. Both academic studies and official 
reports indicate the MST's high level of success. As of 2010, there existed 8,562 
settlements in Brazil, with 67 – a fraction of a percent – arising pre-1985 (INCRA: 2011). 
Sergio Leite, who conducted the most in-depth study of settlements to date, finds that if 
not for movement pressure – specifically land occupations and encampments – led by the 
MST post-1985, the increase in settlements would not have taken place (2004). Likewise, 
comparison with other democracies reveals the near unparalleled advances in land reform 
due to MST pressure (Ondetti: 2008). 
While exact numbers of movement-affiliated settlements are unavailable, we can 
access the number of MST occupations and encampments since 2000 – the first year 
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documented according to movement. In comparison with other movements in the policy 
area, MST occupations and encampments are respectively at 51% and 49%. Similarly, the 
number of families mobilized stands at a total of 494,428 in land occupations, with 
311,160 of them – 63% – organized by the MST. The movement has also mobilized the 
most families in encampments, with over 58% of the total families affiliated with the 
MST, or 85,205 families out of total 146,295 between 2000 and 2010. From these 
numbers, and given that 23 other movements currently have organized land occupations, 
encampments, and settlements, the MST dominates this policy area according to our 
indicators of numbers and percentages, essentially redefining it, since the policy area's 
near moribund status pre-1985. 
Self-governmental, institutionalized resistance rooted in decentralization, 
heterogeneity, and equality is practiced by the movement's “nucleos de base (small 
groups)” in encampments and certain settlements. This nucleo structure, also known as 
“organcidade,” or “organicity,” is central to MST self-governance in each policy area, yet 
is best implemented in the movement's management of agrarian reform where groups 
hold frequent meetings, provide security, provide or help find educational services, 
coordinate production, and organize cultural events. Consensual decision-making 
practices featured in the nucleos decentralize decision-making procedures, assuring that 
members actively participate in administration. In relying on grassroots, conscious-
raising, and efforts to indicate lands for expropriation and occupation, the movement also 
challenges state practices that centralize decision-making in land redistribution by using 
expert information to select land for redistribution. Centralizing decision-making power – 
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characteristic of state power in general – is also apparent in the official redistribution 
procedure, which takes place through executive decree. Instituto Nacional de Reforma 
Agrária (Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform or INCRA), despite multiple 
regional offices, retains the function of distributing land and credit to subordinate social 
actors, showing an unequal division of administration. 
Another element of social movement self-governance – heterogeneity – is 
practiced through the nucleo’s incorporation of diverse local conditions, needs, and 
practices. The MST fosters a movement-centered identity in this area that privileges a 
dispossessed, landless member of society who deserves land redistribution. With this 
mode of identification as a kind of shield, the movement allows for greater heterogeneity 
in encampments and settlements. Institutionalizing heterogeneity counters the blanket, 
homogenizing cultural practices characteristic historically and currently of state-led 
agrarian reform that privileges national identification, security, and development. 
Movement plans for settlement design also challenge private property by promoting 
communal use and ownership. MST agrarian reform opposes government policies that 
favor “emancipation” – granting definitive title and the right to sell land – supporting 
efforts for settlements to exist as public property without individual owners. 
High levels of strategic strength characterize direct-action strategy. Preparation of 
“know-how” is high, illustrated in the time during encampments that follow occupations 
when the movement spends months, sometimes years, sending people to seminars to 
learn ideology, organizing skills, and the MST's history. Between 1984 and 2002, the 
movement trained over 100,000 activists – 25 times the number of teachers from MST 
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normal schools and courses (Plummer: 2008). We also find a high level of knowledge of 
state institutions, which allows the movement to occupy the best land. Planning and 
knowledge levels are also high in objective coherence and consistency, apparent in the 
frequent iterations of targets and time spent solidifying the movement's identity since the 
early 1980s. 
A high level of strategy strength is also found in instrumental strategy. 
Negotiations between movement leaders and institutional elites, particularly those in 
INCRA, reveal the movement's plans for the coherent and consistent use of the institution 
for their own objectives. Comparing INCRA's objectives with the MST's, as well as the 
ideological positions of various influential INCRA officials, reveals antagonism, which is 
characteristic of instrumental strategies. Similar kinds of negotiations and conflicts have 
characterized MST/INCRA relations since the MST began land occupations, showing 
coherence and continuity in the movement's strategic planning. This relationship grants 
the movement ample time to acquire knowledge of INCRA's capacity and resources, in 
their preparation of an alternative mode of institutionalizing agrarian reform. Knowledge 
preparation is also high with respect to using ideational resources, which have been at the 
center of the movement's agrarian reform discourse since the early 1980's. The MST 
combines instrumental and direct-action plans to confront private property and state 
power in land occupations, encampments, and settlements. 
 
Education 
Self-governance in education follows – in terms of success – the movement's 
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implementation of its version of agrarian reform policy. Still, the movement boasts 
impressive numbers, claiming to have pressured state authorities to construct 2,250 
schools where over 350,000 people have learned to read and write, with another 350,000 
currently studying all kinds of subjects, from geography to agroecology, taught by 4,000 
movement-trained teachers.
33
 I single out the MST efforts in special elementary 
education schools and secondary technical schools. Despite a low number of settlement 
schools,
34 
MST gains are apparent in the implementation in various states of the “escolas 
itinerantes (itinerant schools)” in encampments. At their height in Rio Grande do Sul 
(1998-2009) and Paraná (2002-present),
35
 a total of 15 schools attended to roughly 1,000 
students each year per state (MST: 1998; 2000; 2010). More success is seen in the 
movement's experiments with secondary education, particularly with technical schools, 
where in 2010 – one year where we have specific numbers from the movement and the 
state – roughly 40% of high school age students attending rural technical schools were 
affiliated with the MST (10,058 students affiliated with the movement out of 24,465 total 
students (INEP: 2010; PRONERA: 2011)). Since 1985, movement-affiliated high school 
students have attended 31 different spaces under movement direction (Plummer: 2008). 
The number of MST students and schools tells us that the movement's success rate in 
comparison to agrarian reform is lower. 
                                                 
33 http://www.mst.org.br/node/8302. 
34 Of the 2,250 schools, only a fraction of the elementary schools in settlements (3 in the 
state of Paraná, 0 in São Paulo, and 3 in Rio Grande do Sul) operate according to the 
movement's dictates, with even less in the area of secondary education (Fieldnotes: 
ITERRA Conference, 5-25-2011). 
35 The itinerant schools were closed in Rio Grande do Sul in 2009, and later reopened in 
2012. They currently exist in Alagoas, Santa Catarina, and Goias. 
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The roots of MST’s pedagogy are in Soviet thinkers Anton Makarenko and 
Moisey Pistrak, whose theories privilege the importance of collectively managing schools; 
oppose a strict division of labor between teachers, administrators, and students; and 
showcase the culturally creative potential of labor. All instances – from elementary to 
university level courses – incorporate Pistrak's conception of the pedagogical value of 
labor through requiring research and work in cooperatives or agroecological sites, 
allowing the movement to institutionalize local conditions and cultures. The identity 
fostered in education emphasizes how their exclusion from urban education, and their 
unique historical experiences, grants the movement a special purview concerning 
pedagogy and school organization. This counters the homogenizing mode of instruction 
that promotes a single national curriculum in terms of subjects and methodology that has 
been implemented since Getulio Vargas' “Estado Novo” of the 1930s. 
The nucleo structure that characterizes agrarian reform encampments and 
settlements also exists in schools, featuring group management in everything from 
finishing schoolwork to discipline. These practices reveal the same decentralizing 
principle that opposes centralized state policies usually made at the state and federal level 
through the distribution of administrative tasks to students within schools. This 
institutionalizes contention against the subordination of social actors by state power to 
government, usually also devalorizing rural schools and concentrating curriculum design 
with elites. Educational self-governance also opposes privatization and individualization 
through promoting public schools and group-based instruction. 
Direct-action plans are strong in the MST's self-governmental efforts in education. 
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Numerous seminars, some in collaboration with university partners, show a high number 
of iterations on how to administer school programs, from literacy to early childhood 
development. Since MST’s origins, there have been 13 published notebooks on 
movement education by the MST private school, Instituto Técnico de Capacitação e 
Pesquisa da Reforma Agrária (Technical Institute for Training and Research in Agrarian 
Reform or ITERRA), and 18 from the movement's education sector. Training courses in 
normal education have created many teachers educated in the movement's pedagogy 
since the early 1980s. Between 1990 and 2004, the MST reports graduating 10
 
classes 
each with between 30 to 50 movement-trained teachers (ITERRA: 2004). In addition to 
preparation, there is a high level of coherent and consistently formulated objectives in the 
movement's direct-action plans. Not only do we see this frequently in documents and 
pamphlets, but also in interviews with long time teachers who have been integral to the 
movement schools since the 1980s. 
Despite the movement's relationship with INCRA and the creation of the 
Programa Nacional de Educação na Reforma Agrária (National Program of Education in 
Agrarian Reform or PRONERA), which guarantees access to governmental elites, the 
movement shows a relatively low level of strategic strength for both indicators in 
instrumental strategy. The movement has experienced difficulty confronting opposition 
from Tribunal das Contas da União (National Audit Court or TCU) and officials working 
in the Ministério Público (Public Ministry or MP), who have cut funding for programs 
and courses. Their instrumental strategic plans fail with elites in professionalized and 
bureaucratic institutions, as well as with political parties with divergent ideologies. 
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Rather than a simple “closing” of political opportunities, as many theorists would 
contend, the reason for limited success lies in a low level of preparation that places the 
MST at the mercy of changes in government. There is little in movement documents or 
testimonies from leaders when we search for iterations of strategies for political parties 
and bureaucracies. A consistent and coherent way to approach institutions and elites, 
likewise, is lacking. The movement's plans, not contextual factors, explain the mid-level 
success in educational policy. 
 
Agricultural Production 
The lowest ranking area in implementing self-governance is in agricultural 
production policy. While the movement flaunts its collective, successful cooperatives as 
illustrative of an alternative mode of agricultural production, the vast majority have 
succumbed to heavy debt and bankruptcy. In one interview, I was told that only around 5% 
of the hundreds of cooperatives initiated in the 1980s and 1990s continue (Interview: 
Sector of Production-PR, 7-11-2011). Likewise, the movement's turn towards promoting 
agroecological production techniques rarely sees implementation, with less than 5% of 
movement members practicing. If compared with the standard tally for movement 
membership – 1,500,000 people – then only 75,000 people are involved in this area. 
Another measure for movement involvement in agricultural production is the 
number of families accessing state policies for small holder, typically organic, 
agricultural production. From numbers available in 2009 and 2010 in the Programa de 
Aquisição de Alimentos (Food Acquisition Program or PAA), the percentage of finances 
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went from 8% to 12%, ($R 28,699,236 of $R 363,381,941 to $R 44,643,666 of $R 
379,735,466) while participating families in settlements went from 7% to 11% (7,444 of 
98,340 families to 10,440 of 94,398). We can extrapolate from these numbers – because 
we know that roughly 50% of land occupations and encampments in Brazil are under 
MST influence – that only thousands of MST families receive assistance. These figures as 
well as the number of instances of cooperative economic ventures show lower 
percentages of people and spaces than in agrarian reform or educational policy. 
MST agricultural production governance institutionalizes contention in all the 
same ways as education and agrarian reform. Nucleos characterize both the movement's 
sector of production and internal management of cooperatives, challenging the 
centralized development and execution of state economic policy. Likewise, 
agroecological production incorporates local conditions, thereby placing heterogeneity in 
economic practices by focusing production on local conditions and “peasant” farming 
techniques that privilege each farmer and their relationship to their land. Decision-
making abilities are sufficiently dispersed throughout the movement members, equalizing 
skills and knowledge and decentralizing decision-making while challenging the state's 
form of economic management, which grants expertise to institutional elites and favors 
individualized – not cooperative – modes of production. 
The movement shows a level of low success in preparing for economic endeavors 
because this area involves engaging with markets and specialized technical production 
knowledge, areas to which the movement has only recently devoted time and energy. 
Preparation of “know-how” in direct-action strategies, specifically in terms of quality 
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time spent on research, is low. The movement has only recently begun pursuing means to 
access production policies to support their agroecological project. INCRA remains a 
partner with the movement, yet increasingly agricultural programs are administered by 
more professionalized institutions like the Ministério de Agricultura, Pecuária, e 
Abastecimento (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply or MAPA). And similar 
to problems in education, MAPA does not respond to instrumentalist strategies. The 
movement's ability to use elites for production fails to appeal to these officials who favor 
large-scale monocultural production for export and individual entrepreneurship. Again, it 
is not context where we find the problem in movement institutionalization, but rather in 
the strength of their strategic planning. 
Furthermore, the MST direct-action plans have changed radically over time, 
showing problems with respect to consistency and coherence. This has resulted in a 
persistent tension between “peasant” and “working class” identities, apparent in 
interviews and documents. Rooted in different acts and practices, this tension prohibits 
the movement from developing consistent strategies with common objectives. Second, 
the recent acceptance of peasant production into the movement's discourse requires 
dedicating time and energy to acquire agroecological production techniques, which forces 
the movement to devote resources and search out knowledge in new areas. The iteration 
of these direct-action plans shows low levels of frequency and time investment. 
Institutionalizing a form of agricultural production that challenges state power and the 
monocultural agro-export model promoted by governmental elites shows an overall low 
level of success due to low levels of direct-action and instrumental strategic strength. 
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Table 5: The MST's Levels of Strategic Strength and Success Rates 
   Strategies and 
their 
Strengths 
  
 Direct-action Mediation Instrumental  
Policy Area    Level of Institutional 
Strength 
Agrarian Reform High C & C, and 
P 
N/A High C & C, and 
P 
High 
Education High C & C, and 
P 
N/A Low C & C, and 
P 
Medium 
Agricultural 
Production 
Low C & C, and 
P 
N/A Low C & C, and 
P 
Low 
Note: C & C = Coherence and Consistency. P = Preparation 
The above table shows the three policy areas, different strategies with their 
strengths, and levels of institutional strength. Because the MST is a self-governmental 
movement, the mediated strategy column is blank. The far right column of institutional 
strength shows corresponding variation due to different strategic orientations and 
strengths. Also, note the high levels in both strategic categories in agrarian reform, while 
low levels in one sub-category results in a mid-level of institutionalization in education. 
The last category – agricultural production – is characterized by low levels of strategic 
strength in both indicators, and thus, as predicted, we find a low level self-governmental 
institutionalization. 
I conducted archival research, participatory observation, interviews, and textual 
analysis in my analysis of the MST. The first involved participatory observation and 
interviews in Brazil. For three months in 2009, I did pre-dissertation research in the states 
of Pernambuco, Pará, and São Paulo. In the fall of 2010, I returned to Brazil, where I 
stayed until November of 2011. This last time I did extensive fieldwork in São Paulo, Rio 
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Grande do Sul, and Paraná, while also staying three weeks in the capital, Brasilia. I 
conducted over 100 interviews with movement and former movement leaders, 
sympathizers and opponents, governmental elites and personnel, and individuals in 
political parties. Archival research was carried out in Centro de Documentação e 
Memória (Center for Documentation and Memory or CEDEM) in São Paulo, which 
houses an archive of all things leftist, from the Communist Party to the MST. Textual 
work includes analysis of MST newsletters and bulletins (from 1981-2008) as well as 
internal documents. 
To research strategy, I use semi-structured interviews with politicians, movement 
leaders, and movement members. I also collected information from institutional and 
movement websites, as directives describing particular mandates are published and 
described there. I rely extensively on secondary sources and state documents from the 
MEC, different departments of education, INCRA, TCU, MAPA and MP. I analyze these 
documents to understand the different plans and projects, comparing them with 
interviews of elites from these institutions. My data is also derived from participatory 
observation methods. I attended movement-run secondary and primary schools, 
participated in classroom lectures, and even on occasion, helped teach. On settlements, I 
lived with various families where I conducted my research, kept field notes, and 
participated in various movement meetings and assemblies. I sometimes helped with 
typical family activities like doing laundry or milking cows. At all sites, I found the time 
to conduct in-depth interviews with movement members and established leaders. 
I triangulate field notes and interviews with textual analysis of movement and 
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state documents, training manuals, statistical studies, census data, and newsletters in 
order to craft my independent and dependent variables. While in the field, and also when 
I returned, I collected newspaper stories that dealt with the MST's self-governmental 
practices. My research is qualitative and exploratory; the innovative nature of my study 
requires close to the ground attention and conceptual development, necessitating 
qualitative methods. 
 
Implications and Plan 
The MST is one of (if not the) largest social movement in Latin America in terms 
of territorial presence and people mobilized. Aside from the importance of the MST in 
Latin America, Brazil itself has been the center of many studies of experimental 
governing patterns for over thirty years. The return to democracy in the mid-80s saw 
mass demonstrations that helped topple the dictatorship, the development and creation of 
mass parties such as the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party or PT) – an anomaly 
in Latin America, – and the implementation of creative new decentralized participatory 
governance arrangements at the municipal level. Brazil has been a site for governance 
studies and innovative resistance for decades, with a variety of social actors sharing, 
disputing, and challenging political power in exciting and innovative ways. 
Besides methodological and theoretical considerations, the implications of my 
research point to a discussion of alternative social formations. The fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the closely following neoliberal era represented a turn to a technocratic and expert-
oriented, i.e. apolitical time period. As one of (if not the most important) worldwide 
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transformation in discourse and political organization, neoliberalism has ushered in a 
view that there is no alternative. The MST is not absolutely successful, but allows us to 
think about alternatives in practice. 
I discuss the MST's attempts to institutionalize governance in this dissertation's 
five chapters. My next three chapters are each devoted to movement efforts in particular 
policy areas – agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production. Chapter 3 focuses 
on agrarian reform policy and discusses the MST's success in organizing and 
administering encampments and settlements. Chapter 4 accounts for the MST's medium 
level of success in educational policy, focusing on the movement's itinerant elementary 
schools and high schools. I also discuss the challenges faced by the movement given the 
TCU and MP's opposition. In Chapter 5, I discuss the movement's low level of success in 
agricultural production after explaining the movement's economic vision of forming 
cooperatives to practicing agroecology. I highlight their desire to engage with different 
social programs run by different state institutions and the problems the movement faces 
from a divided identity. In the conclusion, I comment on how the concept of self-
governmental resistance and my theory of strategy apply to other self-governmental cases, 
as well as reform-style and revolutionary movements. 
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CHAPTER 3: SELF-GOVERNMENTAL RESISTANCE IN AGRARIAN 
REFORM 
 
Institutionalizing Opposition to State-led Agrarian Reform 
 
MST-led land occupations usually take place late at night, when hundreds, or 
sometimes thousands, of people load buses with destinations only known to a few leaders. 
When they reach their stop – usually a large ranch or farm of an unaware landowner – 
they squat there for months, often years. Immediately after “taking” the land, the families 
set up black-tarp tent communities, known as the “acampamentos (encampments).” On 
the one hand, families live in these spaces with little or nothing, having unreliable access 
to water, food, and sanitation as they await de jure recognition of their land claims by 
state authorities. Yet on the other hand, members show a surplus of ingenuity when 
building these nascent communities with their collective knowledge. From providing 
security in group-based patrols, to dedicating lands to religious buildings and sporting 
events, movement members carry out a de facto form of agrarian reform by re-
appropriating lands according to new economic, social, and cultural uses. Even though 
official expropriation and the legal recognition of settlements characterizes governmental 
agrarian reform policy, the MST already implements an alternative version from the 
moment member families occupy land. 
This chapter focuses on explaining the MST's institutionalization of self-
governmental resistance in the policy area of agrarian reform. Land occupations are often 
only considered destabilizing, especially of mono-cultural, agro-export economic 
production, and status quo, governmental agrarian reform practices. While recognizing 
this quality, I also understand how they, along with establishing encampments and 
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managing relations in settlements, show stabilizing qualities. Land occupations reveal a 
manner of executing agrarian reform that involves masses of individuals, countering the 
official, governmental mode of agrarian reform that is rooted in executive decree and 
elite knowledge. As I discuss in this chapter, various MST practices, such as land 
occupations, are well-organized and systematized efforts to re-appropriate land. 
Recognizing their disruptiveness, I also acknowledge how occupations provide stability, 
order, and rules for movement members. I argue that they simultaneously disrupt status 
quo, dominant authority and provide a movement-guided alternative in its place as they 
vie for control over agrarian reform policy. 
In self-governmental resistance, the MST resists through governing policies 
normally the prerogative of governments that exercise state power. In this chapter, I 
discuss how the movement's land occupations, encampments, and in certain cases, 
settlements,
36
 are central elements in their institutionalization of an alternative mode of 
governing agrarian reform. Through challenging initiatives to privatize land, planning 
communal production and living arrangements, and administering resources collectively, 
the MST implements a version of agrarian reform that counters state power and private 
property. Because of these qualities, the MST's resistance qualifies as self-governmental, 
not revolutionary or reformist. 
In addition to discussing what constitutes the MST's mode of self-governmental 
                                                 
36 My discussions of organization are mainly focused on fieldnotes and interviews with 
participants in encampments. In fact, one contemporary issue the movement is facing 
concerns regaining control of administration and governance in settlements. This 
problem, as well as the declining numbers of encampments, is addressed more in the 
concluding section of this chapter. 
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resistance in agrarian reform policy, I also explain how it has developed. I focus on how 
two sub-categories of strategy – direct-action and instrumentalization – cause the 
movement's institutionalization of this novel mode of social movement contention. As 
will become apparent in this dissertation's other chapters, their success in mobilizing 
participants for their version of agrarian reform exceeds their accomplishments in 
educational and agricultural production policies due to a comparatively higher level of 
strategic strength. 
I begin the chapter by discussing how the centralization of decision-making 
authority, homogenization of singular cultural practices and modes of identification, and 
implantation of unequal social relations – the defining qualities of state power – have 
characterized agrarian reform policies not only in Brazil, but in various other countries. 
After this broad exploration of agrarian reform in the first section, I analyze how the 
MST's practices both contest the state manner of conducting agrarian reform, as well as 
the institution of private property. Comparing the dominant, Brazilian form of agrarian 
reform with the MST's practices reveals how the movement's project is, in fact, 
oppositional. The final, third, section of this chapter explains and evaluates MST success 
by using my theory of strategy – focusing on the preparation of resources and knowledge, 
as well as the level of objective coherence and consistency. I show how my theory 
provides a better causal explanation for the movement's efforts to institutionalize self-
governmental resistance in agrarian reform than alternatives that would attribute the 
MST's success to contextual factors like state strength or governmental allies. 
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3.1 State Governance in Agrarian Reform and the Construction of Private Property 
The General Contours of Twentieth Century Agrarian Reform 
Land redistribution through the formation of rural settlements was an essential 
component to all twentieth century agrarian reform efforts,
37
 from Africa to Latin 
America. A central reason was to transform overly exploitative semi-feudal, feudal, or 
simply non-capitalist, rural forms of production into more equitable modes of capitalist 
production, depriving communist organizers of the chance to mobilize grievances 
(DeJanvry: 1981; Theissenhausen: 1989; 1995). Redistributing land is central to, but does 
not exhaust, an adequate definition of agrarian reform. Agrarian reform, and the policies, 
ideas and laws that constitute it, deal fundamentally with how people re-appropriate land. 
This entails systematic changes to already-existing ownership or tenure patterns, e.g. 
share-cropping, tenant-farming, and/or wage-labor, as well as forms of redistribution and 
acquisition, e.g. top-down state forms and/or through land occupations. In general, 
agrarian reform is the coordinated, planned set of actions to reconfigure patterns of land 
ownership, modes of organizing labor for food production and/or raw material extraction, 
and class relations. 
Agrarian reform policies also reveal the intersection of private property with state 
power. State-led modes of agrarian reform that changed previous ownership patterns 
often took place
38
 by establishing individualized forms of private property. They erected 
                                                 
37 Agrarian reform in Cuba and Soviet Union did not promote the creation of capitalism 
or private property. Policies between countries, however, still centralized state power, 
established unequal administrative roles, and promoted homogeneous cultural 
identities behind developmental ideologies and/or nationalism. 
38 For example, the indigenous tenant-farmers in the pre-agrarian reform Ecuadorian 
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coherent – what James Scott calls – “grids” that “rendered legible” diverse populations 
and cultures for elites who centralized and concentrated the means of social control and 
violence (1998). In grid-making, governmental elites had greater ease establishing 
systems of taxation and police. With fence posts established, taxes were collected, and 
security assured, often, through granting governmental authorities the power to protect 
(and as a byproduct, privileging) individual proprietorship. Exercising force over and 
through territory becomes institutionalized apart from landowners, who were deprived of 
police and semi-sovereign powers. Agrarian reform policies make landowners “private,” 
i.e. social, actors. 
In addition to usually promoting private property, state power in agrarian reform 
policies also centralizes authority and subordinates social actors to government elites. As 
written into many constitutions, eminent domain reserves government the right to 
potentially take the land of any owner for whatever reason, often, for a price. This 
prerogative, in terms of redistribution, provides a base-line difference between 
expropriation and stealing; the former is conducted with state power, while the latter by 
non-state, private groups, or individuals. Centralizing the actual process of expropriation 
also creates unequal state/society relations. For instance, certain authorities or institutions 
exercise roles like surveying territory, expropriating property, and monitoring ownership 
rights and responsibilities. When such roles are performed by representatives of state 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Huasipungo” tenure system were granted land on certain expropriated, large 
plantations where they previously lived in debt peonage. Concerning the relationship 
between private property and state governance, the Huasipungo arrangement – 
characteristic of share-cropping, tenant-farmer, and other general “peasant” forms of 
production – kept families “off the grid,” requiring no state-recognized deed for their 
land, subjecting them to the landowners' oversight and punishment. 
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power, they subordinate social actors who lack such authority. 
The final quality of state power – in addition to centralization and inequality – in 
state-led agrarian reform practices is cultural homogenization, which takes place as a 
result of enforcing private property arrangements. First, demarcating specific lots and 
spaces allows for the construction and proliferation of singular national identities, e.g. 
through solely allowing or privileging access to land by people with citizenship status. 
Second, in the United States as well as through Brazil and other countries in Latin 
America, the process of creating and expanding private property meant the displacement 
of indigenous peoples and their forced subjection to a sedentary form of agriculture. 
Different cultural appropriations of land – nomadic, for example – become subject to the 
“grid” imposed by state-enforced private property arrangements. This grid and 
construction of private property effectively outlaws, or at least makes exceedingly 
difficult, alternative modes of property ownership and their accompanying cultures and 
identities. From cultural homogenization to private property, we can see the general 
economic and political contours of state-led agrarian reform. Such qualities, furthermore, 
constitute the targets of MST self-governmental resistance. 
 
Agrarian Reform in Brazil 
Brazil's official agrarian reform policies, even though differing from the majority 
of other Latin American countries' experiences, still illustrate the general qualities of the 
state power. In Brazil, state-led land distribution takes place through periodic 
expropriations of farms and ranches with the goal to establish rural settlements. Public 
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land is also re-appropriated by governmental authorities and redistributed to other social 
actors after discovering fraudulent land claims and occupancy by large landowners, 
known as “grilhagem.39” Governmental policies and practices concerning agrarian reform 
in Brazil contrast with more extensive and effective cases, e.g. Cuba, as well as with less-
successful examples, e.g. Ecuador, in the sense that these others took place through 
dividing all territory into “reform” and “non-reform sectors.” The former is constituted by 
rural areas subject to redistribution according to certain land size or level of productivity 
requirements, while the latter is exempt (Kay: 1998; Rosset: 2006; Borras Jr, et al: 2007). 
The Brazilian experience, initiated with the passing of the Estatuo da Terra (Land Statute) 
in 1964, never developed in such stark terms with respect to sectors that classified all 
land at one time for potential redistribution. Regardless, the evaluative measures for 
distributing land according to size and level of productivity found in the Land Statute and 
other laws establishes the criteria through which redistribution occurs. State-led agrarian 
reform has not taken place in Brazil by means of creating stark divisions of territory. It 
has, nevertheless, resulted over time in wide ranging re-appropriations of land and 
fundamental changes in rural labor patterns.
40
 
                                                 
39 “Grilhagem” is the name given to taking lands fraudulently, which took place 
historically when lands that were under public domain – known as “terras devolutas 
(returned lands)” – were occupied by landowners. They would write false deeds and 
then place them in desk drawers with crickets (grilhos, in Portuguese) that would 
nibble the papers, turning them into fragments and making them appear old. The term 
“terras devolutas” comes from colonial times, when Brazil's independence from the 
Portuguese king “returned” lands to the Brazilian king. The MST legitimates its 
struggle, at least originally, through claiming how large landowners, “latifundiarios,” 
were illegally using land – practicing “grilhagem”. 
40 The 1964 legislation effected agrarian reform through colonization programs, sending 
poorer rural workers and landless peasants to other areas in the country, particularly 
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Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agrária (Institute for Colonization and Agrarian 
Reform or INCRA) – the MST's main interlocutor and target – is the officially recognized 
governmental institution in Brazil responsible for executing agrarian reform policy. It 
also showcases state power's constitutive elements. First, concerning the subordination of 
social actors, INCRA's main task, as I was often reminded by its workers in my 
interviews, is “fiscalização da função social na constituição (supervising (or ensuring) 
that the social function clause in the constitution is enforced).” The tasks involving social 
function are mighty; INCRA ought to ensure that landowners adhere to labor laws, 
respect environmental legislation, and monitor levels of economic production on all of 
Brazil's 5,175,489 agricultural operations (see Law 4504/1964; the 1988 Constitution, 
Articles 170-174; Law 8629/1993; Agricultural Census 2006). INCRA is also in charge 
of regularizing land claimed “irregularly,” i.e. claimed or occupied by individuals or 
companies with fraudulent documentation. Through these attributes, INCRA assumes a 
police function. In subordinating social actors to the government, the Institute assures that 
it – alone – assesses land according to the appropriate criteria in the event of 
expropriation. Irregular and economically unproductive holdings are subject to INCRA's 
purview. Such land is also the main target of MST occupations. 
INCRA's regulatory or police function relies on verifying and assessing levels of 
land productivity, subordinating social actors in a hierarchical division of labor. Only the 
Institute's officials can conduct studies to ascertain levels of economic productivity and 
verify if land is suitable for expropriation. Furthermore, recent efforts to track and 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Amazon, to diffuse potential land conflicts (dos Tavares: 1993). 
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document land with GPS technologies assists INCRA officers to classify all properties in 
Brazil, providing elites with privileged, exclusive information that erects a barrier 
between representatives of state authority with exclusive access to this data and social 
actors, like the MST, who lack it (Interview: Richards, INCRA-Brasilia, 2-10-2011). 
INCRA is also responsible for distributing initial credits for houses and production – 
known as “creditos de fomento” and “instalação” (respectively, formation and installation 
credits) – that distribute material resources (to be repaid at a later time) to families once 
they have usufruct rights. Together, GPS, credit distribution, and economic assessment 
tests subordinate social actors to governmental elites. State power establishes this 
division, or separation, between governmental elites who deploy it and social actors who 
do not. 
Official, governmental agrarian reform policy is marked by social subordination 
as well as by centralization, another defining quality of state power. Centralization is 
apparent in the use of executive decree in the final decision to expropriate land. MST 
occupations and encampments, as I discuss in the next section, present an alternative 
version. In the movement's oppositional, yet rule-based and systematized, resistance in 
the policy area of agrarian reform, they both decentralize and equalize agrarian reform 
policy through including more individuals and contesting the government's hierarchical 
administrative division of labor. 
Despite INCRA's decentralized façade in the past and present, with regional 
“superintendências,” or offices in each state, state power still acts in a centralizing 
manner. Historically, INCRA officials worked closely with families who acquired land, 
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particularly during the military government. Various officials I interviewed who had 
worked at INCRA during this period actually lived with families during the implantation 
and construction of settlements (Interview: Agneur, INCRA – RS, 2-28-2011). Now, 
internet access and the use of transportation supposedly enable officials to interact with 
families. Such new technologies grant INCRA officials power to keep information, 
document families, and give assistance if needed, despite their persistent complaints of 
insufficient finances and staff (Interview: Jurindir, INCRA-PR, 8-1-2011; INCRA: 2010). 
Yet no matter if operating through a regional office, capital city, or on site, general policy 
directives and budgetary issues are formulated by few elites. Emanating from the capital 
in Brasilia, decision-making authority is centralized in the hands of the executive who 
expropriates property and the few officials who create directives. 
Lastly, the Brazilian government's version of agrarian reform – through the 
executive and INCRA – homogenizes a singular, national culture. Historically, rural 
settlements were part of “colonização (colonization)” projects, integral to the military 
government's campaign for national security and integration (Interview: Paulinho, 
INCRA-Brasilia, 2-8-2011). Even before this, settlement projects established during 
Getulio Vargas's era (1930-1954) intended to disperse immigrants from various countries 
into rural areas to avoid the chances of forming cultural enclaves (dos Santos: 1993). And 
the first rural settlements in the 19
th
 century outside of Rio de Janeiro were also 
established to “Europeanize, whiten, and civilize Brazil (Neves: 2008).” The settlement 
and efforts to redistribute land have always carried homogenizing racial and nationalist 
culture characteristics and favored modes of identification. 
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The nationalist thrust continues because only Brazilian nationals are allowed to 
access agrarian reform policies. Privileging Brazilian families, historically as well as 
currently, connects property to citizenship. Nomadic, indigenous, and specifically, non-
individualized or communal cultures find little to no support, seen in the limited 
recognition and support for extractive reserves for indigenous communities and quilombo 
settlements for descendants of runaway slave communities. Both, in addition to certain 
MST practices, challenge private property and promote alternative identities. The norm, 
historically and currently, however, is the promotion of a singular, nationalist culture that 
hinders the development of alternative, non-sedentary, and communal livelihoods in rural 
areas. 
In addition to how INCRA and the executive centralize, homogenize, and 
establish unequal social roles – together the qualities characteristic of state power – they 
also promote private property. Institutional directives and external pressure brought by 
recent congressional audits particularly contribute to its continued development. For 
instance, many INCRA directors and workers told me of the tension between 
“emancipating” and “consolidating” the settlements. Emancipation, a general term used 
to describe one of the institution's overall directives, comes from Fernando Enrique 
Cardoso's administration (1994-2002). The goal – which some call neoliberal because of 
the emphasis placed on privatization (Wolford: 2005; de Medeiros: 2007) – involves 
families receiving definitive title to their land. This replaces their initial usufruct rights, 
“freeing” (emancipating) them from INCRA's oversight, programs, and policies (Cardoso: 
1997). Government support is intended, from the emancipation perspective, to create self-
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sufficient, individualistic proprietors who eventually own their land and exist 
independently of social programs and services. Since its mid-1990s origin, this view of 
property has found opposition from the MST and their implementation of alternative 
forms of settlement, which I detail in the next section. 
The official alternative to emancipation is consolidation. I was told by officials 
appointed during the center-left Lula administration how consolidation encapsulates the 
government's shift, from “freeing” families, to building adequate infrastructure and 
production capacities. Consolidation deemphasizes emancipation's impetus to form 
individualized, private landholdings. Focusing on infrastructure and development means 
that prior to issuing titles, priorities include building roads, making viable economic 
production, and establishing working sanitation systems (Olivera: 2010). The credits 
distributed, as well as the land, became during the last ten years considered “fondo 
perdido (lost funds),” meaning that families who were distributed resources (land, credit, 
infrastructure) were not expected to repay (Interview: Kiel, INCRA-Brasilia, 1-31-2011). 
The apparent effect is that state policies promote a redistribution of wealth to poorer, 
agrarian reform beneficiaries, de-emphasizing private proprietorship. 
Despite consolidation, private property and emancipation remain dominant. In 
particular, INCRA has come under pressure from Tribunal das Contas da União (National 
Tribunal Court or TCU) to emancipate settlements after Congressional Inquiries both of 
the MST and INCRA stressed the need for greater transparency in agrarian reform policy 
and cost reduction. INCRA has been audited and pressured by the TCU to end 
consolidation by issuing definitive ownership titles, charging families for the credits, and 
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establishing payment plans for land (TCU: ACÓRDÃO Nº 557/2004; TCU: Relatório e 
Parecer Prévio sobre as Contas do Governo da República Exercício de 2009; CPI da 
Terra: 2005). Preferences for emancipation over consolidation were voiced in interviews 
with TCU officials in charge of crafting institutional reforms for INCRA. I was told how 
INCRA's practices of land acquisition and credit distribution were “inefficient” methods 
that created “social dependents” (Interview: TCU Lawyers, 9-13-2011).41 TCU authority 
is grounded in the 1988 constitution and guiding legislation – its “lei organica (organic 
law)” – that grants the institution the ability to compel other institutions to improve costs 
and adhere to constitutional guidelines. With respect to agrarian reform, the TCU uses 
this authority to pressure INCRA to issue definitive title and require that families pay for 
land and credit. Emancipation and not consolidation is the norm. 
Agrarian reform is about changing – or rather, re-appropriating – previous tenure 
patterns, modes of organizing labor for food production and/or raw material extraction, 
and class relations. A state-directed mode of implementing agrarian reform policy is 
characterized by centralizing authority, homogenizing culture, and establishing unequal 
state/society relations. In Brazil, INCRA executes agrarian reform policy according to 
these three defining qualities of state power. Agrarian reform policy also shows, even 
though state power and private property are distinct, that the two can potentially support 
one another. Specifically, establishing an easily decipherable “grid” that legally enforces 
individualized, private property relationships, allows elites to document, find, catalogue, 
                                                 
41 The powers granted to the TCU in the 1992, “lei organica,” includes oversight of all 
public policies accounts, finances, operations and assets, in order to “evaluate costs,” 
placing the institution in a unique position to ensure the application of a business logic 
and rationality to all – including INCRA – governmental agencies. 
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and thus control, populations. INCRA assists in the creation of private property – often 
indirectly because of pressure from other state institutions such as the TCU – while also 
contributing to efforts to homogenize culture, establish unequal state/society relationships, 
and centralize decision-making authority. In the next section of this chapter, I show how 
the MST challenges private property and the central qualities of state power in their 
institutionalization of self-governmental resistance. 
 
3.2 The MST's Institutionalization of Self-Governmental Resistance in Agrarian 
Reform 
 
Self-governmental movements, with the MST as an example, resist through 
designing and implementing policies normally the prerogative of governmental 
authorities. This mode of resistance distinguishes them from reform and revolutionary 
movements. Specifically, they continuously contest state power and private property 
through vying for control of government-controlled services on behalf of their members. 
That is, they take a policy that governments usually exercise and redevelop it by 
practicing it in ways that directly challenge state power. This mode of resistance does not 
challenge the state by pressuring for greater inclusion (like reform movements), or by 
replacing it (as revolutionary movements). Like social movement resistance in general, 
self-governmental contention is not spontaneous or sporadic, but rooted in systematized 
practices and rules – what I see as indicative of institutionalization. In this section, I lay 
out the MST's mode of institutionalizing self-governmental resistance through an 
examination of how the movement implements an alternative mode of agrarian reform 
that challenges both private property and state power. 
  
91 
The MST opposes state-led agrarian reform policies by creating an oppositional 
movement identity and promoting ways to decentralize decision-making power, equalize 
administrative roles, and produce diverse cultures. I observe two ways that the movement 
institutionalizes their alternative agrarian reform project: (1) in their encampment and 
settlement organization and (2) mobilization of land occupations. While usually 
considered solely disruptive acts – especially land occupations – both also play integral 
roles in the MST's mode of implementing their vision of agrarian reform. 
 
Nucleos and the Challenge to Administrative Subordination 
One central element of the MST's mode of self-governmental resistance – with 
respect to both equalizing administrative roles and decentralizing state power – is their 
“nucleo” or small group structure of administration. Also known as “organicidade,” or 
“organicity,” this mode of arranging administrative roles characterizes the movement's 
internal structure overall, including their institutionalization of other areas such education 
and agricultural production. In agrarian reform policy, nucleo administration is clearest in 
the encampments the MST establishes immediately after occupying land.
42
 Early 
movement documents tell how the movement's internal organization originates at this 
level – in the actual space where a movement occupies land – and includes regional, state, 
and then the national level (MST: 1985). Nucleos, or small groups of members, exist 
within each of the movement's sectors and levels. Each nucleo, from the encampment to 
                                                 
42 For more on encampments, see Wolford, Wendy. "Producing community: the MST and 
land reform settlements in Brazil." Journal of Agrarian Change 3, no. 4 (2003): 500-
520. 
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the national level, is ideally led by one man and one woman who are elected for two 
years terms. Together, with the rest of their group, they decide collectively on matters in a 
consensual manner (Stédile and Fernandes: 1999; Martins and Carter: 2010). 
The division of labor within the encampment contests state power's subordination 
of social actors. INCRA's role, as discussed in the previous section, involves expert 
knowledge when assessing land for expropriation and the distribution of credits deemed 
necessary for beginning a viable settlement. These actions create an unequal relationship, 
placing an impermeable barrier between governmental institutions and social actors in 
terms of administration. From the perspective of governmental authorities, agrarian 
reform begins when officials negotiate with families and movement leaders in the 
encampment, begin to divide lots, and grant the formal property rights to the encamped 
families. 
For the MST, agrarian reform begins long before the distribution of credits and de 
jure recognition of the encampment.
43 
From the moment the land is occupied, nucleos are 
created, each with different tasks that correspond to movement sectors, including day-to-
day activities concerning health, education, production, and culture. Each also potentially 
constitutes the movement's contention of specific policy area. But considered together, 
they provide the general governing structure for encampment affairs. 
Requirements for belonging to a nucleo are minimal, if non-existent. In one 
encampment where I lived, identifying land for production and preparing it was 
organized by various families, many of whom had no prior experience in agricultural 
                                                 
43
 INCRA also distributes “cestas básicas,” subsidized food rations, to families in the 
encampments. 
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production (Fieldnotes: Encampment 2 Outside Londrina, Paraná, 7-3-2011). In another, 
the requirement for participation in the education nucleo was having children. Their 
primary work involved finding transportation for children to the municipal school and 
guaranteeing that the children were well-received (Fieldnotes: Encampment 1 Outside of 
São Paulo, São Paulo, 8-10-2009). In two other encampments in different states – Paraná 
and Pernambuco – I participated in nightly patrols that functioned to assure security, 
especially if the need arose to notify families in case of a police (or private security) 
eviction (Fieldnotes: Encampment 1 Outside Londrina, Paraná, 6-20-2011; Fieldnotes: 
Encampment Outside Arcoverde, Pernambuco, 9-10-2009). Regardless of region or state, 
as well as activity, I found similar small group administration with minimal knowledge 
requirements organizing encampment affairs. Such standardization of social movement 
activities, despite connotations implying conservativization or accommodation, is central 
to the MST's resistance. 
Re-appropriating land according to the knowledge that each individual and family 
brings to the encampment directly opposes the mode promoted by governmental 
authorities. The MST’s equalizing efforts to institutionalize their manner of conducting 
agrarian reform distributes roles between different nucleos in the encampments, as well 
as in certain settlements. Like Paulo Freire's understanding of dialogue and knowledge – 
which I further discuss in the next chapter on education – the members are all experts (or 
seen as capable of becoming so) in a variety of ways, from providing security to leading 
meetings. A “lack” only exists from the standpoint of governmental authorities, who 
consider the execution of agrarian reform policy as depending on credit, expert 
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knowledge, and de jure land redistribution. State power's subordination of social actors is 
challenged by the MST systematically equalizing roles amongst members, rather than 
reserving them for governmental elites. Agrarian reform according to the Brazilian 
government, and in particular INCRA, rests on an unequal division of administrative 
labor that is premised on re-appropriating land involving governmental officials policing 
– understood in a broad sense – territory. 
There is also a disciplinary side to the MST's self-governmental resistance in 
agrarian reform policy. For example, dealing with problems within certain encampments 
like stealing, fights, and drinking, usually results in movement leaders expelling rule-
breakers after discussing the issue in assembly with the rest of the encampment (Turatti: 
2005). Some encampments and settlements have completely banned alcohol following 
incidents with certain members (Fieldnotes: Settlement Outside of Caruaru, Pernambuco, 
9-1-2009). Families become subjects trained to form groups, work together, and punish 
one another, with movement leadership prepared to step in only if necessary. The 
disciplinary function in the MST encampment stresses community forms of punishment, 
opposing the state-form of practicing discipline that is rooted in a separate, “public” 
institution, i.e. the police. Government police, however, are usually called for larger 
crimes such as murder (Fieldnotes: Encampment 2 Outside of São Paulo, São Paulo, 8-5-
2009). Despite delegating security in extreme cases to state authority, most movement 
work on promoting their own protection in encampments constitutes a challenge to 
completely entrusting governmental police forces with control over encampment spaces. 
Defiance to state power is located in security provision and discipline that groups supply 
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themselves, without particular knowledge requirements that would subordinate them to 
governmental elites. 
 
The Challenge to Culture 
The institutionalization of MST self-governmental resistance also cultivates a 
movement-centered identity
44
 that challenges the state-directed, homogenizing alternative. 
Most movement activities, including the school day for children and national level 
meetings of leaders, showcase a display of movement symbols, called the “mística.” Each 
mística usually is centered around a ritual that involves the MST's flag, references to past 
– usually deceased – leaders or members, and allusions to common movement demands 
for agroecology or land reform. Nowhere is the mística’s effect more salient than in the 
encampment. I attended, as well as participated in, numerous místicas.
45
 Of all those I 
attended, the ones I observed in encampments were the most organized and disciplined. 
In one encampment, once a week, everyone in the encampment lined up single file to 
sing the movement hymn (and not the Brazilian) while each nucleo's leaders would report 
on issues pertaining to their area (Fieldnotes: Encampment 1 Outside Londrina, Paraná, 
6-25-2011). I was told in another encampment how the children learn the movement's 
hymn and attend místicas to cultivate a sense of belonging to the movement (Fieldnotes: 
Encampment 2 Outside Londrina, 7-5-2011). Songs, chants, and the regular use of 
                                                 
44 For more on identity, see Fanelli, Luca, and Sarah Sarzynski. "The Concept of Sem 
Terra and the Peasantry in Brazil." Journal of Developing Societies 19, no. 2-3 (2003): 
334-364, and also Chapter 1 and 2 in Caldart's “Pedagogia do Movimento” (1999). 
45 I will discuss more particular “misticas” and their contents in other chapters, especially 
as they relate to each of the areas where the MST attempts to gain control. 
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symbols promoted in místicas constitute mainstays in the MST's work to instill their 
identity around the movement, and specifically, their connection to agrarian reform. 
The identity created solidifies member allegiance in opposition to homogenizing 
efforts promoted by the state. In some encampments, one usually sees more MST 
imagery than Brazilian. Entrance points are typically identifiable by the movement's flag 
and guarded by members at checkpoints often wearing the movement's easily identifiable 
red shirts and hats, giving the impression that one is entering an area under the MST's 
control rather than the government's. Even though the “mística” and symbolism appear at 
all events and sites, their roles in encampments are especially salient because many 
people in these spaces are new to the movement. As a result, the movement takes great 
care and time to inculcate a sense of belonging. This work, particularly in the 
encampment, connects the MST to the land and meaning of the struggle for agrarian 
reform. 
While in a sense uniformly applied to all areas where the movement is active, the 
MST's cultivation of their own form of identification also allows local, diverse cultural 
formations to develop with respect to land use. In one collaboration between an 
engineering firm and the movement in Paraná, I was told how movement leaders were 
integral to certain settlement designs, deciding where to place schools, churches, and 
recreational areas (Interview: SENGE Engineer, Curitiba, 10-15-2011). Rather than 
imposing one form of settlement, the movement has embraced multiple forms of settling 
land (especially recently), including circular arrangements known as “agrovilas,” 
individualized settlements where families live apart, as well as the organization in long 
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lines known as “agrolinhas.” Fully communal areas are also promoted, especially in 
settlements. Encampments, where there are no real property divisions, show de facto 
communal land arrangements despite families usually living in separate houses. 
Furthermore, the MST's nucleo structure in place in encampments and settlements relays 
information to all levels of the movement about previous problems in settlement and 
encampment design. These regularized practices contribute to debates and allow for 
flexibility concerning the best arrangement of production, culture, and domicile spaces 
(ANCA: 2002). Movement-centered identity – what I identify as a proximate cause to 
institutionalizing resistance – functions as a barrier between movement and government. 
In agrarian reform, this division acts as a way to enable different cultural appropriations 
of land to develop. 
Governmental alternatives – historically and currently – promoted developmental 
ideologies and nationalism, homogenizing the meanings and practices around land use. 
Organicity and connections with the movement's “base,” or grassroots, regularly provide 
the movement the ability to adapt and change according to local conditions, needs, and 
demands. This opposes the single, homogenous project promoted through the exercise of 
state power. While the citizenship requirement for receiving usufruct and definitive title 
remains in effect with the MST settlements, the institutionalization of the nucleo 
arrangement enables the proliferation of multiple land use patterns. Furthermore, the 
formation of private property through emancipation policy directives and the relatively 
recent TCU efforts to streamline agrarian reform policy reduces the ways land can be 
owned and re-appropriated. The MST's settlement design variations allow for multiple 
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formations, opposing singularity by attempting to empower local actors in organizing the 
spaces where they live. 
 
Decentralizing Practices as Opposition to State Centralization 
In addition to challenging subordination and homogenization, MST 
institutionalized resistance also contests how state power centralizes decision-making 
power. One way the movement practices decentralization in opposition to state power is 
through charging compliance through service or “tax.” While visiting one encampment in 
the state of Paraná, I was told that “acampados (families in the encampment)” each pay a 
$R 3 contribution per month to the movement, while others who do not live in the 
settlement, but who want land, pay $R 90 (Field Notes: Encampment 2 Outside Londrina, 
Paraná, 7-12-2011). The monetary charge is often complimented by a service charge, e.g. 
attendance at protests and political trainings or activities to manage the encampment, 
such as security patrols. In another visit to an encampment, but in São Paulo, I was told 
that all these activities earn potential land reform beneficiaries “points” (Field Notes: 
Encampment 2 Outside of São Paulo, São Paulo, 8-10-2009). Concerning land 
distribution, the “points” earned by members put them on a list that local movement 
leaders keep in order to rank who is most deserving of land. This practice is called the 
“sorteio,” which the MST uses to negotiate with INCRA officials concerning who gets 
settled and where (ANCA: 2002). The movement thus moves families to certain states 
and areas, depending on open slots in abandoned spaces on existing settlements or new 
encampments awaiting official recognition. In this sense, the movement controls the land 
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at the center of agrarian reform policy, taking power away from the government. This 
example illustrates decentralization: the movement establishes itself as an additional actor 
with decision-making authority. 
MST-led land occupations also decentralize the selection, as well as the execution 
process in agrarian reform, by involving hundreds and sometimes thousands of people. 
Rather than waiting for selection of lands and actual expropriation to take place through 
executive decree, the movement selects areas in a variety of ways: sometimes based on 
their own studies, local hearsay concerning criminal behavior of certain landowners, 
and/or perhaps notifications from INCRA officials themselves. The movement's 
expropriation process decentralizes activity by involving many new, previously 
uninvolved, social actors in decision-making. Collectively, families and leaders decide 
where to occupy, indicating the land for later official expropriation. 
Occupations themselves are well-organized, systematized affairs. Apparent 
spontaneity is betrayed by months of door knocking where organizers recruit families 
from rural workers and people who live in the urban periphery for what is sometimes 
called a “festa (party).” This lighthearted language represents the occupation as fun – not 
as potentially dangerous. The location of occupations is shrouded in secrecy, with the 
destination known only to a few leaders. For example, in one occupation, not of land but 
of a government building, I was never told the destination. When I asked other members 
where we were going, I found they were just as confused. Secrecy constitutes a rule or 
procedure, regularly practiced in organizing occupations. In a sense, it centralizes 
decision-making in the hands of a few movement leaders. This feature is temporary, 
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however, as the true dynamics to carrying out the occupations involve many families in 
actual re-appropriation (Fieldnotes: Encampment in INCRA Office, Belem, Pará, 7-1-
2009; Frontline: “Cutting the Wire,” 2005). 
In addition to secrecy and the incentive “point” structure, regularized or 
institutionalized practices integral to occupations include working the land and 
constructing tents for the families to live in immediately after arrival. These efforts serve 
both symbolic and practical goals: on the one hand, families need to live somewhere and 
grow their food, while on the other hand, the movement legitimates many of their 
occupations as cultivating “unproductive lands.” Immediately working on occupied land 
shows the movement as the productive agent as opposed to the landowner. For these 
reasons, land occupations are at once destabilizing and stabilizing, i.e. they challenge the 
dominant socio-economic relations in the countryside, while their regularly established 
internal conduct establishes an alternative mode of organizing and implementing agrarian 
reform policy. 
 
Resistance to Private Property 
The MST's institutionalization of contention in agrarian reform – opposing 
centralized decision-making, promoting a more equal administrative division of labor, 
and enabling multiple cultural land uses to proliferate – also challenges private property. 
In particular, the MST's goal is to create settlements where families have usufruct rights, 
not definitive title that would allow individual families to sell their land (MST: 1995). 
The movement opposes land sales and insists that title ultimately remains with INCRA, 
  
101 
rather than with the individual families. Living on government-owned land removes the 
ability of movement members to individualize land holdings though sales or rent. This 
gives the movement a way to retain members because sales could facilitate individuals 
leaving the movement by selling their land. With the institution private property in 
general, individual owners have their holdings recognized and protected by a separate 
public authority. By vying for control of encampment and settlement design, the 
movement selects families and organizes land use, opposing the divide between public 
and private spheres. 
By refusing the right to alienate property, the MST places a barrier for members to 
exit the movement, while also continually providing a target for complaints (the 
government). The idea that the movement converts itself into a permanent ward of the 
government is actually only a concern during the initial two to three years following de 
jure recognition. At this time, credits and loans for houses and production implements are 
first distributed. This period is when INCRA is most involved, with any sudden changes 
seriously placing in danger the settlement process (Interview: Robert Kiel, INCRA-
Brasilia, 1-31-2011). After the distribution of these resources, however, interaction with 
the government is minimal. The logic behind the demand is not to remain on public land 
per se, but to remove the public/private distinction when it comes to property rights. And 
remaining on government-owned land provides the movement a scapegoat for problems, 
placing blame on the government for not executing agrarian reform to the fullest of its 
potential. 
The movement challenge to private property also occurs through simple acts of 
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ignoring public officials and making preliminary designs for agricultural production. In 
one interview concerning the problems INCRA faces in emancipating settlements, one 
official pointed to boxes of titles sent to MST members that were returned blank to the 
INCRA office (Interview: Jurindir, INCRA office Curitiba, Paraná, 8-1-2011). I was also 
told of the lack of progress in privatizing settlements in São Paulo state, where one 
experience was mentioned (Interview: Jose Bocarim, INCRA office in São Paulo, São 
Paulo, 11-1-2011). The government encourages privatization and the MST challenges it. 
Also, communal production – the dynamics of which I will explore more in Chapter 5 – 
is planned in certain encampments and settlements.  This involves collective land 
ownership where there is no clear divide between individual families. The MST's 
resistance to private property is apparent in their refusal to establish individual property 
arrangements and promotion of collective land ownership. 
The MST's self-governmental resistance institutionalizes a series of rules and 
procedures in the area of agrarian reform policy. They counter state power through 
decentralizing the authority to make decisions in land occupations, resisting potentially 
homogenizing modes of land re-appropriation and land use, and challenging the unequal 
distribution of administrative roles promoted by INCRA. The sense of movement identity 
created in encampments offers a bulwark against attempts to propagate national forms of 
belonging. The movement's efforts, as we will see in the next section, are their most 
successful attempts at institutionalizing self-governmental resistance. In comparison to 
other areas – education and agricultural production – the MST's institutionalization of 
resistance in agrarian reform policy shows higher levels of success. The reason, which 
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becomes apparent in the next section and in the chapters on education and agricultural 
production, is a relatively high level of strategic strength. 
 
3.3 Explaining and Evaluating the MST's Resistance in Agrarian Reform 
The preceding section analyzed the MST's alternative mode of governing agrarian 
reform that opposes state power and private property. That section answered the question, 
what is social movement self-governmental resistance in agrarian reform policy? In broad 
brushstrokes, I explained the contentious nature of the MST's encampments and 
occupations vis-a-vis state-led agrarian reform in the Brazilian context. In that section, I 
explored the nature of the MST's institutionalization of self-governmental resistance 
without documenting its overall level of success. 
This section explains how the movement has developed self-governmental 
resistance. This dissertation's guiding question – how can a social movement successfully 
develop a self-governmental mode of institutionalizing resistance? – is answered in this 
section, specifically through an analysis of movement strategy. Here, I provide empirical 
indicators that I use to explain the movement's development and evaluate their success. 
As a measure of success, I focus on the number of occurrences and participants involved 
in actions particular to agrarian reform such as land occupations, encampments, and 
demonstrations. Land occupations and encampments, like I discussed in the previous 
section, illustrate the MST's brand of self-governmental resistance in agrarian reform 
policy because they simultaneously stabilize a movement-centered form of order while 
destabilizing the government's alternative. Their coordinated, rule-based opposition to 
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state power and private property illustrates their self-governmental qualities. 
Demonstrations or marches, which I discuss more in the conclusion, reveal consistent 
levels of mobilization, but also potential changes in the MST's strategic strength and 
approach. 
I explain the movement's level of success through applying my theory of strategy 
as laid out in Chapter 2. First, I discuss how the movement's combination of strategies 
explains self-governmental resistance in agrarian reform. Second, I measure each 
subcategory's strength. The particular subcategories I document are direct-action and 
instrumental strategies, which I argue, cause self-governmental resistance as seen in the 
MST's alternative agrarian reform project. To support my argument, I use counter-factual 
analysis to rule out alternative explanations. In general, this section tests my three 
hypotheses: (1) that certain combinations of strategic action lead to different modes of 
movement institutionalization, (2) how increases in the iterations in movement plans of 
specific targets and goals, as well as in the time spent researching and documenting 
targets and goals, results in greater strategic strength and thus a higher potential for 
successful institutionalization and (3) if a low level of preparation exists with high levels 
of consistent and coherent objective formation, or visa versa, then we see a level of 
institutionalization lower than if both indicators were classified as high, yet higher than if 
both were low. 
 
The MST's High Level of Self-Governmental Success in Agrarian Reform 
The empirical indicators that I use to document the MST's success in agrarian 
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reform policy come from the academic literature, databases assembled by other social 
organizations, and official state reports. The main indicators I use to measure my 
dependent variable – institutionalization of self-governmental resistance, which in this 
chapter is confined to agrarian reform – include the number of occurrences relevant to the 
policy area (occupations, encampments, and settlements) and the percentage of people 
mobilized. 
We see that at the end of 2010 there were 8,562 settlements in Brazil, with 67, or 
a fraction of a percent, existing pre-1985 (INCRA: 2010). Sergio Leite, who conducted 
the most in-depth study of settlements to date, correlates the upsurge in movement 
activity led by the MST post-1985 with the increase in agrarian reform settlements 
(2004).
46
 Since 2000 (the first year reliable data for occupations has been kept according 
to movement), the MST has conducted roughly 50% of all land occupations in Brazil, 
organizing 1,757 out of the 3,563 total land occupations. Similarly, the number of 
families mobilized stands at a total of 494,428 in land occupations, with 311,160 of them 
– or 63% – organized by the MST. The movement has also mobilized the most families in 
encampments, with over 58% of the total families affiliated with the movement, or 
85,205 families out of total 146,295 since 2000. From these numbers, and given that 26 
other movements currently have organized land occupations, encampments, and 
settlements, the MST dominates this policy area and mobilizes more participants than any 
                                                 
46 First, we cannot know from the existing data how many settlements are actually “MST 
settlements” because sometimes the movement conducts occupations and the families 
chose not to continue affiliation. And second, given the numbers on occupations, we 
do not know if an occupation leads to a settlement, as the families are possibly evicted 
and forced to go occupy elsewhere. 
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other movement (Dataluta: 2011; CPT: 1988-2011). 
Most other movements that struggle for agrarian reform emerged following the 
MST's success in the 1990s. Some movements, such as the Movimento de Libertação dos 
Sem Terra (Movement for Landless Liberation or MLST), emerged over disagreements 
with MST strategy (Ondetti: 2008). Others, such as indigenous organizations located 
primarily in the Amazonian region, noticed the effect of the MST's successful use of 
occupations and copied them. The participation of various labor unions, such as 
Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (National Confederation of 
Agricultural Workers or CONTAG), Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura 
Familiar (Federation of Workers in Family Farming or FETRAF), and Central Única dos 
Trabalhadores (Unified Workers' Central or CUT) can be explained much in the same 
fashion. The MST is special because they are the only movement with a national scope. 
Most others, besides indigenous movements or groups like the Organização de Lutas no 
Campo (Organization for Struggle in the Country or OLC), are regional and confined to 
one or two states. Furthermore, the MST is not only the largest and most dominant, but it 
also has the reputation for being the most disciplined. 
The MST's ability to mobilize participants is also apparent in the number of 
demonstrations they have organized for agrarian reform. As we can see in Figure 3 in 
Appendix 1, the movement has conducted over 58% of all demonstrations calling for 
agrarian reform since 2002 – not land occupations, but practices like marches and traffic 
blockades – (1,354 out of 2,326 total actions). Similar to land occupation trends, the 
movement shows dominance in this area by mobilizing the most participants as compared 
  
107 
to other movements with similar objectives. What stands out, however, when comparing 
demonstration and occupation trends is the apparent reversal. As displayed in Figure 4 in 
Appendix 1, a steady decrease of land occupations has occurred simultaneously with an 
increase in agrarian reform manifestations. This trend, which I will discuss in this 
chapter's conclusion, indicates a change in the movement's direct-action strategic 
orientation. This presents a way to test my first hypothesis concerning the effect of 
different strategies on modes of movement institutionalization. I claim that rather than 
showing a movement demobilized or weak, this trend reveals how the struggle for 
agrarian reform has taken on what may be considered more conventional forms of 
contention. 
From this collection of sources, there is sufficient evidence to support the claim 
that the MST has achieved a high level of success in institutionalizing self-governmental 
resistance. The three different movement-led actions – land occupations, encampments, 
and manifestations – provide concrete examples of the MST alternative project, allowing 
us to measure their level of success. The movement has gained recognition in studies that 
acknowledge their efforts as the primary reason for the upsurge in land redistribution. 
Over the course of this dissertation, I document the movement's success in each area, i.e. 
agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production policy, by comparing the policy 
area's potential participants with those mobilized by the movement. Of all the policy 
areas where the MST is active, agrarian reform is where we see the movement's highest 
level of success. 
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Instrumental and Direct-action Strategies in MST Self-Governmental Resistance 
I identify two subcategories of strategy – direct-action and instrumentalist – that 
explain how the MST has achieved success in institutionalizing its alternative agrarian 
reform project. Each subcategory contains the independent variables of consistent and 
coherent formulation of objectives and level of knowledge preparation. They also 
incorporate the MST's plan to form an identity to guide their practices. Together, they 
cause the institutionalization of self-governmental resistance. A strategic approach to the 
study of how social movements institutionalize resistance focuses on specific movement 
plans concerning how they establish objectives and prepare knowledge, or “know-how.” 
Other agentic approaches, e.g. rational choice, also emphasize the decision-making 
abilities of actors, but apply a singular, de-contextualized way of representing action. The 
problem with this approach is that we cannot observe the effect of different kinds of plans. 
We also miss the role of identities in strategic planning, which I find as a proximate cause 
in explaining self-governmental resistance. Furthermore, variables that solely deal with 
contextual factors – like state strength and implementation of neoliberal programs – fail 
to account for MST rates of success rates. My theory of strategy explains how resistance 
unfolds and allows us to evaluate its success. 
Instrumentalization, which I identify as one sub-category of strategy, involves the 
movement's plans to use another actor for achieving a certain objective. This kind of plan 
locates decision-making squarely with the movement, yet requires the presence of 
another actor for the movement to institutionalize. The relationship, instead of being 
characterized by some kind of symbiotic or synergistic relationship, is fraught with 
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tensions and the persistent possibility for collapse. This contrasts with mediated strategies, 
exemplified by interactions with legislators who are delegated ultimate decision-making 
power. With respect to my theory, general discussions of alliances and coalitions fall into 
the strategic subcategory of instrumentalization. 
One instance of the MST's use of an instrumental strategy is in their development 
of their nucleo form of administration. Nucleos, as discussed in the previous section, 
constitute resistance as well as structure. This form of administration at once defies state 
power and provides an alternative form of order in its place. It arose as a result of 
movement created plans. Rather than appearing spontaneously, the MST used INCRA – a 
governmental institution – to develop its organicity to coordinate its challenge to status 
quo agrarian reform policy. Comparing current INCRA institutional directives and some 
of their documents on the role of social actors in settlement formation during the 1970s – 
before the existence of the MST – with the movement's current objectives, reveals where 
the MST plans to take, i.e. instrumentalize, knowledge and where it plans to 
institutionalize resistance.
47
 
Common goals and the proposed organization in the MST's and INCRA's vision 
of agrarian reform detail where the movement took its plan for small-group 
administration. Prior to the MST's emergence, INCRA planned to settle families 
according to a 12 step program. The steps, or goals, included running schools, 
                                                 
47 The “Comunidades Eclesiais de Base (Ecclesiastical Base Communities)” were also 
important at this time, with movement members connected to the Catholic Church and 
liberation theology. Such base communities are similar to INCRA's nucleos, yet the 
former explicitly concerned functions and agrarian reform. 
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administering health care, and establishing cooperatives.
48
 One retired official also 
included how “cooperation” and “self-management” were to be encouraged between the 
settlers, in addition to organizing “small groups” with specific “functions” (Ramirez: 
2006, 68). INCRA plans and designs for small groups in settlements existed prior to the 
MST's formation in the early 1980s. MST members, particularly in the early days of the 
movement, became aware of these goals and objectives after living in INCRA organized 
settlements (MST: 2002; Smith: 1982). That these plans and objectives existed prior to 
the MST shows a temporal gap with their proposal and the movement's origins. Close 
interaction during these initial stages allowed MST leaders to take INCRA for its designs. 
MST strategic plans, rather than conceiving of action entirely apart from the 
Brazilian government like revolutionary contention, include plans to strengthen INCRA. 
The movement's official position is to demand that INCRA become directly connected to 
the presidency and receive more funds (MST: 2008). This does not mean, however, a 
switch to mediated strategic planning and thus reformist contention. To strengthen 
INCRA would entail more resources for use by the MST, specifically their nucleos. For 
example, technical assistance cooperatives formed by the movement
49
 benefit by 
receiving steady pay, a portion of which is taxed by the movement. Also, the knowledge 
                                                 
48 The 12 programs, in their intended order for implementation, were: distribute land, plan 
territory, set administration organization, distribute initial credits, distribute initial 
production credits, build infrastructure, create means for education, administer health 
care, set up housing, create cooperatives, distribute another round of credits, and assist 
in commericalizing production (Ramirez: 2006, 65-71). 
49 The clearest example is COPTEC (Cooperativa de Prestação de Serviços Técnicos em 
áreas de Reforma Agrária or Service Cooperative for Agrarian Reform) in Rio Grande 
do Sul. Other cooperatives exist in other states, or members are trained and then serve 
communities with no official affiliation. Giving a portion of their pay and knowledge 
constitutes practices characteristic of all of them. 
  
111 
technicians acquire is shared with fellow activists in order to decentralize knowledge 
concerning settlement design. Additional material knowledge resources distributed to 
movement families in the form of credits to build or improve houses, as well as purchase 
food or implements, provide minimal resources upon which families can subsist. Thus, 
despite the MST's coordinated challenge to state power, the movement plans for INCRA 
to exist. In fact, the MST needs INCRA, yet the two remain relatively autonomous from 
one another, with the MST using INCRA for its own ends. In the past, the movement 
planned to use INCRA for its structure. Currently, the movement's instrumentalization 
strategy continues through devising ways to use government resources for their own ends. 
The relative autonomy is apparent from observing the contentious relations – 
illustrative of instrumental strategies – that occur between the MST and INCRA. In the 
pre-MST era, “all the programs were the direct responsibility of INCRA,” whose 
implementation required social actors' participation, yet with implementation ultimately 
requiring INCRA oversight (Ramirez: 2006, 70). Similarly, the claim to ultimate 
responsibility is established in current INCRA norms and directives, subordinating social 
actor's participation to ultimate state oversight. For example, directives for INCRA's 
Diretoria de Obtenção de Terras e Implantação de Projetos de Assentamento (Land 
Procurement Division) explicitly states that it, alone, is responsible for acquiring, 
obtaining, and planning land expropriation, as well as selecting families, while the 
Diretoria de Desenvolvimento de Projetos de Assentamento (Division of Settlement 
Development) claims final authority for coordinating, monitoring, and authorizing 
alterations in sustainable development, economic production, and social justice in 
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agrarian reform policies.
50
 
Tense relations are seen in different opinions concerning the appropriate roles of 
the movement in organizing agrarian reform policy. For some, the roles are defined with 
state actions insulated and separate from social actors (Interview: Richards, INCRA-
Brasilia, 2-10-2011), while others see movement policy execution in a positive light 
(Interview: Clarice, INCRA-Brasilia, 2-1-2011). Divisions internal to INCRA, which 
potentially could lead to a breakup of the partnership, also include multiple positions 
concerning privatization. Some officials with whom I spoke expressed support of the 
movement's opposition of private property (Interview: Robert Kiel, INCRA-Brasilia, 1-
31-2011) while others felt that property ought to eventually devolve to individual actors 
through sales (Interview: Cesar, INCRA- Brasilia, 2-9-2011). The MST's instrumental 
plans for INCRA are central to the development of their resistance but are always in 
danger of breaking apart. 
Counter-factual analysis shows that if not for the relationship with INCRA, the 
MST's self-governmental resistance would have developed differently, perhaps not at all. 
We can understand the special nature of the relationship between INCRA and the MST 
when we compare the Brazilian and Cuban experience of implementing agrarian reform. 
Cuba represents one of the most extensive cases of the implementation of agrarian reform 
policy, as well as one that many MST leaders and members seek to emulate. Comparing 
the two, however, shows that the Cuban experience did not involve social actors in the 
ways we see them involved in Brazil. “Cooperation” figures into the Cuban experience, 
                                                 
50 Taken from website, www.INCRA.gov.br. 
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but only in the narrow emphasis placed on economic production (see Chapter 5 of the 
First Agrarian Reform Law of 1961). Cooperation was central to both INCRA's and the 
MST's plans. In Cuba, the notion is peripheral to centralized state-led action. 
Furthermore, Cuban efforts in agrarian reform represent the coordinated, 
systematized efforts of a revolutionary as opposed to a self-governmental movement. 
This is apparent in how Castro's July 26
th
 Movement, one year before actually seizing 
power, declared “Law 3,” which called for expropriation of land (Pinto Santos: 1999). 
That a movement would declare a law for the entire country shows aspirations to occupy 
state power. MST efforts are not based on passing laws that arrogate to itself the sole 
legislative power to expropriate land. In Cuba, before and after seizing of power, 
implementation focused on redistribution and nationalization by centralized state 
authorities without social participation (O'Connor: 1968; Alvarez, et al: 1995). The 
Cuban experience, also, shows no instrumental relationship with other actors or 
institutions. This quality, as displayed in the Cuban case, is indicative of the revolutionary 
institutionalization of resistance. Even though the MST draws on Cuba for inspiration, 
their institutional relationship with INCRA shows self-governmental – not revolutionary 
– qualities. 
The MST's plans to appropriate INCRA's organizational structure shows the 
origins of the movement's administrative structure that is integral to their 
institutionalization of self-governmental resistance. It also reflects strategic learning on 
the MST's behalf concerning how to conduct agrarian reform struggles. At the time of 
their origins, leaders researched prior agrarian reform movements and discussed with 
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their leaders tactics and strategy.
51
 From their dialogue, conclusions adopted by the MST 
included retaining autonomy from political parties and unions, as well as avoiding 
presidentialism, i.e. centralizing decision-making power in one or two leaders (Stedile 
and Fernandes: 1999). In other words, the success or failure of their resistance, as 
understood by early MST militants, involved the form of the movement itself.
52
 They 
adopted the nucleo form as a means to not centralize power in single leaders, but to 
decentralize it. Movement leaders understood how not to organize from past struggles. 
They kept these ideas in mind when crafting plans to use INCRA's organizational design 
for their own purposes. 
Rival explanations concerning how the MST has developed would attribute causal 
forces either to neoliberal policy reforms or low levels of state strength. Concerning 
neoliberalism, the timing of the MST's development and adoption of the nucleo 
arrangement occurs prior to any kind of neoliberal economic policy implementation. 
Given the timing, neoliberalism is not a cause or a condition for nucleo development. 
Cultural theorists, most notably Cardoso, noted that the military government involved 
social organizations in governance because of their own weakness and desire to gain 
social legitimacy at the end of their regime (1992). These cases, however, are not 
indicative of resistance, but rather synergy or collaboration. The MST's tense relationship 
                                                 
51 Movements included o Movimento dos Agricultures Sem Terra (MASTER) of the 
1950s and the Ligas Campesinas (Peasant Leagues) of Pernambuco in the 1960s. 
52 Likewise, especially historically, communism led to the organization of peasants under 
the banner of working class consciousness, which in Brazil and other countries, 
usually led to the formation of alliances between workers and peasants that did not 
treat the two on equal footing. Welch hints at this, noting how prior movements to 
represent the peasantry during the cold war were often performed by unions (1999, 
2006). 
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with INCRA and state power shows a different kind of relationship, one distinct from 
collaboration, delegation, or synergy. 
Another potential rival explanation – one that focuses on state strength – would 
explain the movement's development as a consequence of state absence or lack of 
capacity. INCRA, given its history of leadership changes and lack of resources, could be 
considered ideal for a social actor to dominate. In fact, Wolford has already made a 
version of this argument, claiming that MST actions in agrarian reform comprise a form 
of “participatory governance by de fault (2010).” From the perspective of social 
movement theory, an institution's limited capacity to repress also could provide the 
opportunity for mobilization (Tarrow: 1998). Governmental weakness, however, does not 
explain the nature of the MST's resistance (self-governmental versus reform or 
revolutionary) because the movement's nucleo structure per se is not derivative of 
governmental absence. Or rather, absence does not, on its own, trigger the development 
of small group management. My account, focusing on strategy – specifically 
instrumentalization – absorbs Wolford's discussion of INCRA's limitations by showing 
where the MST's practice of governance, itself, comes from initially. 
Another example of the movement's instrumental strategic orientation, which 
particularly ties into the movement's efforts to foment their identity in agrarian reform, 
involves their appropriation of ideational resources. The principle of social function laid 
out in the Brazilian constitution,
53
 legitimates the MST's use of land occupations – their 
                                                 
53 For more on the MST and legal struggles concerning land, see Meszaros, George. 
"Taking the land into their hands: The landless workers' movement and the Brazilian 
state." Journal of Law and Society 27, no. 4 (2000): 517-541 
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way of challenging the centralization of state decision-making power. Evoking rights 
assists the movement in making the claim that occupations are a “last resort” for landless 
families that have tried surviving and working in all other possible ways – in cities and/or 
with welfare programs (Jornal Sem Terra: 1985). In this fashion, the movement 
represents its members as having exhausted all other available means to eek out a living. 
Because there is a right to land, however, and all other options fail, they have no choice 
but to develop their own form of access through occupations. This is a central part of the 
movement's “landless” identity: it carries with it some sense of economic deprivation, but 
also the idea that no other option for survival is available for its membership. The place 
of agrarian reform in the social function clause in the Constitution reinforces their claim 
with an appeal to justice, given that the laws exist but governmental elites do nothing. 
If there were no use of ideational resources, then the movement would not have 
the same legitimacy. The appeal to rights and the Constitution grants the movement an 
absolute standard – regardless of the cost of land or programs – to support their actions 
for agrarian reform. This provides the movement an unassailable appeal, what in social 
movement literature would be considered a “master frame (Bedford and Snow: 2000),” or 
in other words, language that is difficult to question. Without the “landless” identity and 
its connection to rights, the movement's call for agrarian reform would weaken, and most 
likely so would member identification with the movement. In their use of rights, 
members see agrarian reform and land as owed to them – for their work, suffering, etc., – 
with landowners illegally taking land (e.g. through grilhagem) and exploiting it. The 
instrumentalization of rights simplifies the demand and easily differentiates friend from 
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enemy. 
With identities so stark, the reasons for agrarian reform are easier to communicate 
and mobilize. The simplicity of their message, the reasons provided for the struggle, and 
identification of enemies, provides means to solidify identities, which in turn, facilitates 
mobilization. Furthermore, the way that the “sem-terra” identity is constructed in plans 
situates the movement subject as the only willing actor in the struggle for agrarian reform. 
The MST's construction of the “landless” identity in agrarian reform policy both captures 
direct-action and instrumentalist qualities. Concerning the former, the movement is 
required to occupy lands because no other option is available. And for the latter, the 
government owes them, especially after decades of unfulfilled promises and failed 
interactions. Adherents to the MST consider themselves as deserving of land and willing 
to use government resources to gain it. 
Constant relationships with INCRA and repeated use of rights-language allow us 
to evaluate the MST's instrumental strategy in taking the nucleo form of organization and 
ideational resources. Movement bulletins and documents criticizing large landowners and 
their abuse of power in the early 80s, reveals the early movement's efforts to connect the 
violation of the social function clause with large landowner unproductivity (e.g. Jornal 
Sem Terra: April, 1984; Jornal Sem Terra: December 1984 and January 1985). As is 
apparent in current movement documents and statements (e.g Jornal Sem Terra: July 
2004; Jornal Sem Terra: August 2009), evoking the social function clause of the 
constitution and specific laws to challenge large, unproductive landowners by calling on 
INCRA to redistribute land, remains unaltered. While difficult to measure the use of ideas, 
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an electronic search for “reforma agrarian (agrarian reform)” in the movement's two 
major internal publications for circulation to membership – A Jornal Sem Terra and o 
Boletim Sem Terra – yielded 7,789 hits. “Sem terra (landless)”also appeared 6,639 times. 
Such a high iteration of terms indicates coherence and consistency in strategic planning. 
In addition to coherence and consistency, multiple interactions since the late 
1970s with INCRA officials has resulted in the movement acquiring knowledge, or 
“know-how,” concerning how to build nucleos and self-govern. In fact, the first settlers 
that began the MST in the late 1970s were families returning from failed attempts in the 
Amazon who had participated for years in INCRA settlements (dos Santos: 1993). 
Regardless of fluctuations in levels of occupations and manifestations (see Fig. 1 in the 
Appendix), they both trigger regular responses and engagement with INCRA officials 
more than any other governmental actor. Routine meetings, visits to encampments, and 
protests at INCRA regional offices are some of the activities that characterize the 
movement's interactions with INCRA. Regular interactions with INCRA since the 1970s 
have granted the movement a high degree of knowledge concerning the state's 
organizational structure. Such frequent contact with INCRA provides the MST with time 
to learn from prior practices and to craft ways to use INCRA in the institutionalization of 
their alternative mode of agrarian reform featuring land occupations and encampments. 
Combining with the movement's instrumental strategy to implement its version of 
agrarian reform is its direct-action strategic plan. While the form of the MST's nucleo 
organization comes from plans to instrumentalize INCRA, the content concerning how 
the nucleos decentralize decision-making authority, equalize administrative roles, and 
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promote localized, heterogeneous cultural formations, is conceived in the movement's 
own direct-action strategic orientation. Movement documents that detail how to organize 
and administer encampments and settlements (MST: 1985) were, in part, systematizations 
of prior direct-action practices from early encampments like Nova Ronda Alta and Macali 
e Brilhante (Jornal Sem Terra: May 1982; Jornal Sem Terra: June 1982). These 
experiences, implemented according to the nucleo model, generated lessons, as well as 
actual leaders, for future struggles. In nucleos, movement members learned to debate, 
discuss, and arrive at decision themselves, independent of allies. These experiences 
became elaborated in documents that focus on how to hold movement-led meetings and 
make collective decisions through them (MST: 1999; 2009). 
MST direct-action strategic plans privilege the movement's own decision-making 
efforts in implementing and designing agrarian reform without outside influence. For 
example, as I was visiting two encampments, I noticed how an adjacent one was 
completely vacant. I was told that the campers were out at a political training exercise 
and that this was common to all encampments (Fieldnotes: Encampment 1 Outside of São 
Paulo, São Paulo, 8-10-2009). Political training serves, as I was told, to inculcate an MST 
and socialist identity into the movement's new recruits. I also attended a political training 
retreat set up by the movement's grassroots organizers, a Frente de Massa (Mass Front), 
to debate the recent decline in land occupations and devise strategies for future efforts 
(Fieldnotes: Settlement outside of Porto Alegre RS, 6-5-2011). Older activists, many of 
whom have worked in the MST for decades, attended these strategy meetings to elaborate 
plans for future action and dissect current problems. Both of these events, even though 
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independent of one another, showcased well-organized and planned attempts by the 
movement to set future action plans. They also, regardless of member experience levels, 
emphasized actors planning to rely on themselves to execute agrarian reform, rather than 
involve some outside actor. In fact, other than me, only movement members attended. 
Workshops, meetings, and seminars also train movement members for conducting 
meetings and leading land occupations. The number of movement documents meant for 
internal distribution and debate concerning planning different kinds of movement 
activities and practices – 35 cadernos de formação (training notebooks) were published 
between 1986 and 2000 as compared to 17 in the area of eduction – show a relatively 
high level of knowledge preparation.
54
 Complementing movement materials, workshops 
at multiple times throughout the year at various places disseminate the knowledge 
concerning political theory and grassroots organization to movement members and allies. 
One study documents 29 “centros de formação (training centers)” that have trained over 
102,180 movement members in direct-action tactics, on the movement's identity, and on 
reasons for their struggle (Plummer: 2008). The number of documents shows how the 
movement iterates their direct-action plans often, while the high number of graduates and 
training centers displays their commitment to spending quality time in creating self-
reliant members with a strong movement-centered identity. 
Direct-action plans show consistent and coherently elaborated objectives. We 
observe such qualities in comparing the practice and planning of nucleo administration in 
                                                 
54 As I will show in the other chapters, political training in agrarian reform, on nucleo 
organization, and administration, as well as how to conduct land occupations, outpace 
the other areas in terms of members trained and materials disseminated. 
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encampments at Nova Ronda Alta in the 1980s with current cases. The small group 
division into nucleos, decentralization of leadership, and consensual decision-making 
efforts, were qualities of these early MST encampments (Carter: 1997; Jornal Sem Terra: 
June 1982). From security patrols, to small “voluntary” work groups sent around the 
country as part of the movement's service contribution, the encampments I visited in 2011 
retained the same nucleo organization and governance as described by scholarship and 
early movement accounts. Furthermore, documents from the 1980s are still used for 
training members in seminars and workshops in encampments and settlements, providing 
further evidence of consistency in the movement's direct-action plans. Lastly, many of the 
original movement militants remain in top leadership positions. While this has been 
critiqued by some for creating a movement hierarchy (Banford and Rocha: 2002), this 
older cadre serves a crucial role for the movement's direct-action efforts by often 
speaking at movement events to remind people of the past struggles, emphasize the 
importance of continuing resistance, and show that the movement can lead its own efforts. 
Thinking in counter-factual terms reveals how the MST would have developed 
differently if direct-action plans were different or absent. The nucleo structure, while 
coming from INCRA, requires constant ideological maintenance in the MST's adaptation. 
Or rather, the INCRA's small group administration did not oppose private property and 
appeal to the Cuban Revolution – these qualities come from the MST's efforts to fuse the 
nucleo organization in agrarian reform with their identity. Without the direct-action plans 
and training, these qualities would be absent. I was also told by one of the MST's 
agricultural technicians how encampments and settlements that developed a rigorous and 
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well-planned nucleo format were more likely to remain cohesive, produce economically, 
and stay in the movement, versus those that were less organized in terms of group 
administration (Interview: RS MST/COPTEC, 3-9-2011). Thus, without the high level of 
knowledge and planning, membership identity and sense of belonging would be lower. 
Land occupations are not only risky but have often, in many states, turned violent. If 
families chose to stay, they often wait years and remain vulnerable to police evictions and 
vigilante violence. For many, the risks are quite real, and without the well-thought out 
plans for how to carry out agrarian reform themselves, and a clear identity, many 
individuals would leave. 
Without these materials and planning, members would have little instruction to 
follow, risking the implementation of the MST's self-governmental resistance in agrarian 
reform policy. Allies, such as the unions and the church, helped organize members in the 
early years and continue to attend marches or demonstrations, but they have not shown 
the will or the means to provide day-to-day efforts at assuring effective grassroots 
organization. The MST had to create their plans, mostly, through consulting prior 
Brazilian movements and researching other examples of agrarian reform. The level of 
preparation and energy devoted to creating new leaders and training members in nucleo 
organization, as well the tax or service contribution alluded to in the previous section, 
also produce a high level of discipline. If not for this movement-created discipline, as 
well as time spent on creating strategic plans, the movement would not have lasted this 
long or achieved their current level of success. 
Existing theories have difficulties predicting the level and kind of 
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institutionalization we see in the MST's efforts to control agrarian reform policy. Political 
Process Theory (McAdam: 1999), or scholars who focus on opportunity structures 
(Tarrow: 1998), would see the relationships established with INCRA as evidence of 
“openings” within official institutions.55 For these theorists, levels of repression, the 
proclivity to assist, or help from elite allies are factors that explain mobilization. These 
potential explanations are also independent of a movement's plans or objectives. While 
contextual factors may account for the origins of protest waves, they do not provide a 
way to connect the outcome – self-governmental movement resistance – with an input 
that explains kinds of resistance, i.e. reformist struggles or self-governmental. For an 
explanation that differentiates between kinds of movements, we need to focus on the 
movement's own perspective and plans. Agentic theories, e.g. rational choice, would 
collapse the kinds of strategic approaches and plans followed by the MST into the one, 
broad category of utility maximization. And like structural approaches, they miss the 
chance to explain variations. 
Furthermore, trends particularly in land occupations, trouble the 
repression/facilitation hypothesis. In one study of the MST, Ondetti notes that an 
unfavorable government actually led to, with favorable media coverage, an increase in 
movement mobilization (2006). The recent decline in occupations and encampments, 
furthermore, problematizes the connection between facilitation and mobilization given 
the presence of a favorable center-left government. What a focus on strategy reveals is 
that a movement's actions, vision, and plans are just as important – if not more so – than 
                                                 
55 Ondetti's explanation for the variation in level of land occupations relies on this kind of 
explanation (2008). 
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context. It is not the elite as much as what the movement does with them that is relevant 
in determining movement courses of action and resistance. While Ondetti's account does 
not explicitly focus on strategy, if it were not for the persistent direct-action plans of the 
MST to occupy land and form encampments, the media would have had nothing to cover. 
The current decline is not a result of contextual factors, but as I will discuss in the 
conclusion, a result of strategic changes. 
Even though strategy is the main factor at work in explaining the MST's 
institutionalization of self-governmental resistance, the way the movement would have 
devised its plans would have changed if the left-leaning President Lula had lost in 2002. 
Ondetti considers the time following FHC's second term (1998-2002) as one of the most 
difficult in the movement's history (2008). The government coordinated opposition to the 
MST by outlawing the creation of settlements from lands acquired through occupations, 
eliminating technical assistance programs, and cutting the special credit program from 
agrarian reform beneficiaries. At this time of extreme vulnerability and relatively low 
levels of mobilization, the Lula government signaled a positive change for the movement. 
Accordingly, the MST continued their combination of direct-action and instrumental 
strategic planning. In an alternative scenario without an allied government in power, the 
movement would have had to make adjustments during an already difficult time. As we 
will see in education in the next section, the MST has difficultly instrumentalizing 
oppositional governments. If José Serra, instead of Lula, had won the presidency, we 
could expect a significantly lower level of institutionalization – especially in agrarian 
reform. The reason is not context per se, but the MST's strategic problems in 
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instrumentalizing certain kinds of authorities. 
Cultural approaches, e.g. Alvarez: 1998, would discuss the movement's 
appropriation of rights. They could also, particularly where contextual and existing 
agentic theories encounter problems, potentially differentiate between kinds of strategies 
and movements. Studies included in this camp focus on describing movements without 
providing empirical indicators that show levels of implementation or mobilization. In 
other words, while these studies document cases, they do not provide a rationale to 
explain variation in movement success. 
My focus on instrumental strategies pinpoints where the administrative basis for 
the MST's self-governance originates. Noting the movement's historical development and 
contentious relationship with governmental institutions provides an explanation based on 
strategy. Both indicators of strategic strength – knowledge preparation, and consistent 
and coherently elaborated objectives – were high for strategic subcategories of 
instrumentalization and direct-action. We observe a high level of institutionalization, as 
well as a movement-centered identity in both strategic orientations, proving all three of 
my hypotheses. 
The best explanation concerning how the MST has developed self-governmental 
resistance lies with the movement's strategic orientation. Both actors – INCRA and the 
MST – had similar plans and visions for conducting agrarian reform policy. Given that 
the MST developed after INCRA, and given the differences with key cases like the Cuba, 
there is little doubt that the MST plans took INCRA's institutional structure and resources, 
vying for control of agrarian reform policy. Their use of resources also has contributed to 
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success in institutionalizing their mode of governing agrarian reform. They have 
managed to use legal discourses in creative ways to show how they – and not some other 
actor – must carry out agrarian reform. While an instrumental strategic orientation 
explains the form of self-governmental resistance, the content, or how self-governance is 
conducted, lies squarely with the MST's own work and preparation. In this way, direct-
action and instrumental strategies combine in the formation of the MST's alternative, 
oppositional agrarian reform project. 
 
3.4 Conclusion: A Change in Resistance? 
My goal in this chapter is to illustrate that the MST's practices of self-governance 
in agrarian reform policy challenge both the institution of private property and state 
power. In self-governmental resistance, movements remain contentious because 
movement-led order contests both private property and already-existing state forms of 
governance that emphasis centralization, homogeneity, and the establishing of unequal 
administrative roles. The MST's approach to establishing self-governance in agrarian 
reform policy contests each of these forms of state conduct, specifically in the way they 
organize land occupations and encampments. They have successfully – as seen in the 
numbers of land occupations, encampments, and settlements – institutionalized an 
alternative – and oppositional – mode of agrarian reform. To institutionalize this vision, 
they have crafted instrumental and direct-action strategic orientations. With high levels of 
knowledge preparation, and consistently and coherently formulated objectives, the 
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movement shows a high level of strategic strength, which means high levels of success in 
institutionalizing resistance. 
Movement efforts at institutionalizing a form of self-governmental resistance have 
not been a total success. Opposition to the movement's plans not only comes in direct 
ways, but also from the same institutions that they use in their projects. Certain 
interviews with officials called INCRA a “state within a state” that “does too many things” 
while taking on “responsibilities other institutions ought to (Interview: Clarice, INCRA 
Director, Brasilia, 2-1-2011; Interview: Cesar, INCRA Director, 2-6-2011). Such 
comments hint at problems both for INCRA and the MST. I was also told that “of course 
I will attend to the movement's demands. However, I always tell them that we can not 
give them a lot. If they want bigger changes they need to go confront bigger institutions 
(Interview: Clarice, INCRA Director, Brasilia 2-1-2011).” Ironically, the same institution 
(INCRA) that facilitates the development of movement governance stymies it through 
limited resources and capacity. The effect is that the movement has regular access to 
resources and allies. The problem, however, is that repeated interactions potentially 
provincialize the struggle, removing it from the wider public's attention. 
Also, the movement's shift from land occupations to protests shows a shift to 
more conventional social movement forms of contention. Specifically, if land occupations 
and encampments disappear, then the MST potentially becomes a reform-style movement. 
This, in itself, is not a problem for the movement. It does mean, if we follow Tarrow's 
work, that the movement will become further professionalized and eventually stop 
disruption. Some in the movement have already noticed this trend, issuing a letter before 
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leaving at the end of 2010 about worrisome conservative trends. Many movement 
members also recognized the current state of “crisis” the movement was in given the 
decrease in more confrontational actions. 
Now, as more recent movement documents show, the struggle has entered a phase 
the MST calls “accumulação de forças (accumulating forces).” The idea, from what I 
heard from members and read in documents, is to accumulate resources (material and 
ideational) in order to conduct more confrontational struggles in the future. The danger, 
obviously, is that the future never arrives. And if the tendency for the movement to 
organize peaceful demonstrations instead of land occupations continues as part of their 
efforts to accumulate forces, then agrarian reform policy self-governmental resistance 
will simply be replaced by demands. 
My hypothesis concerning the institutionalization of social movement resistance 
involves a substantive understanding of strategic strength. A lower level of self-
governmental resistance, therefore, would come about through changes in strategy. And 
in fact, as the discussion above concerning “a accumulação de forças” illustrates, we are 
seeing such changes. The shift, in this example, is a decreased effort in direct action 
planning – especially with respect to conducting land occupations. Demonstrations 
continue, but they take the form of demanding another actor, either a political party or 
institution, to do the work of agrarian reform on the movement's behalf. For this reason, a 
strategic shift is taking place to mediated strategies – delegating decision-making power 
and authority over the dynamics of agrarian reform policy. The land occupation is a 
policy instrument in terms of decentralizing land access and creating the conditions for 
  
129 
encampments. In many ways, the contestation of private property is also inextricably 
connected to occupying lands. If these end, the movement continues. Yet the way it 
persists is as a reform-style social movement. 
I had the feeling while I was doing my research that the movement rested too 
much on its laurels, or in other words, it sought glory and recognition for actions and 
successes that have long passed. I was told frequently of the success at Fazenda Annoni, 
which was occupied in the mid-1980s, and how the largest occupations ever were led in 
Paraná, which occurred in the 1990s. These events, while key to the movement's 
successes, have not been reproduced in the last ten years. If the strategies concerning 
agrarian reform – essentially the policy area that has made the movement – continue to 
shift to a more mediated approach, then so does the innovative nature of the MST. 
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CHAPTER 4: SELF-GOVERNMENTAL RESISTANCE IN EDUCATION 
 
The MST's Alternative Educational Project 
 
Early in my fieldwork I visited the MST's school and centro de formação (training 
center), the Escola Nacional Florestan Fernandes (Florestan Fernandes National School 
or ENFF).
56
 The school is impressive: four dormitories, cafeteria, bookstore, communal 
garden, multiple classroom buildings, and various smaller houses for staff. This veritable 
village rests on seven acres and is administered by twenty or so permanent movement 
staff, various temporary movement-member assistants, and the students who attend 
classes. Together, they execute the school's daily activities – from providing meals to 
implementing pedagogical goals – in small groups comprised of five or six people. This 
“nucleo (team),” mode of managing the ENFF also characterizes the form of conduct the 
MST has developed to institutionalize their mode of resistance within other policy areas. 
As I illustrated in the previous chapter on agrarian reform and nucleos in encampments, 
these teams provide the means for the movement to challenge state power through 
resisting the subordination of social actors to governmental elites. In this chapter, while 
the policy area is different, the form through which the MST conducts its resistance is 
much the same. 
The MST garners most attention for its dramatic land occupations, where families 
occupy and squat on publicly or privately owned land. Land occupations, and their 
ensuing encampments, are key elements of the movement's way of institutionalizing an 
alternative agrarian reform project. In addition to changing the ways land is re-
                                                 
56 For more in-depth analysis of the ENFF, see Silva (2005). 
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appropriated, the movement has also managed to institutionalize resistance in both 
educational and agricultural production policy. The former, which is the focus of this 
chapter, has gained fewer adherents than in agrarian reform, yet more than in agricultural 
production. Despite this lower level of success, the reasons for which I explain later in 
this chapter, the MST's self-governmental resistance in education is integral to their mode 
of resistance. Their actions in this policy area also draw the attention of activists and 
scholars, having earned the movement multiple domestic and international awards.
57
 
In this chapter, I show that one of the reasons why the MST has been recognized 
for their educational efforts is their systematic and oppositional nature. The movement's 
educational projects, with the ENFF as one – but by no means the only – example of 
success, draws our attention to two perplexing qualities of social movements in general 
from the standpoint of both common depictions of movements and representations in the 
academic literature. The first perplexing quality is how this actor – a social movement – 
which we typically associate with disrupting order can also establish it. Characterizing 
this order – this mode of institutionalization as I call such regularization of movement 
contention – we find rules and practices that constrain, as well as enable, member 
activities in service provision. This chapter focuses on the MST's institutionalization of 
self-governmental resistance in the policy area of education. 
                                                 
57 International actors such as the United Nations' Childrens Fund (UNICEF) recognized 
the movement in 1995 and 1999 with awards for their educational endeavors. Within 
Brazil, the MST has earned awards from Teachers' Unions, i.e. Sindicato dos 
Professores do Rio Grande do Sul (Sinpro-RS), for their efforts at another of their key 
schools, Instituto Técnico de Capacitação e Pesquisa da Reforma Agrária (Technical 
Institute for Training and Research in Agrarian Reform or ITERRA), and from 
Ministério de Educação (Ministry of Education or MEC) for their work in Educação 
de Jovens e Adultos (Education for Young People and Adults or EJA). 
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The second surprising quality about the MST concerns how its form of 
institutionalization is oppositional. Simply because “movement” is in their name, does 
not automatically entail contention. The MST's territorial presence, number of members, 
and multiple areas of involvement reveal grandeur. Yet the possibility remains that their 
service provision either is either complicit in dominant social interests, or unintentionally 
supportive of them. Collective resistance – a defining quality of a social movement – has 
to be sustained and engage some power structure that is cultural, political, and/or social in 
nature. I ground this dissertation in how the MST challenges state power and private 
property. This chapter focuses on how they oppose these targets through designing and 
implementing an alternative mode of education. 
The MST's institutionalization of education, as I will describe in this chapter, 
remain contentious. The Brazilian government exercises state power by designing and 
executing educational policy that homogenizes cultures, centralizes decision-making 
authority, and creates an unequal division of administrative roles. The movement's 
opposition to state power in educational policy is observed in how they encourage 
cooperation in decentralized small groups and focus on local cultural practices. They also 
challenge private property through educating students on cooperative living and 
economics in the classroom. For these reasons, the MST's institutionalization of 
educational practices is the same mode of resistance – self-governmental – that I 
introduced in Chapter 2 and illustrated in the previous chapter on agrarian reform. To 
isolate how social movement self-governance constitutes resistance in educational policy, 
I draw attention to how the movement has attempted to gain control of elementary and 
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secondary schools. I compare the movement's practices with those of the Brazilian 
government to highlight their differences and where we observe contention. 
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the central elements of the state mode of 
governing education in general, and in Brazil. After establishing how state power is 
exercised in educational policy, in the second section, I present the MST's educational 
designs and instances of implementation. I also illustrate how they challenge the central 
elements of state power – centralized decision-making, cultural homogenization, and an 
administrative unequal division of labor – as well as private property. The third, and final, 
section of this chapter evaluates and explains the MST's efforts. Like in the previous 
chapter on the movement's attempts in agrarian reform policy, I document the number of 
potential participants and compare that number with the movement's results. I find that 
the movement's achievements, with respect to potential adherents, are less than what we 
find in agrarian reform. I explain and evaluate these results with reference to my theory 
of strategy, comparing it with potential accounts from Political Process and Rational 
Choice Theory. The movement's level of success is less in this area given certain strategic 
problems, especially adequately preparing to instrumentalize governmental authorities. 
 
4.1 The Intersection of State Power and Education Policy, Generally and in Brazil 
State Power and Education 
Education potentially encompasses, in different ways, each of the other two policy 
areas – agrarian reform and agricultural production – that I use to document variation in 
the MST's institutionalization of self-governmental resistance. For example, movement 
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member training seminars on how to conduct occupations could qualify as educational. 
Likewise, agricultural production necessarily involves learning agroecological or 
conventional methods either in a school or from one's own family. If we equate learning 
and instruction to education, then no area is untouched. Thus, to pinpoint the nature of 
MST resistance in education, we need to first detail, in a general sense, how state power 
and education function together. 
Education and state power intersect in the promotion of national cultures, 
centralizing decision-making power, and subordinating social actors. Fukuyama sees 
education as central to state-building, despite considering it secondary to other services 
such as security (2004). Historical works, such as Weber's discussion of France, present 
the nation-building effects of institutionalized instruction in disseminating norms and 
language (1979). Marxist analysis highlights the policy area's broadly construed 
economic dimensions. As an “apparatus,” educational policy, for instance, assists in 
capital accumulation (Althusser: 1971). Thinking in Althusserian and Gramscian terms, 
Apple discusses how despite existing relatively autonomous from dominant class 
interests, educational policy functions to generate consensus around the hegemony of 
capitalist production (1995). State power facilitates capital growth and accumulation 
through particular educational policies and initiatives. Similarly, other studies show how 
neoliberalism and educational policies intersect by training social actors to work at the 
bottom of a hierarchical economic division of labor (Green: 1997; Olssen and Peters: 
2005). Training workers also bolsters private property by better qualifying wage-labor. 
These studies reveal general themes that connect state power to education. First, 
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state power and educational policy often coalesce around fomenting uniform cultural 
identities. Whether explicitly favoring certain languages over others, or encouraging 
students to sing the national hymn at the beginning of the day, state power fosters the 
creation of a singular national identity. Second, educational policy is directly involved in 
favoring certain forms of economic behavior over others. Training and developing skill 
sets subordinates certain citizens in a capitalist hierarchy. And lastly, governments have 
worked to centralize the guidelines for instruction and curriculum in specific 
bureaucracies. Educational policy instills a national identity, develops and delivers 
particular directives from a singular, hierarchical governmental institution, and 
subordinates social actors – economically and administratively – in the process. 
 
State and Education in Brazil 
In Brazil, we can observe the development of state power through educational 
policy at two distinct periods of time. The first takes place prior to Getúlio Vargas' 
“Estado Novo (New State)” in the 1930s. Before Vargas, in what is referred to as 
“dualidade structural (sistema dual de ensino (dual instruction))” education was an elite 
privilege, not a right. Class and administrative inequality was institutionalized through 
governmental elites securing for their own progeny – often through establishing rigorous 
and selective exams – the means to enjoy a liberal arts education in secondary schools 
and universities, leaving “the masses,” or rather, everyone else, with little or no schooling 
(Nagel: 2001). Rural populations, which the MST claims as their base, were denied 
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access to education at this time. Centralized practices were weak – yet existent – given 
the sparsity of access to education overall. 
The Vargas-era Constitutions of 1934 and 1937 attempted to replace elite 
education with more centralizing, homogenizing efforts to establish a uniform curriculum 
grounded in nationalism. As part of nation and government-building efforts, primary 
education was guaranteed free, as a right for all. Right replaced privilege, regardless of 
actual enjoyment. Curriculum design shifted towards implementing one national model 
for all Brazilians in subjects such as Portuguese, Science, and Math (Freitas and Biccas: 
2009). Indicative of the effort to instill a national identity, 800 private German schools 
were closed, and then reopened, but as 900 public schools with instruction exclusively in 
Portuguese (Dalbey: 1970). Homogenizing practices of curriculum design under the 
banners of “rationality” and “standardization” brought more than 991,000 additional 
students into a national system to “erradicate ethnic, cultural, and national identities” and 
create one singular Brazilian identity (De Souza: 2008). 
Also at this time, decision-making concerning the administration and oversight of 
curriculum and pedagogy was centralized in one, singular institution – Ministério da 
Educação (Ministry of Education or MEC) – created in 1930. Other actors, e.g. the 
Catholic Church and large landowners, retained a certain level of control over schools 
within their spaces of influence, yet ultimately were subordinated to governmental elites 
(Marin and Marin: 2008; Caíres: 2008). In a way, these social actors continued exercising 
a certain governmental prerogative until mechanization of agricultural production led 
rural workers to leave for cities in the 1960s and 1970s. Even though these economic 
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changes came after Vargas' time, his institutional redesigning of the Brazilian government 
provided the groundwork for the increased exercise of state power. We see this in MEC's 
centralization of decision-making power. 
Relatively recent Constitutional reforms with respect to education continued to 
subordinate social actors and homogenize cultural differences. The impetus behind 
granting municipalities greater governmental powers during the creation of the 1988 
constitution was absent in educational policy (Samuels and Kingstone: 2000; Pierce: 
2013). While elementary education remained enshrined as obligatory and free in the 
Constitution, specific laws involving education were shelved for later elaboration.
58 
Only 
in 1996, with the Lei de Diretrizes de Base (Law of Basic Directives or LDB), does 
education receive particular policy guidelines. Even with the LDB's recognition of the 
devolution of pedagogical autonomy to state-level and municipal governments, Article 26 
still ensures uniformity in instruction through promoting a single, national curriculum.
59 
                                                 
58 In 2013 the constitution was amended to guarantee free and obligatory secondary 
education. Prior to that most recent reform and the 1996 LDB, the most discussion of 
education is found in the “emendas transitorias (transitional amendments),” located at 
the end of the 1988 constitution and the 1971 LDB. The vast majority of educational 
policy discussions in the 1988 constitution focus on the distribution of tax money for 
expenses. 
59 Article 26. “Os currículos do ensino fundamental e médio devem ter uma base nacional 
comum, a ser complementada, em cada sistema de ensino e estabelecimento escolar, 
por uma base nacional comum, a ser complementada, em cada sistema de ensino e 
estabelecimento escolar, por uma parte diversificada, exigida pelas características 
regionais e locais da sociedade, da cultura, da economia e da clientela. (Curriculm for 
elementary and secondary education must have a common national base that will be 
completed in each system and place of instruction. This national common base, at 
completion, in each system and place of instruction, may allow for a diversified part, 
given regional and local social qualities, particularly dealing with culture, economy, 
and client).” For more discussion on the history of rural schools, see Edla Soares, 
Parecer 36/2001. 
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The LBD recognizes rural education – where the MST inserts its pedagogical project – as 
“distinct” and “particular,” yet ultimately intending it to “complement” dominant, 
centralized directives. The place of rural education is clear; alternative education projects 
are welcomed, as long as they are subordinate to governmental direction. Such direction, 
furthermore, implicitly favors schools in urban areas. The subordination of rural to 
national (read urban education) simultaneously homogenizes cultural practices in schools. 
Exams within the Brazilian education system also continue to institutionalize dual 
instruction. Before and after the 1960s military government, these exams – known as 
“vestibulares” – institutionalized a way to assure that only students who attended the best 
high schools and/or paid for special preparatory classes entered universities (Romanelli: 
1973). Access has expanded over the last ten years, particularly due to the growth of 
private schools, but mainly for wealthy elites (McCowan: 2007). In spite of this growth, 
in comparison with other Latin American countries, Brazil still ranks low in average 
years of school attendance (7.2) and high in secondary school dropout rates (25%).
60 
The 
persistence of dual instruction institutionalizes both class and state/social hierarchies 
through exams: the wealthy tend to pass the exams as the state administers them. Exams 
also show social subordination through subjecting poorer segments of the population to 
governmental elites. 
Recent efforts to professionalize technical education insert schools into a global 
division of labor, yet in a narrow, economic fashion that privileges private property. 
Governmental priorities mirror aspects found in the MST's own pedagogical program – 
                                                 
60 Study and report available at http://g1.globo.com/educacao/noticia/2013/03/brasil-tem-
menor-media-de-anos-de-estudos-da-america-do-sul-diz-pnud.html. 
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addressing historical inequities of access to secondary education, including social actors 
to resolve social problems, and breaking down the division between mental and physical 
labor (MEC: 2006a; MEC: 2010a). MEC documents on this renewed attention to 
technical education, particularly in high schools, also mention the “pedagogical value of 
labor” in technical education, as well as its base in “social justice (MEC: 2010b).” 
Despite these initiatives, government-led initiatives in technical education for secondary 
education still suffer from limited resources (MEC: 2010; Interview: Valtier, Ex-Director 
Instituto Federal Paraná, 8-2-2011). More importantly, these efforts are oriented around 
training the Brazilian workforce for competition in the global economy. While providing 
more opportunities for students, particularly from rural spaces, these programs insert 
students as individuals – not collective or group actors – into the labor market where they 
ought to receive better wages. The techniques intend for instruction to better qualify 
wage-labor, not to question its existence or practice, thereby supporting private property. 
The three central elements of state power – centralizing decision-making authority, 
homogenizing cultures, and creating an unequal administrative division of labor – all 
characterize Brazilian educational policy. Such elements also constitute the main targets 
for MST self-governmental resistance. Decision-making authority concerning curriculum 
design shows signs of centralization specifically through concentrating power in official, 
governmental institutions. The promotion of urban over rural schools and the system of 
exams place a barrier between social actors and governmental elites. The exams are 
crafted by governmental actors and limit the entry of usually poorer segments of the 
population. Technical schools, notwithstanding the government's recent socially-
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conscious attempts to change instruction, remain wedded to qualifying wage-labor and do 
not question wage-labor itself. Or rather, they assist in advancing private property. 
Historically and currently, we also see the homogenization of cultures through closing 
private German schools in the promotion of Brazilian identity, and the reorganization of 
the curriculum according to standardized, mainly urban-based subjects. 
 
4.2 Institutionalizing Resistance in Elementary and Secondary Education 
MST Self-Governmental Contention in the Schools 
In the previous section, I illustrated how state power exists in general and within 
Brazilian educational policy. This chapter's focus is on how the MST's educational 
project constitutes self-governmental resistance, rather than revolutionary or reformist. 
The key qualities of self-governmental resistance include coordinating rule-based 
procedures that challenge state power and private property. To identify such resistance, I 
focus on instances of movement contention in specific policy areas – like education – 
where governments deploy state power. In vying for service control, we observe in the 
practice of self-governmental resistance the institutionalization of the precepts of 
decentralization, heterogeneity, and role equality against the exercise of state power. 
In this section, I begin by first explaining the meaning of a concept central to the 
MST's pedagogy – “reality” – and illustrate how curriculum and pedagogy designed from 
it challenges the homogenizing imperatives of state power and private property. I 
illustrate how the movement institutionalizes its vision in certain elementary schools, 
specifically in the schools known as the “escolas itinerantes (itinerant schools).” These 
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schools highlight the movement's work on institutionalizing “reality” as a means to 
inculcate a particular brand of MST identity around education. Second, I discuss how 
cooperation – both inside and outside the schools where the MST exerts influence – 
contest the centralization of decision-making authority and social subordination. I focus 
on secondary education as an example of how cooperation challenges state power with 
respect to centralization and social subordination. Specific MST high schools also reveal 
unique ways to challenge private property. 
 
“Reality,” Resistance, and Private Property 
The movement's educational project involves a creative, movement-centered 
understanding of production and context. In one document, the movement explains that 
“labor generates all wealth, identifies us as a class, and makes us capable to construct 
new social relations and consciousnesses,” with movement-administered schools “not 
having one sole objective to create laborers, but being a privileged place to analyze the 
labor process (MST: 1996, 169).” “Construction” is not ex nihilio, or from abstract 
principles, but as explained in another movement document, rooted in “diagnosing 
problems within already-existing social relations to change them (MST: 1995).” The 
focus on problems and relationships ultimately revolves around the oft-repeated concept 
of “reality.” The term is vague enough to fit nearly any content within it, yet specific 
enough to guarantee that the movement is the only actor that knows its contents. 
MST instruction is intended to remain wedded to local knowledges and practices, 
which the movement grants itself the power to determine. Labor, in this regard, is not a 
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form of work that reproduces social relations. Rather, labor-as-construction grounds 
educational processes in creativity, cultivating in students a sense of their role in 
producing social, economic, and political relations. This broad meaning of labor 
construed by the movement in their understanding of “reality” opposes being limited to 
professional development for specific occupations. It also involves educating students in 
a way that raises a critical awareness concerning private property. In how the movement 
teaches “reality,” students see themselves as producers, as well as exploited by dominant 
class interests. Already, at a young age, students begin to develop a class consciousness 
that is critical to private property and capitalism. Movement education places students, of 
all ages, in a classroom where instruction promotes the formation of politically-conscious 
students that understand labor as creative power rather than simply action involving 
wages. 
 
Culture and Order in MST Elementary Education 
While all schools in their application of the movement's pedagogy focus on 
production and “reality,” the itinerant schools institutionalize these precepts particularly 
well. Their distinctive quality arises from their direct role in collective action – they 
conduct class in marches and protests, rather than the other schools that remain fixed in 
particular locations. Student participation in marches and protests directly incorporates 
into instruction movement demands – at times the police abuse of power, and at others, 
demands for agrarian reform – meanwhile making the children into protesters (MST: 
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1998).
61
 “Reality” in this case involves direct-action and struggle, two key elements the 
movement instills in their membership overall. Itinerant school rules orient students to 
both direct participation and reflection about their role in the movement, connecting the 
reasons for action with practice. 
The movement also institutionalizes, especially within the itinerant schools, a 
counter-state identity. We can understand one aspect of how identity creation is advanced 
through their efforts to inculcate the movement's hymn. At one school, before the school 
day began, the children recited the movement's hymn instead of the Brazilian (Fieldnotes: 
Encampment 2 near Londrina, 6-30-2011).
62
 I was told afterword that because the 
children are younger, they need to become familiar with basic MST symbols and songs, 
such as the hymn, which doubles as a device to discuss the importance of the movement's 
struggles. The hymn's particular words also function to teach children how to read and 
write, rather than using abstract, didactic materials featuring pictures of apples, airplanes, 
or balloons that have no direct ties with the student's lives. 
Cultural identity within the MST's itinerant elementary schools opposes state 
power's efforts to homogenize cultures, creating a movement-centered identity that 
enables local demands and practices to develop. The repetition and pedagogical value 
inherent in teaching the movement's hymn shows a certain circularity immanent to the 
                                                 
61
 Itinerant schools serve the children of movement members who reside in encampments 
prior to acquiring land title. 
62
 Organized in what the MST calls “mística (mystic)” prior to any movement event, this 
practice often showcases movement symbols, stories about MST leaders, poems 
and/or music. One movement member told me that the mística has roots in the MST 
early days of mobilizing with the Catholic Church, and so should really be considered 
a morning prayer. For more detail, see Brava Gente chapter on the mística (1999). 
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production of movement self-governance: the movement produces its own “reality” 
through organizing protests, while teaching its members the meaning of those practices. 
This leads members to adhere to the movement's ideals, symbols, and identity. The 
movement's identity acts as a buffer between members and state power's promotion of 
nationalism. 
Such seemingly homogenizing practices inculcated by the movement are balanced 
by the movement's regular practice and promotion of “generative themes” in instruction. 
The Freirian concept of “temas geradores (generative themes)” instills within students 
recognition of their immediate surroundings and practices. The MST has long written and 
systematized instruction based on the Freirian concept (MST: 1992).
63 
When asked to 
provide an example, one teacher told me how the content of his classroom discussions 
came from students' own understanding of the encampment's needs, which at one time 
concerned access to water, and another, the need for literacy (Interview: Teacher, 
Encampment 1 Near Paraná, 6-21-2011). This aspect of the movement's pedagogy uses 
local needs, practices, and beliefs. Generative themes allow for local practices to shape 
instruction, allowing for multiple modes of identifications and culture to develop. Not 
uniformity, but localization and diversity are encouraged within spaces where the MST 
attempts to instill its own identity within members. 
I attended a training course organized by the MST's sector of education and the 
State University of Londrina, Paraná, concerning “generative themes” and early 
                                                 
63 Generative themes, as developed by Freire and applied by the MST, seeks to disrupt the 
abstract instruction that remains divorced from students' lived experience For further 
elaboration of the concept, see Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 
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childhood education. At the course, teachers from all 10 itinerant schools received 
instruction on how to incorporate lived experience into literacy education (Fieldnotes: 
Itinerant School Training, 7-31-2011). The seminar, as well as various movement 
documents used to refine the concept, reveal how incorporating context and reality 
through generative themes is not periodic, but a regular, systematized – in other words, an 
institutionalized – mode of conduct within the MST's alternative educational project. 
Itinerant schools also institutionalize discipline. For example, families in the 
encampment must sacrifice food for the school's daily snack (Interview: Encampment 1 
near Londrina, 6-21-2011). There is nothing forcing families to do this. However, this 
“voluntary contribution” improves the families' reputation within the movement. This 
connects to the movement practice of “sorteio” referenced in the previous chapter on the 
MST's institutionalization of an alternative way of conducting agrarian reform policy. As 
I elaborated in that chapter, the movement contests state power in the “sorteio” because it 
decentralizes the means to select families and redistribute land. Educational activities also 
figure into this practice. Through regularly contributing to movement schools (sending 
food, helping construct buildings, monitoring student performance) members increase 
their chances to be identified by the movement leadership as “good settlers” who deserve 
land from INCRA.
64 
The discipline here uses a state service – land redistribution – that 
movement leaders coordinate with INCRA to compel members to contribute provisions 
for MST schools. 
                                                 
64 This relationship involves what in the previous chapter I discussed as the “sorteio,” 
through which the MST controls the land selection process in certain states. In the way 
mentioned above, education also factors into the selection process and “points 
acquisition.” 
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Discipline also functions in the classroom. While I did not hear of consequences 
for students if they do not sing the movement hymn or attend class, all students receive 
an individual “parecer (opinion)” that charts their progress and that allows teachers to 
adjust. Rather than failing students, some repeat grades in order to meet generally 
established requirements in areas like literacy (Fieldnotes: Encampment 1 near 
Londrina/PR, 6-20-2011). Students are disciplined by having to follow performance 
standards created by their teachers rather than standardized tests that are typical of state 
education practices. Such discipline within schools, as I discuss more in the context of 
secondary education, also takes power from the Brazilian government. Or rather, the 
movement itself administers what is normally a public service – not for all Brazilians – 
but for its members. Order and discipline challenge state power's subordination of social 
actors to an unequal administrative division of labor. All MST schools show this quality 
in some fashion. MST high schools display it at a more advanced level. 
 
Cooperation, Decentralization, and Equality in Secondary Education 
Another core tenet of the MST's mode of challenging status quo, dominant 
educational policy involves cooperation. Similar to the manner in which the ENFF is 
governed, movement nucleos inside and outside each school design and execute the 
movement's pedagogy. Like other sectors, its leaders negotiate with state officials, 
supervise, design policies, and administer the movement's educational practices at local, 
state, and federal levels (Carter and Martins: 2010). Overall, across 24 of the 26 states 
where the movement is active, the MST's sector of education cooperates with local, 
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regional, and national levels of the movement and membership to perform these activities. 
Specifically, the sector ensures the collective management of schools through 
establishing community-wide and internal meetings. They monitor the educational 
process, acquire and distribute political materials, evaluate development, and assure the 
presence of the movement's vision and symbols in instruction (MST: 1999; 2001). If 
“reality” guides the content of the MST's educational vision and project, the cooperation 
of different movement nucleos within the movement's educational sector provides its 
form. 
No matter the level of the school – elementary, secondary, or university – 
administrators, students, and teachers form groups that debate, evaluate, and decide on 
everything from who cleans the classroom to how to incorporate agroecology into a 
course. Within each school, students form nucleos that elect coordinators that form 
another group for each grade or course. These groups then organize into another group 
that represents the entire school with administrators and teachers. This pyramid-like 
structure, especially in schools, has been described in movement documents as 
“ascending and descending democracy.” 
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Figure 1: Ascending and Descending Democracy within MST Schools 
 
As discussed in the pedagogical statement of the MST's sole private high school, the 
Instituto de Educação Josué de Castro (Institute of Education Josué de Castro or IEJC),
65
 
“in ascending democracy, each nucleo debates and makes proposals at each level... [while] 
decisions that are ultimately decided upon are implemented, and responsibilities 
distributed for execution, in descending democracy (ITERRA: 2004, 37-39).” This 
structure is best seen in schools, with hit-or-miss applications in other areas (Campigotto: 
2009). It is also rooted in Lenin's and the Bolshevik's organization of democratic 
centralism. 
The decision-making practices in this form of administration militate against how 
state power promotes centralization. By allowing individuals to express concerns and 
problems in the “ascending” phase, MST rules decentralize implementation and design-
making through distributing responsibilities within each school's student body. The active 
involvement of students in both the initial implementation phases decentralizes the design 
                                                 
65 The IEJC is housed within the other of the MST's flagship educational institutions, the 
Instituto Técnico de Capacitação e Pesquisa da Reforma Agrária (Technical Institute 
for Capacity-Building and Research for Agrarian Reform or ITERRA) 
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and execution of educational policy – key components of self-governmental resistance. In 
“descending” also, execution is shared by many members, rather than remaining with a 
few. This design and elaboration in documents show the regularized, systematized nature 
of decentralization in MST education, particularly amongst high school students. 
Centralization in the exercise of state power concentrates decision-making in the hands of 
a few individuals or elites, as I discussed in the prior section with respect to MEC in the 
Brazilian government. 
Additionally, the allocation of roles among students, administrators, and teachers 
challenges the unequal administrative division of labor forwarded by state power and 
executed by the Brazilian government. Other schools, like the ENFF, feature internal 
school cooperation that involves everyday management. For example, every high school I 
visited in São Paulo, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul organized daily meal time 
preparation and clean-up with different “nucleos (teams).” Study times and many in-class 
assignments were also coordinated by groups. In the movement's “Instituo Educar 
(Educate Institute)” where I spent a month, I became a member of one nucleo, 
participated in classes as a student, assisted in a class project on local agricultural 
production practices, served breakfast, and helped in the daily farm chores where students 
practiced agroecology techniques. My participation in management activities included 
periodically meeting with all nucleo leaders and the school administration. At one 
meeting, the topic concerned how to organize the school's day-to-day maintenance during 
holy week when many students returned home (Fieldnotes: Instituto Educar, Pontão, Rio 
Grande do Sul, 3-30-2011). 
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My time in Instituo Educar illustrates how the movement contests state power's 
tendency to subordinate social actors in a hierarchical division of labor and to centralize 
decision-making. The collective management of everything from studying to 
maintenance challenges centralizing state practices that ground decision-making in top-
down authority structures. The breakdown into small nucleos ensures that prior to taking 
a decision concerning implementation or proposing an issue, students have the chance to 
discuss and communicate preferences. Decentralization, here, disperses decision-making 
power to more actors. The distribution of tasks, furthermore, challenges the unequal 
administrative division of labor that has normally remained the prerogative of specific 
bureaucracies. The very separation between “public” and “private” in common speech 
assumes this hierarchical division of administrative labor that subordinates social actors. 
What self-governmental resistance reveals is how government does not have a monopoly 
on governance, especially in educational policy. 
Internal school cooperation also constrains member activity, specifically in terms 
of problem resolution. All schools, for example, prohibit alcohol consumption. While I 
was at one, a student was expelled by the administration after repeat violations. The 
school's permanent administrators at this time called a series of meetings with the 
students to explain the suspension. This is different than simply handing down 
punishment and expecting that people accept it, as police power typically functions 
according to state power. While providing discipline, the administration explained its 
actions to the students and asked for input. At the same school, but with respect to a 
different incident, a stolen item was returned after pressure brought by school-wide 
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meetings. Rather than punishing the students by accusing suspected individuals, periodic 
meetings were held where the problem was discussed and everyone was told to leave the 
missing DVD player in the school basement. After multiple meetings, and through 
playing on guilt, the DVD player was found without any guilty parties claiming 
responsibility (Fieldnotes: Instituto Educar, Pontão, Rio Grande do Sul, 4-5-2011). These 
disciplinary practices show the other side of self-governmental resistance: to live and 
abide by collective rules and norms in the school, one is subject to dismissal and 
expulsion by the group. Group discipline shows movement-created order, but one that 
equalizes the administration of punishment throughout the membership. 
 
Alternancy and Contentious Curriculum Design 
Cooperation also connects each school to the movement outside it, which in the 
process contests the state-sanctioned unequal division of labor. To ensure that students 
have multiple opportunities to implement their collective living and management 
experiences, the movement implements the “pedagogia de alternância (alternating 
pedagogy).”66” Alternancy allows students to remain updated on developments at home 
and incorporate into their studies the concrete needs of the places where they live, 
facilitating the cooperation between movement nucleos inside and outside any particular 
school. During a visit at a different movement high school in Paraná state, I was told by 
students how they learn “what it means and how to live in the collective” so that they can 
                                                 
66 In alternancy, students go back and forth for the entire duration of the course – usually 
between two or three years – “alternating” between three months at school, “tempo 
escolar (school time),” and three months in their encampment or settlement, “tempo 
comunidade (community time).” 
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later “take that [knowledge] back to the settlements to practice it (Interview: Nucleo, 
Milton Santos, 7-6-2011).” Alternancy allows for back and forth updating between the 
school and the places where movement members live, allowing for local beliefs and 
needs to enter instruction. The student's comment also shows how the school functions to 
spread knowledge of how to live in groups to families in encampments and settlements. 
Alternancy also connects tangible needs of students' communities with certain 
political objectives of the movement, challenging who designs and has power over course 
curriculum. For their Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (End of the Course Project or TCC) 
students frequently elaborate projects that economically benefit a cooperative or a group 
of families from their respective communities. Examples I discussed with students 
included an organic milk operation, a distillery for liquor production, and a community 
garden for a settlement school (Interview: Nucleo 1, Instituto Educar, Pontão, Rio Grande 
do Sul, 4-15-2011; Interview: Nucleo 2, Instituto Educar, Pontão, Rio Grande do Sul, 4-
17-2011). Themes that orient entire courses at ITERRA also arise from the movement's 
cooperative networks. Every Técnico em Administração de Cooperativas (Technician in 
Cooperative Administration or TAC), – which in 2010 was in its 10th course, each 
respectively graduating 30 students – has featured different needs considered essential to 
the MST, such as training movement members in health care practices or in the layout of 
settlements (Interview: Sector of Production, Paraná; ITERRA: 2001). Instead of 
emanating from governmental elites, the content discussed and learned in courses arises 
from the movement itself. The standard subordination of social actors, especially rural 
populations, is resisted by movement practices that regularly propose their own needs 
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into course materials. 
Another effort supported by the movement to challenge historical subordination is 
o Programma Nacional para Educação na Reforma Agrária (National Program for 
Education in Agrarian Reform or PRONERA).
67
 This program creates openings in higher 
education for movement-affiliated, college age students. Just as importantly, through the 
program, students are not required to pass a general standardized exam (vestibular) to 
enter University like typical entrance policies. PRONERA specifically challenges the 
historically exclusionary selection process through guaranteeing slots in secondary and 
high school education to children of rural families who historically have been 
marginalized from access to higher education (PRONERA: 2004; 2012). Financing 
comes through the periodic distribution of INCRA resources, while implementing 
pedagogical decisions and managing day-to-day course activities falls on the shoulders of 
specific universities or private places of instruction and the movements involved 
(Interview: INCRA-RS, Maria de Loudes, 3-23-2011). As I will elaborate the movement's 
instrumentalization strategy in the next section with respect to PRONERA, through such 
programs, the movement uses state resources in order to bring historical excluded 
individuals into education. PRONERA is representative of efforts to dismantle “public” 
spaces, which subordinates social actors according to class.
68
 
The content and mode of instruction in secondary schools also contests private 
                                                 
67 PRONERA funds went for the movement to administer classes in 43 public universities 
for over 10,000 students in secondary and post-secondary education in 2010 (INCRA: 
2011). 
68 The problems and opposition to this program by the TCU and Public Ministry are 
discussed in the next section, specifically with respect to how they show the contested 
nature of instrumental strategic orientations. 
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property. In addition to adopting the critical understanding of “reality” that grounds all 
pedagogical materials, high school students in the state of Paraná learn about agroecology 
in the “Dialogo dos Saberes (Dialogue of Knowledges).” The oppositional nature of the 
practice of agroecology will be discussed at length in the next chapter on agricultural 
production. The pedagogy surrounding it, also, challenges status quo technical 
education's promotion of private property and wage labor. Specifically, students learn 
how to convince movement members to stop producing with purchased inputs, e.g. seeds, 
pesticides, etc. Another focus is to create groups – not individuals – that guide families in 
their respective settlements to produce agroecologically. (Unpublished Dialogo dos 
Saberes Document: July 2011). 
Rather than inserting students into the global economy, students are asked to teach 
one another and others in the places where they live. In the process, they are taught to 
“socialize,” or disseminate without charge, education (Fieldnotes: Escola Milton Santos, 
Maringá, Paraná, 7-6-2011). The pedagogy promoted in the “dialogue,” and also in 
PRONERA courses, decommodifies access to education. Students, when they go to their 
communities, spread what they learn without a price. The content of their studies goes 
towards creating more self-reliant producers who do not purchase inputs – private 
property or technical training – for their operations. 
Like we saw in the previous chapter on agrarian reform, state power subordinates 
social actors through making knowledge the province of certain institutions. In 
educational policy, MEC grants itself, as well as state and municipal authorities, the 
authority to design curriculum and pedagogy. INCRA's multiple regional offices share 
  
155 
with Brazilian education the façade of decentralization and localized distribution of 
knowledge. Social subordination continues through both of these governmental 
institutions, no matter if state power is exercised nationally, at the state-level, or in 
specific municipalities. A real coordinated challenge to the function of social 
subordination that characterizes state power is apparent in the MST's efforts to socialize 
knowledge. Disseminating agroecological production techniques and socializing 
knowledges place the movement in a position to produce knowledge. This takes power 
from the government and relocates it in the hands of MST members and teachers. 
MST educational practices challenge the subordinate role that state power 
reserves for social actors. The movement also challenges the unequal distribution of the 
means to govern by opposing the LDB's subordination of rural education to a national, 
uniform project. Movement-led secondary schools especially reveal this, as the standard, 
“public” goods nature of education assumes and relegates “private” actors to the 
administrative sidelines. Furthermore, institutionalizing the principle of cooperation in 
educational provision contests state power centralization by placing decision-making 
power in the movement's hands inside and outside each school. Movement efforts to 
decentralize educational policy involve more actors in the process. Pedagogical practices, 
from the movement's understanding “reality” to socializing knowledge, also contest 
private property. The MST's alternative educational project rivals the state version that is 
represented by the Brazilian government. The constitutive elements of self-governmental 
resistance – decentralization, heterogeneity, and equality – appear in the movement's 
focus on “reality” and cooperation. 
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4.3 Explaining and Evaluating the MST's Resistance in Education 
In this section, I analyze overall figures on schools and students to explain how 
they indicate the movement's mid-level success rate in institutionalizing self-
governmental resistance in educational policy. I find that in terms of percentages of 
potential adherents, the data shows that the movement has a lower level of success than 
what we see in the area of agrarian reform. The reason for this lower performance lies, as 
I will discuss, with a lower level of strategic strength in instrumental strategic planning. 
I have three hypotheses that guide my project and that I test in this section: (1) 
that certain combinations of strategic action lead to different modes of movement 
institutionalization, (2) how increases in the iterations in movement plans of specific 
targets and goals, as well as in the time spent researching and documenting targets and 
goals, result in greater strategic strength and thus a higher potential for successful 
institutionalization and (3) if a low level of preparation exists with high levels of 
consistent and coherent objective formation, or vice versa, then we see a level of 
institutionalization lower than if both indicators were classified as high, yet higher than if 
both indicators were classified as low. This chapter illustrates not only how different 
strategic combinations lead to movement self-governmental resistance, but also how a 
low level of strength in one strategic sub-category (instrumental) when paired with a high 
level of strength in another (direct-action) leads to a mid-level of strength in overall 
movement institutionalization. 
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The MST's Mid- Level Success in Self-Governmental Resistance 
Self-governance in educational policy follows – in terms of success – the 
movement's ability to administer agrarian reform policy. The MST has received 
international awards, including a prize in 1995 from UNICEF for their ability to pioneer 
federal programs such as Programa Nacional de Educação na Reforma Agrária (National 
Program for Education in Agrarian Reform or PRONERA) and involve multiple state-
level Departments of Education in their educational project. They also boast impressive 
numbers, claiming to have pressured state authorities into constructing 2,250 schools 
where over 350,000 people have learned to read and write, and another 350,000 currently 
study all kinds of subjects from geography to agroecology, all taught by 4,000 
movement-trained teachers.
69 
 
The MST's efforts in education are more dispersed and fragmented than what 
these figures portray. While the movement periodically implements its pedagogy in 
elementary schools in certain settlements, there are only a few of these experiences.
70 
Some of the best known cases include the elementary school “Nova Sociedade (New 
Society)” in the municipality of Nova Santa Rita near Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul 
and “Iraci Salete,” near Rio Bonito in Paraná. In Paraná, I was told that of the 21 
elementary schools in the state on movement settlements, only three are “of the 
movement” and “implementing the movement's pedagogy (Interview: Sector of 
                                                 
69 http://www.mst.org.br/node/8302. 
70 If we compare the number of settlements in each state – there were 353 in existence in 
PR in 2010, 135 in RS in 2003, and 149 in SP (INCRA: 2012) – and assume that for 
each settlement we find a school, even then, the percentage of movement schools as 
opposed to non-movement rural schools would be small. 
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Education PR, 8-5-2011).” The climate in São Paulo is worse, where the movement 
claims to control no primary or secondary schools (Interview: Sector of Education SP, 11-
8-2011). At a conference on MST secondary education, I was told that there were a total 
of 50 high schools built on all MST settlements with none under MST influence 
(Fieldnotes: ITERRA, Secondary Education Conference, 5-5-2011). Of the 2,250 schools 
identified by the movement, only a fraction operates according to the movement's 
dictates.
71 
 
The schools that the movement has pressured governmental authorities to 
construct, but does not control internally, are not the focus of this chapter. Those 
instances benefit the communities, and without MST influence, it is most likely that they 
would never have been built. However, they do not show successful institutionalization, 
and they do not qualify as movement schools. To study the prevalence of movement 
education as exercised by the MST, I focus on itinerant and integrated high schools 
outside of the settlements that exist in greater numbers than the experiences in 
settlements. I focus on these two kinds of schools because of all the kinds of schools 
where the MST institutionalizes resistance, itinerant elementary schools and integrated 
high schools are the most systematized and regular instances where we can observe 
trends and actual implementation. My analysis of trends in the states of Rio Grande do 
Sul, Paraná, and São Paulo allow us to test claims in the social movement literature 
                                                 
71 The movement has a wide definition of school, by no means restricting their tally to 
those that are officially recognized. Training centers count as schools, for example, 
and they number at least 31 (Plummer: 2008). Courses often organized by the MST in 
public universities with state assistance numbered 39 in 2010, and given that these 
programs have been in place since the end of the 1990s, we can extrapolate these 
figures to hundreds of schools attended by thousands of students. 
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concerning allied and oppositional government. They also, more than other states, show 
the most continuous experiences with secondary and primary education. 
Thousands of students have passed through schools that the MST has controlled 
in terms of internal administration and pedagogy. In absolute terms, this is a lot of people. 
But in comparison to both rural schools overall and schools on agrarian reform 
settlements, the MST has gained relatively little control over students and their schools. 
At their height in Rio Grande do Sul (1998-2009) and Paraná (2002-present),
72
 the 
itinerant schools attended to roughly a thousand students each year per state in 15 schools 
(MST: 1998; 2000; 2010). The MST counted 5 schools in encampments with 952 
students at the itinerant schools' peak in 2003 in Rio Grande do Sul.
73 
The highest number 
of students attending schools in Paraná was 1,255, spread among 10 encampments in 
2010 (MST: 2003, found in Meurer, et al: 2006; MST: 2010). The percentage of rural 
schools and students in each of the states where I conducted my field research, when 
compared to the number of elementary education age children in the MST, are a fraction 
of a percent.
74
 
More success is seen in the MST's experiments with secondary education, 
                                                 
72 The itinerant schools were closed in Rio Grande do Sul in 2009, later reopened in 2012. 
They currently exist in Alagoas, Santa Catarina, and Goias. 
73 The other numbers for itinerant schools come from movement documents during the 
schools' existences in 2000, when there were 13 schools and roughly 600 students 
(MST: 2000). 
74 To compare with non-movement elementary education, the number of elementary 
schools in each state are as follows: in Rio Grande do Sul in 2003, 4,447 movement 
schools out of a 10,790 total schools officially classified as rural, with 256,517 
students enrolled out of 2,644,743 students total; in Paraná in 2010, 1,688 movement 
schools out of 9,112 total rural schools, with 160,853 students enrolled out of 
2,687,406 total students; in São Paulo in 2010, 1,469 movement schools out of 26,888 
total rural schools, with 112,695 students enrolled out of 5,985,884 total students. 
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particularly in the area of technical schools. In 2010 – one year for which we have 
specific numbers from the movement and the state – roughly 40% of high school age 
students attending rural technical schools were affiliated with the movement (10,058 
students affiliated with the movement out of a total of 24,465 students (INEP: 2010; 
PRONERA: 2011)). Since 1985, movement-affiliated high school students passed 
through 31 different schools under movement direction (Plummer: 2008). At the time of 
my research, there were approximately 134 movement high school age students in São 
Paulo, 220 in Paraná, and 280 in Rio Grande do Sul (INCRA: 2010).
75 
The numbers by 
state
76
 in Figure 1 of Appendix 2 allow us to see the MST and government efforts for 
select years for which data is available. Figure 2 in Appendix 2 shows the total number of 
agrarian reform beneficiaries, many MST, who received education through PRONERA 
financial assistance. The movement has also emphasized nationally, and at the state level, 
the establishment of “educação do campo (countryside education)” curriculum within 
                                                 
75 These numbers only include high school students whose courses received PRONERA 
funding. There were a total of 10,580 students, not only from the MST but from other 
rural movements, receiving some form of instruction. Many of them were in the MST 
and also practiced the pedagogy of the movement. I do not include them in the 
numbers listed above because they had already graduated from high school and were 
participating in university level programs. 
76 For each state, the numbers of high school/ professional education students in federal 
institutions – the specific educational area where we find MST involvement – were in 
São Paulo, 1,188, in Paraná, 3,013, and in Rio Grande do Sul, 4,602, including private, 
state, and municipal schools. The total numbers by state for joint high 
school/professional education students in both rural and urban technical schools were: 
SP, 28,873, PR, 28,240, and RS, 5,491 (INEP: 2004; INEP: 2010) These numbers 
seem to show that movements pedagogical involvement and successful 
implementation in federally-supported, joint high school/ professional education 
courses is a fraction of the overall number, yet given that the vast majority of 
integrated high schools in each state are urban – SP, 21,026, PR, 26,672, and RS, 
4,402 – the MST maintains a significant presence in rural technical high schools 
(INEP: 2010). 
  
161 
Departmentos de Diversidade (Departments of Diversity). 
Land occupations, encampments, and demonstrations are the main indicators of 
movement success in agrarian reform. Together, they also show how the MST dominates 
the policy area of agrarian reform. The movement has success in education, but 
comparatively less than in agrarian reform. As I show in the next chapter, this is more 
than what we find in agricultural policy. The indicators I establish to judge success 
represent instances of actual institutionalization, e.g. schools, and percentages of 
members involved, e.g. students. As shown by the available data, as well as efforts by the 
MST to forward institutional changes within certain Departments of Education 
throughout the country, the MST’s level of success in education lies approximately 
between its levels of success in agrarian reform and agricultural production. 
 
Instrumental and Direct-action Strategies in MST Self-Governmental Resistance 
Self-governmental movements do not accept the standard state/society 
distinctions, but challenge them. We observe resistance in opposition to centralization, 
homogeneity, and administrative inequality, specifically contesting the subordination of 
“social” interests to one singular “public.” I hypothesize that strategy drives the 
development of self-governmental resistance. The reason is that prior to any action there 
must be a guiding plan or set of objectives. Strategy is this plan that also involves a 
movement's self-understanding or identity. More than structural variables like state 
strength or neoliberal adjustment, strategy explains how resistance institutionalizes. I 
evaluate each subcategory of strategy involved in self-governmental resistance– direct-
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action and instrumental – in terms of (1) coherence and consistency of objectives, and (2) 
preparation of knowledge, or know-how. Direct-action plans detail the movement's role 
in executing a particular policy area. Different from direct-action strategy, instrumental 
strategic planning uses and requires another actor for policy execution. This differs from 
mediated strategic planning, which is defined by the delegation of decision-making 
power to a non-movement actor. Because the MST institutionalizes self-governmental 
resistance, they do not use mediated strategies. 
The MST successfully governs educational policy, according to its vision, but at a 
lower rate than what we observed in the prior chapter concerning agrarian reform. For 
this reason, I claim the MST shows a mid-level of success in education, especially when 
we compare the number of sites and people mobilized with those for agrarian reform and 
agricultural production. The reason for the mid-level success in education is a high level 
of strategic strength in direct-action strategic planning combined with a low level in 
instrumental. 
The movement's direct-action strategic plan shows high levels of consistency and 
coherence. We can discern the movement’s strategy's coherence in its protest demands. 
When we survey protests for education since 2002 (when reliable numbers for different 
movements become available), we find 242 events led by the MST out of a total number 
of 375 documented events, or 64% of all events led by movements organizing to advance 
rural education.
77 
As we can also see in Figure 3 in Appendix 2, the number of protest 
                                                 
77 The CPT has maintained numbers on social movement protests according to type since 
2001. Only since 2005, however, have they consistently differentiated protests for 
some kind of education-related demand from “other” protests. 
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actions has increased since 2002, even as the MST is sharing the field of struggles for 
education with unions and indigenous movements. In newspaper articles that routinely 
document MST protests for education, we find consistent and coherent demands aimed at 
state departments of education or INCRA (Agencia Brasil: 7-18-2005; Folha de São Palo: 
8-22-2005; A Folha de São Paulo: 6-11-2008; O Globo: 2-19-2009; Agencia Brasil: 6-8-
2009). In multiple interviews, I was also told of movement leaders' lack of respect for 
state agencies, of state agencies’ inability to deliver resources, and of state agencies’ 
sporadic attention to movement demands (Interview: Sector of Education-PR, 7-31-2011; 
Interview: Encampment 1 Near Londrina, PR, 6-21-2011). Comparing interviews with 
newspaper reporting shows how movement messaging and goals are clear and simple, 
often including access to more resources and more movement control. We see coherence 
in the movement's representation and selection of their targets, as well as in the content of 
their demands. The regular nature of the movement protests and demand-making over 
time also shows a high level of consistency. 
Evidence for preparation in the MST's direct-action strategy for education is in 
their implementation plans, and in particular, the number and quality of movement 
documents. The movement's collection of notebooks serves to systematize experiences 
and concepts for internal distribution and instruction. Since MST’s origins, there have 
been at least 13 notebooks on MST educational precepts published through ITERRA and 
18 by the movement's education sector. From how to teach geography to what is the 
meaning of cooperation, movement notebooks assemble concepts and experiences for 
members to study the movement's principles and philosophy. Every movement school I 
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visited, from elementary to secondary, had a library stocked with various didactic 
materials, yet always showcasing MST-published manuals and texts. These movement 
materials serve as the basis for training teachers. For example, at one training seminar on 
early childhood education, I studied with members how to teach generative themes with 
nursery rhymes in kindergartens and used the publication “MST Escola,” which is a 
collection of movement educational documents (Fieldnotes: Caruarú-Pernambuco, 8-1-
2009). At other schools I attended, including São Paulo, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul, 
the movement's notebooks were regularly assigned readings in class. 
Knowledge preparation in direct-action strategic planning is used to train teachers. 
Since the movement's inception, the movement has had plans to train teachers from its 
own ranks rather than contracting “those from the outside (MST: 1991).” Between 1990 
and 2004 in normal education, the MST reports graduating 10
 
classes from movement-
run schools with between 30 to 50 movement-trained teachers in each class (ITERRA: 
2004). Other courses at the university-level also train movement members on their 
pedagogy, specifically the “licenciatura em educação do campo (undergraduate course in 
countryside education)” with over 100 students enrolled in 2010 (INCRA: 2010). The 
movement itself plans in their documents and in their courses how to execute educational 
policy itself. Developing courses, and training movement teachers in these courses, 
propagates knowledge of the MST's pedagogy and the means to implement it. The 
number of teachers trained by the movement in their distinct pedagogy is evidence of a 
high level of direct-action strategic planning. 
When we analyze the strength of the movement's direct-action efforts counter-
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factually with respect to the outcome of institutionalized self-governmental resistance, we 
can see how different levels of strategic strength would have contributed to lower levels 
of movement success. For example, a hypothetically less coherent implementation plan 
would have deprived the movement of implementing its educational vision, for without 
the plan, there is nothing to institutionalize. Low levels of teacher preparation, similarly, 
would have left the movement with no one to practice it. And with the already-existing 
high turnover rates amongst non-movement trained rural teachers (Interview: Sector of 
Education-PR, 7-31-2011), rural schools would most likely be left with few to no 
educators. The MST calls on the Brazilian government to construct schools for the 
movement to run. And while we see many schools constructed, this is not a result of 
strategic planning focused on mediation because the movement plans to execute policy 
through them. 
Already-established theories have trouble explaining the MST's mode of 
institutionalizing self-governmental resistance because they lack a focus on strategic 
plans and initiatives. Political Process theorists would explain levels of movement 
success in terms of elite facilitation or repression. Yet, when we look to MST 
institutionalization in certain states, and the political parties in their respective 
governments, the variations in allies/opposition lead us to search out other explanations. 
Specifically, in the state of Paraná, itinerant schools have been successfully organized 
while implementing the movement's pedagogy in schools on settlements has not. Roberto 
Requião, who is considered by movement leaders an ally, was governor from 2002 to 
2010. Because Secretaries of Education at the state level are nominated by governors and 
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they mainly direct educational policy overall for their respective states, variations among 
kinds of schools where the MST has success in Paraná cannot be deduced from 
governmental allies. In fact, comparing the low number of elementary schools across 
states with oppositional governments (Rio Grande do Sul, 2006-2010) and ally 
governments (Paraná, 2002-2010) shows low levels of implementation regardless of who 
is in office. 
São Paulo, however, seems to suggest the opposite, especially in comparison to 
states like Paraná or Rio Grande do Sul. In fact, Paraná's Department of Diversity within 
the Secretary of Education actually published MST's didactic materials, while the director 
of pedagogy in São Paulo had never even heard that the movement had a distinct 
pedagogical project – “educação do campo” (Interview: Eduardo – Department of 
Pedagogy, SP, 11-21- 2011). While this seems to suggest a potential governmental 
“opening” in Paraná, it does not explain the lack of institutionalizing education in 
settlement schools in Paraná. I account for the variations above when discussing the 
dynamics to the MST's other strategic approach – instrumentalization. 
Instrumentalization, even though weak, still characterizes the movement's 
planning. Evidence for the MST's plans to instrumentalize governmental actors for their 
own project includes their use of the language of rights and desire for continuous 
schooling for children. When asked why the movement in Rio Grande do Sul sought to 
certify the itinerant schools, I was told how “students were learning to read and write, yet 
had nothing to prove their skill levels. When they went to state schools, they had to take 
tests, many times having to repeat grades (Interview: MST Sector of Education-RS, 3-9-
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2011).” I was also told how the movement's project is meant to “assure access to their 
right to education (Interview: MST Sector of Education-PR, 7-31-2011).” The itinerant 
schools, furthermore, use resources from state departments of education. First appearing 
in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul in 1996, authorized by the Conselho Estadual 
de Educação (State Educational Committee or CEE)
78
, roles for all actors – the MST and 
the state Department of Education – are specified in the 1996 Parecer 1.313. In 2003, 
Paraná's CEE legalized itinerant schools in that state through Parecer 1.012. In each 
parecer, the Department of Education is in charge of supplying financial and physical 
materials for the schools, while elaboration and execution of the pedagogical proposal 
remains with the movement, as does the selection of professors, and the majority of 
evaluating procedures.
79
 
The language of rights shows explicit recognition of state authority, as does the 
desire of continuous school attendance. Rather than establishing a parallel educational 
system, as we would expect in revolutionary struggles, the movement retains pedagogical 
                                                 
78
 Every CEE in each Brazilian state has norm making, deliberative, and consultative 
powers for their respective state's educational policies, within the limits set by the Lei 
de Diretrizes de Base (Basic Legal Directives in Education) of 1996 (the prior version, 
1974). 
79 All itinerant schools have an “escola base,” in a movement settlement which acts as the 
pedagogical and administrative center for each itinerant school in each encampment. 
The itinerant and base schools differ given that the itinerant schools do not have a 
permanent structure, which the base schools have because they are located on 
settlements. Both, however, follow similar pedagogies and fit within the overall 
movement's educational vision in the same way. While the associated base school 
handles the pedagogical elements of the itinerant schools, a separate non-governmental 
organization (NGO) takes charge of resources from the state to the individual schools. 
In Rio Grande do Sul, the NGO was Instituo Preservar, and in Paraná, the Associação 
de Cooperação Agrícola e Reforma Agrária do Paraná, (Association of Agrarian 
Cooperation and Agrarian Reform of Paraná). 
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autonomy while using ideational and material resources for its own ends. The MST 
claims and implements their own educational vision, unlike reform-style movements that 
would demand inclusion into already-existing governmental relations backed by the 
exercise of state power. Plans to use resources and rights in movement-led 
implementation reveals how MST resistance includes vying for control of the educational 
policy area. 
Consistent and coherent messages connecting the movement's identity in 
education appears regularly in movement publications. In both Journal dos Sem Terra and 
Boletim dos Sem Terra, “education” and “school,” respectively appear 1,845 and 1,216 
times. In comparison, “land” and “agrarian reform,” typical of agrarian reform policy, are 
in these movement's publications 10,999 and 7,734 times. The content of many of these 
references to education often includes the current and historical deprivation suffered by 
movement members, particularly in rural areas. It also includes how the “reality”of the 
countryside and the movement's own history of struggle require the design and 
implementation of a movement-led pedagogy. In addition to these meanings, movement 
members also frequently mention how urban schools discriminate against landless 
students. Discussions are primarily oriented around how governments provide education 
and public schools, but the education and schools are organized without taking into 
consideration the specificity of the countryside. 
A common slogan heard at movement events – educaçao do campo, direito nosso, 
dever do estado! (countryside education, our right, the state’s duty!) - showcases the idea 
that the MST exercises the right to provide education with the government providing the 
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means. Or rather, we see the idea of instrumentalization present in the kind of identity 
represented in movement chants that simultaneously recognize state power and promote 
the idea that movement ought to use it. The kind of identity the movement promotes is 
primarily geared towards the movement member's own abilities to manage their schools 
and pedagogy. This shows attempts in their strategic planning to create a specific identity 
in the area of education that requires movement-led initiatives. The strength of the 
movement's identity in education, in comparison to their efforts in agrarian reform, is 
similar but weaker. Additionally, the movement has more problems in the development of 
their instrumentalist strategy. 
As displayed in the relatively recent closing of the movement's itinerant schools 
in the state of Rio Grande do Sul in 2009, the MST faced a concerted effort by the 
Ministerio Publico (Public Ministry or MP) to official end the movement, repression 
from the state-level government of PSDB Governor Yeda Crusius, and hostility from the 
then Secretary of Education, Mariza Abreu.
80
 Part of the problem involved how the 
                                                 
80 The MP sought to “declare the MST illegal,” in the name of “protecting children” from 
the movement's alleged “disruption of public order,” and “use of public resources for 
criminal behavior (Public Ministry, Act 1.116, 2007).” One MP official told me how 
the movement was “terrorist,” employing tactics “similar to those used by guerrillas in 
the Vietnam War,” with children in movement schools “never learning to read or write 
anything but the name Karl Marx (Interview: Gilbero Thums, 3-15-2011). At the same 
time, the PSDB Governor Yeda Crusius (2006-2010) earned a reputation for repressive 
actions against social movements and unions, drawing mass protests, federal 
investigations, and low approval ratings (Carta Maior: 6-12-2008; Folha de São Paulo: 
3-6-2009; Radioagência NP: 8-9-2008). In the area of education, the then Secretary of 
Education, Mariza Abreu, told me how in the countryside “everything is difficult and 
isolated – it’s no wonder people move to cities for culture, rural life is not all that 
great,” and also remarked how she “continued to negotiate with the movement, even 
when members would appear with their children in protest (Interview: Mariza Abreu, 
Porto Alegre, 3-11-2011).” 
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movement's tactical choices – including protesting, occupying buildings, and involving 
children – while showing resolve and coherence, continued despite the unfavorable 
conditions. Increased police actions and unusual violence towards the movement were 
documented early in Crusius' regime (Instituto Humanitas Unisinios: 4-17-2007), yet did 
not result in any change by the movement in terms of their actions. In fact, INCRA was 
occupied by the MST on various occasions to make demands, as well as various large 
ranches that have been targeted repeatedly by the movement for over ten years (MST: 8-
9-2009; 9-9-2009). In this way, direct-action tactics rendered difficult any kind of 
instrumentalist relationship. 
Prior to the Crusius administration in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, the 
movement's plan – discerned in the low number of pareceres and the belief in 
Constituinte Escolar during Dutra's time in office (1998-2002) – included ways to use the 
government for the movement's objectives. Remaining relatively autonomous from the 
government, the MST planned to use their resources despite the risk that the relationship 
would break down. Conflict – a key element to instrumental strategies – ultimately led to 
the breakdown of the relationship. In terms of preparation, the movement knew of the 
government's position, yet consistently led protests – at 7 per year in Rio Grande do Sul – 
and occupied ranches and offices as if no change in governmental administration had 
occurred (CPT: 2006-2010). Or in other words, the movement showed a low level of 
knowledge preparation in terms of how to engage with non-allied governments. They 
knew that the Crusius regime was not friendly to the movement's cause, as well as being 
unfriendly to the movement itself, yet did not conceive of a different mode of interacting 
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with government. 
The persistence shows, on the one hand, resolve, while on the other hand, 
difficulty adjusting plans to changes in the political climate. We can compare within the 
movement their efforts in Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná to observe the differences in 
terms of institutionalization. Instrumentalist strategic efforts between the MST and 
various Department of Education leaders in solidifying resolutions and institutional 
supports with the government in Paraná created a series of resolutions and decrees that 
have made the closing of schools tedious and difficult (Interview: Ex-Departmento de 
Diversidade, Curitiba-PR, 8-20-2011). These agreements in Paraná, however, do not 
apply to settlement schools, only to itinerant schools. 
In Rio Grande do Sul, the movement did not invest time and resources in working 
with state officials, as is apparent in the lower number of resolutions and lack of an 
official countryside education department within the state-level Department of Education. 
Rather, the movement banked on the government's “constituinte escolar (constituting the 
school)” program, which actively involved social actors in crafting individual school 
directives and internal rules (Interview: Ex-CRE, Bagé-RS, 5-17-2011; Mendes: 
Unpublished). The program did not last and did not materialize in multiple protective 
legal mechanisms for movement schools. In Paraná, the MST better balanced 
instrumental strategies with a direct-action. The movement planned differently in Rio 
Grande do Sul, where state-level leaders favored direct-action over instrumentalization. 
As a result, the movement's efforts were repealed easier in Rio Grande do Sul than in 
Paraná. Indeed, in the latter they continue to this day, despite a government deemed 
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unfriendly according to many movement members. 
The problems the MST faced in Rio Grande do Sul are indicative of general 
problems facing the movement in instrumentalizing governmental institutions for their 
educational project in São Paulo. In Paraná, the movement had more success, especially 
with respect to establishing more agreements and itinerant schools because of a better 
development of an instrumentalist strategic orientation. Similarly, comparing the 
movement's efforts in Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo – where the movement's 
institutionalization of education has seen no success – shows similar problems in 
elaborating a lack of strategic strength in their instrumental approach with governmental 
actors. While one government official I interviewed had never heard of the movement, I 
was also told how other attempts to reach out to regional officials were always met with 
the same rejection (Interview: MST Sector of Education, 8-11-2011). Movement actors 
make appeals, but have not adequately prepared knowledge concerning how to use 
governmental elites in São Paulo. These differences between states reveal that the 
movement inconsistently approaches state-level Departments of Education for 
instrumentalization. And as consistency is an indicator in my theory of strategy, the 
movement's plans in this regards can be classified as low. 
An alternative counter-factual scenario for the MST in Rio Grande do Sul entailed 
stopping protests and the involvement of children. This tactical retreat would potentially 
have saved the movement for a time, given that Public Ministry officials claimed that the 
movement's involvement of children in protest provided grounds to remove them from 
their parents and stop protests (Interview: MP-Luis Teichneir, 3-15-2011). I was told how 
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the movement began to become aware of such systematized practices concerning children 
as well as the documenting of all individuals in protests by the police with the change in 
administration (Interview: Leandro Scalabrin, Rede Nacional de Advogados e Advogadas 
Populares, Renaap, 4-3-2011). This hypothetical switch could have sped up the inevitable 
– in 2010, a large group of militants left the movement due to what they considered a lack 
of the movement's resolve in conducting confrontational actions (see “Carta de Saída 
(Resignation Letter)” from Spring 2011 where 50 influential leaders left the MST and 
other left-wing Brazilian movements). Yet, rather than these leaders leaving due to the 
perceived loss of radical resolve, a movement-initiated “cease-fire” could have allowed 
these individuals to remain in the movement with the idea that the lull in action was both 
the movement's own choice and would end eventually. Time and effort could have been 
placed on devising new methods or new alliances with social actors to pressure 
governmental authorities. 
Despite these issues in strategic strength and planning at the state level, the 
movement has succeeded in instrumentalizing federal-level resources and institutions 
through PRONERA. While the itinerant schools existed through contracts with local 
state-level departments of education, MST high schools have their juridical identity 
established through the federal government. Through the network of Institutos Federais 
(Federal Institutes) in each state, the movement establishes relationships to certify their 
courses and issue diplomas. The other federal connection that these high schools possess 
is funding through Instituto Nacional de Colonização de Reforma Agrária (National 
Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform or INCRA), and in particular, PRONERA. 
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The movement's instrumental strategy includes accepting and using state money from 
PRONERA for courses that the movement administers. PRONERA funds went for the 
movement to administer classes in 43 public universities for over 10,000 students in 
secondary and post-secondary education in 2010 (INCRA: 2011). 
While instrumental strategic planning has characterized MST efforts in 
institutionalizing movement-led secondary education, their level of strength is lower than 
what is prevalent in agrarian reform policy. Specifically, preparation has been lacking in 
creating and sustaining alliances. For example, in one interview with a former bureaucrat 
in the Department of Education in Paraná, I was told how some members during 
negotiations did not know the potential resources of the department (Interview: Ex-
Departmento de Diversidade, Curitiba-PR, 8-20-2011). I was also told in another 
interview, how, “if the movement knocks on my door, well, I will answer, yet they have 
to realize that if they want real change, INCRA is just too small to make that happen 
(Interview: INCRA-Brasilia, Clarice Aparecida dos Santos, 2-1-2011).” Both of these 
comments – the first from Paraná during a time when the movement felt the government 
was favorable and the second from an important ally at the national level – reveal 
strategic problems concerning the movement's use of government. In terms of preparation, 
the way the MST has used government for its own ends could be greatly improved and 
changed. And while PRONERA shows a successful case of instrumentalization, even 
there, INCRA officials see the movement's efforts as weak. 
The MST engages in instrumental strategic planning. For this reason, and 
combined with direct-action strategic planning efforts, the movement's struggle for 
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control over educational policy for their members qualifies as self-governmental 
resistance. Yet, because of problems with their instrumental approach, the movement has 
a weak level of strength on the indicators of consistency and preparation. When 
contrasting with the movement's instrumental plans in agrarian reform, their attempts to 
conceive of ways to use government or social actors for their own purposes is not as 
developed. For this reason, the movement's institutionalization of self-governmental 
resistance in educational policy measured in number of occurrences and percentage of 
people mobilized is less than their efforts in agrarian reform. 
Different instrumental plans and orientations would have resulted in alternative 
patterns of institutionalization. A change in favor of solidifying non-government alliances 
in educational provision would potentially have benefited movement self-governance. 
Even as the number of non-MST social movement actors involved in educational 
initiatives including unions and indigenous groups has grown over this last decade, the 
movement has under-utilized alliances in institutionalizing resistance in educational 
policy. This would place the movement more at risk of losing decision-making power to 
other movements, but would also enable them to have more autonomy to challenge 
governmental efforts in educational policy. As their efforts on settlements show, they 
need to strengthen strategic plans. Movement leaders know this, currently referred in 
certain movement documents as the need to “re-take control” of schools in the 
settlements (Fieldnotes: ITERRA, Secondary Education Conference, 5-5-2011; Interview: 
MST Sector of Education-PR, 7-19- 2011). Keeping state resources and institutions at 
bay could solidify greater social bases of support, as well as potentially granting the 
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movement's greater autonomy. Instrumentalizing other movements, however, could mean 
that the movement loses consistent access to funds and recognition. 
Similarly, differences in institutionalization could have arisen from a different 
mode of knowledge preparation for instrumentalizing governmental resources. Despite 
the strategic relevance of thinking of education as a right, the movement could construct 
arguments akin to how they institutionalize agrarian reform. In particular, the rhetorical 
moves to show how the MST has exhausted all possible efforts to practice education has 
not been deployed as it has been for agrarian reform. Claims of discrimination, the desire 
for school stability, and recognition of historical specificity, all go into the MST 
educational identity. However, the recognition of the Constitutional right to education is 
rarely mentioned as part of their identity in this policy area. Rather, the right to land 
typically “trumps” education demands and actions, in the past and currently. I was even 
told in one case how the movement's attempt to insert an alternative pedagogy into 
secondary schools created a rift currently between leaders who feel education is essential 
and those who disagree (Fieldnotes: Escola Milton Santos, 7-6-2011). Even since the 
movement's early origins, many families thought that they were first involved in the 
struggle for land, and only upon receiving it, were schools to be considered. 
A re-focus on identity could promote the idea that only the MST can deliver the 
right to education in the countryside, versus some other actor, and that other options for 
education provision have been exhausted. An essential part of the movement's conception 
of “reality” contains this premise. Clearly elaborating and illustrating it strategically 
would allow the movement to deal with state-level departments to grant the MST and 
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potential allies more prerogatives over the use of state resources. 
In terms of social movement theories, the movement's problems in developing 
strategic plans concerning instrumentalization could be explained by Political Process 
Theorists and studies that deploy the concept of Political Opportunity Structure. Their 
arguments would discuss how opponents of the movement closed off avenues for 
cooperation and access to resources, and at the same time, repressed their activities. This, 
at best, is a partial explanation. The agentic side of the equation, particularly with how 
the movements engaged state authorities needs consideration. Governmental authorities 
perceived the MST as a threat and made this clear in repressive activities. Yet, as shown 
in Rio Grande do Sul, the movement knew of the administration's designs. Without 
adjusting, their direct-action approach led to relations with governmental actors that 
closed off any instrumentalist possibilities. This also shows a greater problem in the MST 
strategic efforts in education, especially when we consider how they have no approach 
when dealing with governments that challenge their project. 
Comparing efforts in all three states reveals the glaring absence of any state-level 
project in São Paulo, as opposed to initiatives in Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul. Again, it 
is easy to attribute the cause of this to governmental actors that “close” access to social 
actors. However, when I interviewed bureaucrats working in the state's Department of 
Education, they did not express hostility, but a general lack of knowledge that the MST 
even had an alternative project. Likewise, after interviewing movement leaders in the 
Pontal de Paranapanema, I was told how repeated efforts since the 1990s in the region at 
discussing the pedagogy of the movement with state elites have not resulted in any 
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inroads. One would expect a change in plan or approach when dealing with this lack of 
facilitation. This has not taken place. Re-thinking strategy and crafting of the movement's 
identity with respect to education administration could help in re-approaching 
governments. The comparison of Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná in terms of resolutions 
and pareceres shows that the movement, in latter, planned to instrumentalize authorities 
better than in other states. 
Rational Choice theorists would focus the explanation on incentives. Concerning 
movement problems in instrumentalization, this theory would conjecture that a mid-level 
of institutionalization arises from the movement's inability to provide incentives for elite 
and/or member collaboration. Incentive provision, for members, would entail greater 
provision of material resources. We see this in a high level already distributed in various 
states, from PRONERA, to specific resources allocated for movement-initiatives in their 
itinerant schools. The high level of resources already-distributed indicates that the 
movement's problems here lie elsewhere. Concerning incentives for elites, the movement 
could make more appeals to force their respective governments to collaborate. Added 
pressure through protests could raise awareness, thereby providing “incentives.” The 
problem is that increased pressure, especially in states like Rio Grande do Sul, did not 
result in a favorable response from the government. In fact, just the opposite resulted. A 
proposed explanation based on incentives for members and elites has been proven 
incorrect by actual events. 
 
4.4 Conclusion: Lessons 
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In this chapter, I show how the MST has achieved a mid-level success rate in 
mobilizing participants for their alternative educational vision. The reason for this level 
of success, as I illustrate in the last section, is a high level of strategic strength concerning 
their direct-action approach combined with a low level in instrumentalization. According 
to my hypotheses, this mix of strategic levels results in a mid-level of movement 
institutionalization. We still can observe the presence of instrumentalist practices and 
aspirations, clearly seen in relationships with INCRA and PRONERA. This mode of 
strategic planning does not show the same level of strength as in the movement's efforts 
for agrarian reform. Without a steady level of instrumental strategic strength, the 
movement remains at the mercy of governmental elites who can close off avenues if they 
so choose. 
The MST has received much international attention – not only for their dramatic 
land occupations, but also for their efforts in education. The movement is seen as a 
success, if not an example for emulation worldwide. Despite this attention, a disciplined, 
social-scientific analysis of the movement's efforts in educational policy has escaped 
most research. This chapter attempts to fill this void: first, by developing and testing a 
theory against rivals; and second, through accounting and measuring movement efforts. 
Both, together, have not been conducted previously. 
It is difficult to easily transport the MST's project into other contexts, especially to 
derive implications. My study of strategy in part leads us to the conclusion that 
movement action primarily revolves around plans, not static, seemingly impermeable 
variables like state strength or neoliberalism. To focus on strategy ought to spur activists 
  
180 
and academics alike to consider that how a movement organizes itself matters as much as 
external factors. Implications also include particular conceptions we have about what are 
state and social roles. The movement challenges common sense understandings of the 
actors that assume the position of executing educational policy. The MST contests the 
public/private divide and shows us that resistance can take place through 
institutionalizing oppositional action. The movement shows how an actor unlikely to 
disrupt order – a social movement – can build its own in schools, a typical place where 
we find cultural, economic, and social forms of power at work. 
Like the movement's efforts in agrarian reform, the trend in increased 
demonstrations is a sign that the movement could be changing focus. In the area of 
education, this does not pose the same problem as we discussed in the last chapter on 
agrarian reform. However, the evidence on demonstrations does highlight what can be 
understood as a change to a more conventional reform-style mode of institutionalizing 
resistance. Many schools, however, continue to exist and promote the movement's 
pedagogy. I often heard how movement schools were to train members to become 
“técnico-miltante (militant-technicians)” who were to have technical expertise in a certain 
area, but also a commitment to the movement's struggle. Despite this claim, 2012 TCU 
decisions on changes for PRONERA explicitly mention how the “técnico-militante” 
program needs to end as a goal in movement education. Whether or not this changees 
practices internal to schools will be seen in years to come. 
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CHAPTER 5: SELF-GOVERNMENTAL RESISTANCE IN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTION 
 
“Without Cooperatives, the Settlements do not Survive” 
- MST Director, Sector of Production- Paraná State, 8-11-2011 
 
Music permeates MST marches and rallies. One song – “só sai reforma agrária 
(loosely translated as “approve, or pass, agrarian reform)” – that I came to memorize after 
hearing it more times than I care to remember, lays out some of the central reasons for the 
movement's struggle. Its third stanza, specifically, refers to the importance of agricultural 
production. Usually sung in a jovial manner, the passage – “nossa terceira tarefa é 
produzir, no trabalho coletivo, colher muito, e repartir (our third task is to produce, work 
collectively, harvest a lot, and share)” – reminds MST members of the need not only to 
work in agriculture, but to do so collectively. Emphasized especially in the early days of 
the movement, while also continuing through the present day, collective work usually 
centers on cooperatives of dozens of families that design and implement production plans 
together. Entire settlements were (and many still are) organized around their cooperatives, 
connecting the fate of the movement's efforts in agrarian reform with their success in 
agricultural production. “Só sai reforma agrária” draws our attention to the vital 
relationship between agrarian reform and agricultural production, albeit in a light-hearted 
manner. 
Occupations and the ensuing encampments at the center of MST agrarian reform 
policy are not intended to be campsites or resorts. The movement breaks up prior land 
holdings and re-appropriates property, resisting status quo, dominant governmental 
policies to construct an MST-centered alternative in their place. This dynamic of 
  
182 
institutionalizing resistance characterizes agrarian reform policy, as well as the other 
policy areas where the MST actively vies for control, such as in agricultural production. 
Developing cooperatives, as I discuss in this chapter, is one alternative proposed by the 
movement to challenge state power and private property and the prescriptions, plans, and 
practices encouraged by governmental elites. Many cooperatives were born during the 
encampment phase of the movement's efforts to implement an alternative version of 
agrarian reform. Despite overlapping temporally, the actual plans and institutionalization 
of resistance differs in ways that I explain and explore in this chapter. 
I analyze in this chapter the different ways that the MST has institutionalized 
agricultural production policy. I show how the MST attempts to govern agricultural 
production in ways similar to their activities in education and agrarian reform through 
opposing state power and private property. Crafting and institutionalizing ways to make 
members economically viable, while remaining oppositional to large-scale landowners 
and governmental elites, has been a key priority since the movement's inception. In 
addition to cooperatives, other practices that count as concrete examples of the MST's 
institutionalization of self-governmental resistance in the formation of a kind of 
oppositional economy include attempts to foment agroecology and to informally 
incentivize cooperation between producers through using governmental policies. 
Cooperation, both inside and outside of actual production cooperatives, contests 
governmental policy prescriptions that promote individualistic, profit-generating 
operations. 
This chapter grounds the MST's institutionalization of self-governmental 
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resistance in agricultural production policy. Even though agrarian reform, as a policy area, 
is distinct from agricultural production and education, their fates are inextricably 
connected. Because most agrarian reform settlements feature land parcels that are 
relatively small, working together in any fashion, such as in pooling scarce resources and 
exchanging knowledge, is necessary. Isolated producers, living far removed from the 
means to transport their goods and market them, also often have limited means to 
pressure governmental authorities to create production policies for agrarian reform 
beneficiaries. The fear is that if the cooperatives fail, so do the settlements. After all, with 
no economic opportunities, people leave the areas they initially occupy in the name of 
agrarian reform. Regardless of the number of schools or health care clinics, or even 
amount of land distributed, agrarian reform hinges on the ability for rural inhabitants to 
earn a living. For these reasons, as I was told by one movement leader, without 
cooperatives, the areas where movement member families live – the settlements – are in 
jeopardy. 
This chapter addresses the tensions, the problems as well as the successes, 
surrounding the nature of MST resistance in the policy area of agricultural production. I 
focus on the movement's efforts to institutionalize agricultural cooperatives and 
agroecological production techniques – i.e. craft and follow regularized rules and 
procedures. I claim that movement efforts in the area of agricultural production, like I 
have already discussed in previous chapters on education and agrarian reform, also 
illustrate self-governmental resistance. With respect to agricultural production, however, 
the level of success is lower than what is displayed in the two other areas. This chapter 
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reveals how one major problem that has plagued movement efforts in agricultural 
production concerns strategic strength – with respect to the ability to plan ways to 
instrumentalize governmental elites and resources as well as to coherently design their 
own direct-action approach. Like previous chapters, I showcase the importance of 
movement identity as a contributing factor in institutionalizing self-governmental 
resistance. A low level of strategic strength has created problems, in fact, divisions, 
within the MST's identity concerning agricultural production. 
This chapter has three sections. In the first section, I elaborate on the meaning of 
state power in contemporary Brazilian agricultural production policy. I also document 
how neoliberal economic policy dictates have come to permeate prescriptions made by 
official, governmental elites to small rural producers. The first section presents the targets 
that the MST resists. In the second section, I describe the MST's coordinated efforts – not 
only in demands but also in implementation and design – to organize agricultural 
production in opposition to the dominant form encouraged by state authority. I concretize 
this discussion by grounding it in the development of production cooperatives and the 
movement's relatively recent promotion of agroecology. In the third and final section, I 
explain how the movement has institutionalized resistance in agricultural production and 
evaluate their success. Despite various success stories and achievements, I show how the 
MST's efforts in production have lagged significantly behind other efforts in education 
and agrarian reform. Here, I discuss that more than contextual factors, such as elite allies 
or state strength, the reason for the movement's limited success is due to flawed strategic 
planning. This, in turn, has created problems for the movement's identity, which has 
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further impeded institutionalizing self-governmental resistance in agricultural production. 
I conclude with a discussion of ramifications of these problems for the MST. 
 
5.1 Neoliberal Orthodoxy and State Power in Brazilian Agricultural Governance 
The Combination of Neoliberalism with State Power 
Over the last thirty years, dictates central to neoliberalism have become fused 
with state power overall, including in the area of agricultural policy. This combination 
has complemented the central qualities of state power – centralization, homogeneity, and 
inequality – rather than erase them. In this section, I discuss the key, identifiable elements 
of neoliberalism and how they buttress state power. I first explain how state power and 
neoliberalism are connected, and then, I concretize their dynamics through a focus on 
agricultural policy development in Brazil. This section's purpose is to explore the 
practices that the MST opposes in their cooperatives and agroecology initiatives, which 
are taken up in this chapter's third section. 
We see the development of neoliberalism occurring in two time periods. The first 
time period, commonly referred to as the “Washington Consensus,” runs from the late 
1970s and early 1980s through the mid to late 1990s. The subsequent “Post-Washington 
Consensus” continues through to the present day. This division is rooted in differences 
between macro-economic reforms focused on privatizing state-owned enterprises, 
reforming monetary policies, and removing import tariffs (Williamson: 1990) and 
subsequent efforts grounded in promoting local actor participation in social programs and 
granting greater autonomy to national governments to craft development strategies 
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(Weber: 2002; Stiglitz: 2008; Birdsall and Fukuyama: 2011). Peck and Tickell summarize 
this shift as “roll-back” versus “roll-out” neoliberalism (2002), with the shift a direct 
response to perceived failures by the practitioners who led the charge for the first round 
of reforms. 
The central elements of state power – promoting a singular culture, subordinating 
social actors, and centralizing decision-making power – are supported by neoliberal 
economic policy. First, the practices encouraged in both “roll-back” and “roll-out” 
neoliberalism emphasize what Burchell calls “an enterprise form of conduct” that 
encourages actors such as individuals, families, and governments to consider themselves 
as isolated, autonomous, cost-benefit calculators (1996). Burchell's recognition of 
“conduct” highlights the cultural component of neoliberalism. Promoting business 
practices also facilitates the creation of a singular mode of identification, specifically to 
the market. Neoliberalism is not economics devoid of culture, but rather it is a certain 
kind of culture rooted in particular practices and beliefs. 
In addition to identifiable cultural beliefs and practices, what also connects 
neoliberalism to state power is its “paradoxical” quality. The paradox, according to Rose, 
is that neoliberal policy portrays itself as the critic of government calling for deregulation 
in favor of the “market” while ultimately depending on governmental authorities for 
implementation (1996).
81 
The paradox reveals dependence on state power, and in 
particular, efforts to subordinate social actors and centralize decision-making. Concerning 
                                                 
81 For more on the historical context of this transition, especially in the late 1970s, see 
Foucault, Michel: "The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France, 1978-
1979," Lectures at the College De France, (2010). 
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the former, implementing neoliberal policies requires a governmental actor to deregulate, 
cut social spending, and privatize. Such elements at the core of neoliberalism assume 
separate private and public sectors, with the public sector enabled to execute changes 
over and onto private, i.e. social, actors. Accompanying this role hierarchy, decision-
making powers are reserved, or insulated, for a few economic elites in financial 
institutions. Through centralization and social subordination, state power enables the 
central cultural norms of neoliberalism to proliferate. 
In Latin America, neoliberal reforms came at the expense of interventionist states. 
Before either “roll-back” or “roll-out” reforms, governments from Mexico to Argentina 
crafted credit, technical assistance, and tax policies to favor large-scale agricultural 
production to acquire foreign currency as part of import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
(Haggard: 1990; Frieden: 1991). Large-scale agricultural production was favored – and 
remains so in the name of neoliberal orthodoxy as comparative advantage – usually in the 
form of grain production for export (Anderson and Valdes: 2008). The turn to 
neoliberalism in the 1980s also insulated macro-economic policy-making from social 
actors, while opening social policy to their participation (Collier and Handlin: 2009). 
Evelina Dagnino calls this latter development the “perverse confluence” of neoliberalism 
and participatory governance, as greater social involvement is contingent on following 
neoliberal norms (2007). Her insight draws our attention to co-optation, which the MST 
avoids, through consistently challenging the decision-making dynamics and role 
hierarchy promoted through state power. 
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The Neoliberal State in Brazilian Agricultural Policy 
Neoliberalism's “roll-back” phase in Brazil begins in the late 1980s, becoming 
entrenched in Collor de Mello's administration (1990-1992) with the ending of price 
fixing policies for particular crops and the cutting of large investment subsidies.
82
 At this 
time, we see a decrease in the amount of money distributed to all agricultural producers. 
Cuts that began during the Collor administration continued through the following Franco 
era (1992-1994) and the first mandate of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1994-1998) 
(Araújo, et al: 2007). In place of subsidies, large agribusiness operations began taking out 
loans from private banks rather than relying on governmental programs and credit.
83 
Following both Rose and Peck and Tickell, executing “roll-back” neoliberalism involved 
governmental actors. The kinds of beliefs and practices they promoted, over and onto 
social actors, were rooted in a singular understanding of economic behavior made 
possible through subordinating social actors to governmental elites. 
In FHC's second mandate (1998-2002), “roll-out” replaces “roll-back.” 
Grounding this transformation – specifically for how we understand MST resistance – is 
the change in agricultural policy to favor the idea of the “family farmer” as opposed to 
                                                 
82 Prior to the neoliberal turn, the Brazilian system was characterized by price controls for 
specific crops, subsidized credit for technological investments (e.g. tractors), and 
particular governmental agencies being in charge of specific crops (e.g. coffee and 
sugar). These programs developed in the early 20
th
 century, based on goals to secure 
rural to urban population shifts and providing food cheaply to the newly amassing 
urban populations (Barros 2008). 
83 Such changes, however, did not completely end support for large-scale agriculture. 
Reliance on private banks has caused large producers to incur significant debts (in 
2000, debt was 25% of gross agricultural production and in 2005, it was 25%) 
(Damico and Nassar: 2007), leading to federal government debt restructuring and 
bailouts twice over the last fifteen years (Rezende and Kreter: 2007). 
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the idea of the “peasant.” In one interview with a Ministério de Desenvolvimento Agrário 
(Ministry of Agrarian Development or MDA) official who works in the FHC-created 
Secretário de Agricultura Familiar (Secretary of Family Farming or SAF), I was told how 
credit and loan policies were intended for “family farmers, you know, like what you have 
there in the United States (Interview: João de Guadagin, MDA-SAF, 2-11-2011).” Others 
in the Instituto de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (Institute of Colonization and Agrarian 
Reform or INCRA) – the governmental institution mainly involved in agrarian reform 
policies – would use “farmer” (in English) to distinguish between Brazilian “peasants” 
and the supposedly superior United States “farmer (Interview: Luciano Valadares, 
INCRA, 2-2-2011).” Marking the shift towards the promotion of the “family farmer ethic” 
in rural populations was the development of two ministries for agricultural policy,
84
 as 
well as the creation of special education, land reform, and production policies, which 
came as a response to massacres of landless peasants in the states of Roraima and Pará 
(Ondetti: 2008). Even though these programs addressed certain issue areas where the 
MST is active, their official elaboration remains wedded to neoliberalism and state power. 
The FHC administration's “Reforma Agraria: Compromisso de Todos (Agrarian 
Reform: A Compromise for Everyone)” oriented agricultural policy under the banner of 
creating the family farmer. Along with the “Compromisso,” the FHC government created 
a set of policies known as the “novo mundo rural (new rural world).” The guiding idea 
was that all small producers were to receive the same treatment by “integrating agrarian 
reform beneficiaries into family farming (Cardoso: 1997, MDA/Jungmann: 1999).” As a 
                                                 
84 For more on this difference between the MDA and MAPA, see Fernandes (2010). 
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means of integration, the separate, already-existing credit policy for agrarian reform 
beneficiaries, o Programa de Crédito Especial para a Reforma Agrária (Special Program 
for Agrarian Reform Credit or PROCERA), tripled from $R 89 to $R 250 million in 1995 
and 1998, respectively. However, this increase was not to last, as PROCERA was later 
eliminated, and agrarian reform beneficiaries were absorbed into the already-existing 
credit policies for small producers known as the Programma Nacional de Fortalecimento 
da Agricultura Familiar (National Program for Strengthening Family Farming or 
PRONAF). 
PRONAF works to instill an individualistic business ethic, and thus neoliberal 
culture, revealing the specifics of the government's intended family farmer ethic. To 
qualify, families must meet certain group-based requirements,
85
 divided according to 
gender, age and most importantly, income.
86 
Regardless of the category, one overall 
objective is to “expand and improve products and their production in order to better 
                                                 
85 Accessed from http://www.mda.gov.br/saf/index.php?sccid=1862. 
86 The stipulations are the following: Group A (recently settled farmers), Group B (family 
famers not living on settlements), Group A/C (settled farmers previously in group A), 
agroindustry (for investments in infrastructure, crop commercialization, artisan 
production, rural tourism), agroecology (organic farming), Eco (sustainable 
development), Rainforest (sustainable development focused on reforesting areas), 
Semi-Arid (infrastructure development primarily in the northeastern part of the 
country), Woman (targeting programs for women), Youth, Defrayal, and 
Commercialization (for farmers and their cooperatives), Quotas (for cooperatives), 
Microcredit, Food (for particular crops such as milk, rice, beans and wheat). PRONAF 
works by the government fixing interest rates on particular loans that are destined to 
these groups. Annual defrayal interest rates are fixed for each PRONAF subcategory 
based on farmer’s income levels: up to $5,000 Reais, 1.5%; between $5,000 Reais and 
$10,000 Reais, 3%; from $10,000 Reais to $20,000 Reais, 4.5%; and from $20,000 
Reais to $30,000 Reais, 5.5%. Annual investment credits are also fixed based on 
income levels: up to $7,000 Reais, 1%; between $7,000 to $18,000 Reais, 2%; 
$18,000 Reais to $28,000 Reais, 4%; and from $28,000 to $36,000 Reais, 5.5%. 
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family earnings for individuals and collectives,” to “increase capital, production and 
profit… [and] create incentives for family farmers, as well as stimulate a sense of 
responsibility (Ministry of Agrarian Development: 2-2-2006).
87” The allusion to 
responsibility fuses a market culture and its imperatives – the pursuit of capital and profit 
– to the family, facilitating a means for the latter to identify with the former. 
Second, despite the group-based classification system, the ethic is nearly entirely 
individualistic. For example, an overwhelming number of recipients have been 
individuals – 98% between 1999 and 2004. Little to no money and few contracts have 
been signed with cooperatives. Only a small number – 2% – have been signed with group 
associations or devoted to projects oriented around agricultural infrastructure (Correa and 
Silva: 2007: 56). Group participation is not rooted in some notion of creating active, 
empowered social actors who have decision-making power in the design or 
implementation of policy. Rather, such practices have already been carefully defined and 
targeted by governmental elites for the “roll-out” of neoliberal practices onto social 
subordinates. In this construction, social actors are passive recipients. A different, 
contentious group dynamic that features collective decision-making rules and procedures, 
as I will elaborate in the next section, characterizes the guiding elements of the MST's 
oppositional economy. 
The language – expressed by both INCRA and MDA officials as well as found in 
Compromisso and PRONAF criteria to receive credit – depicts agricultural production by 
the family-farmer-as-business as superior to other peasant ways of producing and as a 
                                                 
87 Accessed from http://www.mda.gov.br/saf/index.php?sccid=813. 
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goal of governmental policy. “Integration” is a step on the path towards creating 
“efficient,” market-oriented economic producers. Agrarian reform policies, and credit, 
work as instruments in the state-led effort to promote neoliberal governance, placing a 
neoliberal ethic, or culture, onto recipients. Experts, from officials in the MDA to INCRA, 
administer and deliver these credits to agrarian reform beneficiaries, along with the 
knowledge and ethic concerning family farming. With the family farmer, we find a 
collection of policies, practices, and beliefs that reveal the connection of neoliberal policy 
dictates and state power. Rather than at odds, the two function well together, 
complimenting one another. 
Access to governmental resources is contingent on neoliberal principles. The 
Brazilian government, by promoting and providing credit accordingly, subordinates 
social actors in the process. The division of small producers into groups seemingly 
decentralizes access, but actually grants a relatively few number of governmental elites 
the decision-making authority concerning group criteria. Both concentrating decision-
making power and subordinating social actors illustrates two of state power's central 
elements. And the attempts to fashion all small producers into a singular “family farmer” 
homogenizes beliefs and practices, subjecting alternative cultural practices to market 
rationality. This last quality shows the third element of state power at work – the 
homogenization of culture. State power centralizes decision-making power, subordinates 
social actors to governmental elites, and promotes a singular mode of cultural 
identification. In these ways, neoliberalism combines with the central elements of state 
power rather than working at odds with them. 
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Despite the change from FHC to the center-left Lula administration in 2002, 
neoliberal reforms – especially of the “roll-out” variety – were strengthened without 
fundamental changes. To assuage business and investor anxiety after feeling the pressure 
from international and domestic forces, Lula continued Cardoso's macro-economic 
monetary policies (Amaral, et al: 2008). And while the funding provided for INCRA 
increased, as well as credit through PRONAF for small-producers, the guiding neoliberal 
compass in agricultural policy established during FHC's time remained unaltered. 
Neoliberal governance in agricultural policy began during the Cardoso regime in the 
1990s and became further entrenched during Lula's time in office. 
The hierarchy established between state agencies and producers demarcates 
different spaces for “state” and “social (or economic)” actors – producing a binary that 
subordinates
 
passive rural recipients using elite-determined criteria. The neoliberal forms 
of economic behavior that are encouraged and promoted are uniform and singular, 
attempting to homogenize a singular culture of economic production. As I will show in 
the next section, the MST's design and implementation of production cooperatives and 
agroecology directly challenges the conduct and policies encouraged by the Brazilian 
government. 
 
5.2 The MST's Institutionalization of Resistance through Cooperatives and 
Agroecology 
 
In addition to protests against agribusiness and occupations of experimental 
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production areas,
88
 MST resistance in the area of agricultural production takes the form 
of the systematized implementation – what I consider the institutionalization – of an 
alternative, oppositional project. Agricultural policy in Brazil shows central elements of 
neoliberalism. The previous section of this chapter dealt with how neoliberalism 
combines with state power through certain governmental institutions and credit programs, 
especially PRONAF. In this section, I discuss how MST production institutionalizes 
resistance to the elements of state power and private property in designing and 
implementing alternatives to status quo, dominant agricultural policy dictates. 
Specifically, the movement's challenge comes through decentralizing decision-making, 
opposing the subordinate status of social actors in economic activities, and proliferating 
localized forms of production. By organizing production on a communal basis, the ways 
in which the movement has institutionalized their resistance in cooperatives and 
agroecology production also challenges private property and neoliberalism. 
 
CPAs: Resistance to Private Property and State Centralization 
The clearest example of the MST's efforts to institutionalize oppositional 
production is through its Cooperativas de Produção Agrícola (Agricultural Production 
Cooperatives or CPAs).
89
 Since the late 1980s, the CPA has been seen by the movement 
as the “superior form of cooperation (MST: 2008, 74).” Every CPA – totaling 49 with 
                                                 
88 The two main examples of the latter are the MST occupations of research centers of 
Aracruz cellulose in Rio Grande do Sul (2006) and Synenta in Paraná (2007). 
89 There are two main kinds of MST-promoted cooperatives, the CPA and the CPS. The 
CPSs, Cooperativas de Prestação de Servicos (Service Cooperatives) do not 
collectivize production on site but work mainly to produce technical assistance to 
members and facilitate production. For more, see MST (2008) and ITERRA (2001). 
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2,229 participating families (Carvalho: 2006) – has the same guiding rules and 
encourages the same kinds of opposition to neoliberal governance. One CPA I visited, the 
Cooperativa de Produção Agropecuária Nova Santa Rita (Cooperative of Agricultural 
Production in New Santa Rita or COOPAN) currently works with members of 30 families, 
a decrease from the original 60 families in the mid-1990s. Regardless of this decline – 
something I also encountered at the four CPAs I visited
90
 – the 30 families divide 
production into different areas, or sectors, rotating between pork, dairy, and rice 
production. Each sector periodically meets to discuss what they will produce and need, 
which they then communicate to the entirety of the cooperative general assembly for 
debate and approval. Essentially the same nucleo design featured by the movement in 
other policy area governance, such groups – rather than those proposed and implemented 
through PRONAF credit policies – make executive decisions concerning how to 
distribute and administer resources. 
In the CPAs, the families' houses are shaped in a circle, known as the “agrovila,91” 
with a communal garden as well as a common kitchen and a school. Collective 
organization – not just for eating but also for housing – also characterizes the division of 
land that belongs to COOPAN, where families live separately in individual houses that 
are grouped together but production and socialization spaces are not privately demarcated. 
                                                 
90 Besides COOPAN, the other CPAs I visited were Cooperativa Agropecuária Vista 
Alegre (COOPAVA) in São Paulo, Cooperativa de Produção Agropecuária Cascata 
(COOPTAR) in Rio Grande do Sul, and COPAVI in Paraná. 
91 Agrovila is not a term special to the movement. It was initially part of the military 
government’s colonization settlements in the 1970s and was used when creating 
settlements in the Amazon. 
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Salaries are divided equally among members,
92
 with deductions for personal consumption 
coming out of their monthly pay (e.g. a deduction is made if someone eats some pork 
produced in the cooperative's pig sector). Thanks to communal production and living, 
some members leave for periods of up to two years to contribute in the movement's 
political activities while a core group maintains the operation (Field notes: COOPAN, 3-
27-2011; see also MST-CONCRAB: 1995; MST: 2008). These practices demonstrate 
how COOPAN, other production cooperatives, and the ideas of cooperation promoted by 
the movement challenge private property. The inclusion of schools, communal eating, 
and communal land arrangements also open up typically isolated, or individualistic, 
social arrangements to collective decision-making. 
MST cooperation also challenges the centralization of decision-making and the 
subordination of social actors that is encouraged in official, status quo agricultural 
policies. In the democratic, group-based division of labor found in the cooperative's 
different areas, spending and buying priorities are subject to debate. Besides debate, a 
porous division of labor characterizes each group, as nothing forces members to remain 
in one specific area. Such dynamics collapse divisions between “state,” “society,” and 
“economy.” In the MST's cooperatives, a clean and clear separation of public from 
private is erased. Neoliberal governance, through the exercise of state power, strictly 
separates theses spheres, organizing them in a hierarchical organization that subordinates 
                                                 
92 While this is counter to how typical businesses operate, it does not make the MST's 
form of organization unique. From the cooperatives of Mondragon in Basque areas of 
Spain to the Kibbutz in Israel, equitable distribution of earnings is common 
cooperative practice. In fact, the MST crafted their form of cooperation by researching 
these cases (MST: 2001). 
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social actors to centralized, expert decision-making in insulated public, governmental 
institutions. As institutionalized in actual practice, MST resistance also contests the status 
quo agricultural production policy's individualizing efforts seen in governmental 
programs such as PRONAF. Whereas the groups established in PRONAF credit programs 
reveal a hierarchy among the state authorities that create them and the social actors that 
perform in them, MST production groups equalizes decision-making power without a 
rigid role hierarchy. Besides frequent group meetings, elections by the cooperative’s 
members place leaders into upper-level positions within each enterprise (MST: 2010). 
 
Institutionalized Resistance to Culture: The Experience of Bionatur 
Another cooperative experience similar to COOPAN, but dispersed territorially 
throughout Rio Grande do Sul, is the agroecological seed cooperative Cooperativa 
Nacional de Terra e Vida (National Cooperative of Land and Life or CONATERRA), 
better known by its brand name Bionatur. Bionatur is central to the MST's 
institutionalization of alternative agricultural production not only because of its focus on 
collective, decentralized production practices, but also because of its emphasis on seed 
exchange and distribution rather than sales. Bionatur is a “social business,” which means 
that losses are socialized, or assumed by all members, rather than falling on the shoulders 
of individuals (Interview: Bionatur equipe técnico, 3-30-2011). The priority is not profit 
but maintaining the production of diverse agroecological seeds. In this manner, the profit-
oriented, capitalized “family farmer” emphasized and promoted since the FHC 
administration in the mid-1990s, is encountered with an alternative. 
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Bionatur also buys a certain percentage of the seeds from their members to sell to 
the government and private actors. This is a rule, established between the cooperative's 
producers and its management. The political significance of this regularized procedure, 
and why it counts as oppositional, is that it challenges monocultural production by 
encouraging producers to diversify (Interview: Bionatur equipe técnico, 3-30-2011). The 
limit on purchases provides producers a reliable source of income, but not one that they 
can exploit without end. They thereby avoid dependence on seed sales to the cooperative, 
opposing the specializing, potentially monoculture-creating logic implicit to comparative 
advantage. In this fashion, the institutionalization of seed purchasing and development 
contests neoliberalism. 
While CONATERRA shows the same contentious practices that characterize 
COOPAN's institutionalized decision-making procedures, the former cooperative also 
opposes homogenizing tendencies inherent to state and neoliberal governance by 
localizing production practices. The separate groups that characterize Bionatur differ 
from CPAs like COOPAN in that they are dispersed throughout the Rio Grande do Sul, 
rather than remaining in one settlement, and they focus on agroecological seed 
production. Usually comprised of five or six growers, each group also has one lead 
coordinator and one MST-affiliated extension agent communicating with all the groups in 
a region. By functioning in multiple areas, different kinds of seeds can be grown, unique 
to specific regions (Interview: Bionatur grower, 4-2-2011). The group structure also 
allows for various kinds of seeds to be grown according to multiple, localized production 
methods. In this way, the cooperative structure challenges efforts to standardize cultural 
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production practices and foods. Whereas state power works to homogenize modes of 
identification and beliefs – which are complimented by the emphasis placed by neoliberal 
policy on the market – separate groups enable different, multiple practices to develop. 
The movement's cooperative institutional arrangement enables this to take place. 
 
Agroecological Production in the MST's “Transitional” Phase 
In addition to Bionatur's efforts to promote agrecology, the MST attempts to retain 
the allegiance of disillusioned families – the reasons for which I will discuss in the next 
section – through encouraging families to stop using chemicals and to diversify 
production. At the end of the 1990s, many production cooperatives were in crisis 
economically (MST-CONCRAB: 1999), and movement leaders recognized the need to 
pursue an alternative way of organizing production. This led to a period of extended 
debates during the “transitional period (Interview: MST Direção Regional-Porto Alegre, 
3-23-2011).” 
One effect was the embrace of agroecological production, which further 
decentralized and localized agricultural production. For example, in a visit to one site in 
Rio Grande do Sul, one producer who grew mainly produce received regular technical 
assistance from the MST's technical assistance cooperative, Cooperativa de Serviços 
Técnicos (Cooperative of Technical Services or COPTEC), and belonged to a regional 
agroecological “nucleo (group).” Shortly before visiting the production site, COPTEC 
technicians led a presentation to the regional group – an assembly of producers 
numbering close to 25 – about permaculture and land use. The discussion centered on 
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how producers were to acquire knowledge of their specific sites, including locations of 
water sources, nature of soil quality, and lay out of the terrain. They were told that “they, 
too, were to do research. That everyone researches, not only people with college degrees. 
(Fieldnotes: Settlement in the Porto Alegre Area, 3-3-2011).” Through disseminating 
technologies and encouraging localized research, COPTEC/MST technicians enable the 
proliferation of local practices. Whereas state power favors standardized practices as well 
as centralized decision-making procedures, the movement's project contests uniformity 
while favoring a decentralization of decison-making power. 
As in the policy areas of education and agrarian reform, the MST works to 
cultivate a common identity among all producers. Songs, such as “só sai reforma agrária,” 
reiterate that all members are to produce, work together, and share the surplus product. 
Various posters produced by the movement also show families displaying their produce. 
While in the next section I show how strategic strength problems have led to problems in 
the movement's creation of their producer identity in agricultural production, efforts have 
been made to join all the members under the banner of “workers.” The class-based 
identity, as I have already discussed in other policy areas, involves a certain adherence to 
Marxist principles and symbols, e.g. red clothes and hats, and flag design. The 
movement's “mistica,” as led by children and adults at movement schools and events, 
nearly always feature some kind of food item and production tool. And while the family 
is important to the movement production, it is avoided as the central guiding or orienting 
economic unit.
93
 In agricultural production, the movement’s work on creating a coherent 
                                                 
93 The debate I have heard over peasant or family farmer is found more in academic 
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identity challenges the landowners – who are considered unproductive and thus 
illegitimate proprietors – and governmental elites. In agricultural production, while 
debate rages concerning how the movement is to produce, there is no question that 
movement members identify with the movement as workers and producers before they 
grant allegiance either to the state or the market. 
The movement's effort to cultivate a producer, rural worker identity complements 
their project to oppose both state power and neoliberalism in agricultural production 
policy. Group decision-making practices within cooperatives, supported by regular 
elections, shows a fluid division of labor. This fluid mode of organizing production 
challenges the hierarchical mode of distributing tasks that characterizes state power's 
subordination of public, governmental actors over private, social ones. Also, rather than 
centralizing and concentrating decision-making processes, the movement's system of 
cooperative and initiative to collective production equalizes decision-making efforts 
concerning design and execution of agricultural production. MST efforts to contest 
private property occur through socializing living, as well as redistributing earnings and 
establishing limits to production. Neoliberalism when combined with state power's efforts 
to homogenize culture, favors a business ethic grounded in an idealized family farmer 
subject. The MST counters this family-based model by allowing for multiple, localized 
production spaces to develop within the spaces where their cooperatives and 
agroecological practices are located. In the next section, I explain how the movement has 
                                                                                                                                                 
circles than within the movement. I think that there is analytical value to the 
distinction, but in my interviews with movement workers, individuals used the 
concepts interchangeably, showing no cleavage or opposition to one over the other. 
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developed their economies of opposition, documenting their limited, yet still important, 
success. 
 
5.3 Explaining and Evaluating the MST's Resistance in Agricultural Production 
The MST's Low Rate of Success in Agricultural Production 
The MST boasts impressive numbers concerning its institutionalization of 
agricultural production. The last reliable measure I found was done in the mid-2000s, 
when the movement claimed 49 CPAs with 2,229 families participating, as well as 32 
Cooperativas de Prestação de Servicio (Service Cooperatives or CPS) with 11,174 
members, and 7 more cooperatives that deal with credit, work and other activities 
(Carvalho: 2006). The majority of these cases are in southern Brazil. Gonçalves estimates 
that around 15% of the families mobilized by the MST participate in cooperatives, with 
over 44% in the state of Paraná (2008). In another calculation, I was told that most, but 
not all, are found in the south, with the current percentage of participants at around 5% 
(Interview: Director Sector of Production, Paraná, 8-11-2011). In the same interview, I 
was told that less than 5% of movement members implement agroecological production 
techniques. If we take the movement's own membership tally – 1,500,000 people – this 
means that roughly 75,000 people participate in alternative agricultural production. 
Another measure for movement involvement in agricultural production is the 
number of families accessing state policies for small-scale production, as those are more 
likely to use agroecological techniques. From numbers available in 2009 and 2010 in the 
Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos (The Food Acquisition Program or PAA), the 
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percentage of finances going to agrarian reform beneficiaries went from 8% to 12%, 
(from $R 28,699,236 of $R 363,381,941 to $R 44,643,666 of $R 379,735,466) while 
participating beneficiary families went from 7% to 11% (from 7,444 of 98,340 families to 
10,440 of 94,398 families). Because we can deduce that roughly 50% of agrarian reform 
settlements are under MST influence (CPT: 2000-2010), we can conclude that the 
number of movement affiliates that practice agroecology is in the thousands. 
Self-governmental movements aim to divide state power by challenging the 
design and implementation of specific policy areas, unlike revolutionary movements that 
occupy state power, or reform-style movements that seek incorporation within it. The 
MST's systematized, institutionalized resistance in agricultural production, as elaborated 
in the previous section, qualifies as a self-governmental form of contention. However, 
when we compare the numbers in agricultural production with the results in educational 
and agrarian reform policy, we see that the MST succeeds in agricultural production, but 
at a lower level. This variation, in terms of people mobilized in agrarian reform, 
educational, and agricultural production policy, shows that both MST agrarian reform and 
educational efforts outpace MST efforts in agricultural production. The reason, as I 
explain in this section, is found in how the movement's strategic plans in agricultural 
production suffer from a lack of consistency, coherence, and preparedness. 
In general, this section tests my three hypotheses: (1) that certain combinations of 
strategic action lead to different modes of movement institutionalization, (2) how 
increases in the iterations in movement plans of specific targets and goals, as well as in 
the time spent researching and documenting targets and goals, result in greater strategic 
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strength and thus a higher potential for successful institutionalization and (3) if a low 
level of preparation exists with high levels of consistent and coherent objective formation, 
or visa versa, then we see a level of institutionalization lower than if both indicators were 
classified as high, yet higher than if both were low. The combination of two kinds of 
strategic plans – direct-action and instrumentalist – explain the development of self-
governmental resistance, which are present but weak. The remainder of this section is 
devoted to how my focus on strategy provides a better explanation than other, more 
contextualized accounts for the MST's level of success in their institutionalization of an 
alternative, oppositional agricultural production project. 
 
Instrumental and Direct-action Strategies in MST Self-Governmental Resistance 
A strategic approach, focusing on instrumentalization and direct-action, centers 
analysis on movement plans. The previous section of this chapter detailed the nature of 
MST resistance in agricultural production. This section applies my theory of strategy to 
explain how the movement's cooperatives and agroecological production practices have 
institutionalized resistance. Direct-action plans, particularly, locate decision-making 
within the movement itself. They detail how the movement alone will control a particular 
policy area. Instrumental plans likewise undertake to explain how the movement can gain 
control, yet necessarily involve another actor – governmental or social – that the 
movement uses for its own ends. I evaluate both strategic plans in terms of their level of 
preparation, consistency, and coherence. Furthermore, as I discussed in the theoretical 
chapter of this dissertation, my understanding of strategy also situates a certain identity 
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that characterizes the movement's own self-understanding. I identify identity as a 
proximate cause in my theory of strategy, meaning that the levels of strategic strength 
correlate with the levels of cohesion and coherence within certain policy areas. Or in 
other words, when strategic strength is low, so will be the level of coherence and 
consistent elaboration of a movement's identity. Creating plans with a fractured identity 
leads to problems for the movement to communicate objectives to membership, as well as 
guide the development of plans. 
Concerning preparation, the MST has experienced difficulties in creating direct-
action production plans for the CPAs. The origins lie with the influence of the Catholic 
Church and the idea of cultivating the land in common, which was based in the religious 
imperative of treating fellow members and “creation” with respect, but featured few 
specific or practical details concerning how to manage an agricultural operation (Balanço 
Político da Cooperação no MST: 2006). In the mid 1980s, production was organized into 
the Sistema de Cooperativas dos Assentados (Cooperative System of Cooperatives or 
SCA), coinciding with the movement’s plan to organize all the settlements as collective 
enterprises (CONCRAB: 1997).
94
 This effort to formalize and systematize cooperative 
production, I was told, was seen by many as an imposition and many families rejected it. 
When families refused to join, divisions were created in the movement, and when 
families quit, divisions were created on particular settlements (Interview: MST Direção 
Estadual RS, 4-3-2011). Rather than preparing the member base on the importance and 
“how-to” concerning cooperative economic management, as well as providing 
                                                 
94 This sector changes again in 2006, currently named the Sector of Production, 
Cooperation, and Environment. 
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alternatives, a singular, vague conception of cooperation dominated early direct-action 
plans. 
For those in the CPAs, problems with adequate knowledge and implementation 
plans remained. The MST, in a self-critical move during its “transitional” phase, noted 
how the failure of many cooperatives was due to high debts and a lack of trained 
personnel, as well as poor production plans (MST-CONCRAB: 1999). Visiting various 
cooperatives allowed me to understand these issues. At successful sites, I was told how 
current members started with little to no experience in managing agricultural production. 
This is not to claim that they had no experience in agriculture. In fact, it was documented 
in the First Census of Agrarian Reform, conducted in 1996 – the year when many CPAs 
were created – that the overwhelming majority of agrarian reform beneficiaries had 
experience in the countryside, but mostly as salaried workers, squatters, or peasants 
(Schmidt, et al: 1998). These categories show that the majority of individuals in the 
movement occupied subservient, non-decision-making positions. Direct-action plans 
brought together people who were not trained in these positions. Or as I was told by one 
leader, “when we came together to socialize production, all we socialized was misery 
(Interview: MST Sector of Production Paraná, 8-11-2011).” 
Instead of adequate knowledge on how to establish small-scale cooperative 
production, plans intended for the movement to adopt large-scale, agribusiness 
production. At one cooperative, I was told that beginning in the 1990s, the movement 
intended for cooperatives to engage in monocultural production in commodities like corn 
and soy. Goals were to “be like the big ones, like the large landowners (Fieldnotes: 
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COOPTAR, 4-5-2011).” It is hard to fault the movement members for holding these 
objectives, given that their knowledge concerning production came from working on 
large-scale operations. For many families, success meant adopting the chemical and 
machine-intensive, commodity production with which they had prior experience. And 
given that the 1996 census documents show that the vast majority of movement members 
occupied such low level decision-making positions within large-scale operations, we can 
extrapolate that the movement overall held to these aspirations but had little practical 
content concerning actual know-how. 
Problems concerning preparation in the MST's direct-action strategy for 
implementing their cooperatives also characterized their instrumental approach. Prior to 
PRONAF's individualizing imperatives, the credits through PROCERA, from 1985-2001, 
explicitly incentivized groups through “tetos (ceilings),” 1 and 2 (Souza, et al: 2010). The 
difference between the ceilings was that to receive Ceiling 2 resources, which were 
double Ceiling 1 financial amounts, one had to request credit as a group. Movement 
members who received credit referred to this period as a time of “easy money” because 
initial restrictions and requirements for obtaining credit were lax (Interview: COPERLAT 
Direção, 4-1-2011). Movement documents on cooperatives and cooperation recognize 
PROCERA as a vital instrument for economic development and cooperation, showing 
how the MST intended to use the credit program to fuel their alternative agricultural 
project (e.g. MST: 1995). 
Despite these intentions, the movement members who received PROCERA 
resources began either with little to no productive means, or poorly formulated plans to 
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produce “like the big ones.” Combined with an unclear direct-action plan, PROCERA led 
to many farmers going into debt, and later leaving when they were insolvent. Likewise, 
while using the money for movement production objectives was the plan, vague 
objectives led members to focus on short term needs like purchasing food and building 
supplies, not on improving their production abilities (Interview: Claudete, INCRA-RS, 3-
14-2011). Like the low level, or simply vague, knowledge characteristic of its direct-
action plans, the movement had poorly formulated plans concerning how to 
instrumentalize governmental resources. Without a clear direction for resources destined 
for production, the movement shows a low level of instrumental strategic strength in 
terms of preparation. 
In spite of the problems concerning how to instrumentalize resources and craft 
direct-action plans, cooperation and cooperatives exist. In some cases, like COOPTAT 
and COOPTAR, the reason is that they cut their losses and sold the larger equipment they 
purchased after receiving PROCERA credit, whereas most others, such as COANOL, 
went into bankruptcy and stopped production (Interview: Direção COOPTAT-RS, 6-12-
2011). Also, the movement, after recognizing the crisis of solvency in the late 1990s, 
focused on “regional reference points,” or rather, special cooperatives, e.g. COOPAN in 
Rio Grande do Sul and COPAVI in Paraná, that concentrated their energies in terms of 
training members in production, financing, and working with the youth (MST: 2008). 
Rather than past attempts to fit all settlements into the same model, the direct-action plan 
for cooperatives oriented a select few. Additionally, at COOPAN, I was told that many 
members “learned by trial and error,” acquiring direct-action know-how from gradually 
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learning. The movement has also recently recruited leaders from the Basque cooperatives 
of Mondragón (specifically from their NGO, mundokide), who are teaching members 
how to manage cooperative finances and production in Sergipe and Paraná (Fieldnotes: 
Outside of Rio Bonito PR, 7-23-2011, Interview: Director of Mundokide, 7-25-2011). 
Both direct-action and instrumental strategic plans explain the level – albeit low – 
of agricultural production institutionalization. The cooperatives resist state power and 
private property, yet the number of them and their members is low in comparison to other 
policy areas where the movement is active in promoting self-governmental resistance. 
Low levels of knowledge preparation in instrumental and direct-action strategies, 
however, do not mean that the movement completely lacked a strategic approach. While 
low, production know-how developed over time, only after serious problems riddled 
large-scale production failures, and it developed gradually, while resources acquired 
through credit programs and the use of allies for movement objectives have characterized 
plans. 
A low level of preparation also characterizes the MST's instrumental strategic 
plans for agroecological production. This is where we see the movement’s involvement 
with public policies such as Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar (School 
Alimentation Program or PNAE) and CONAB. I was told by the director of the MST's 
confederation of cooperatives, CONCRAB, that the plan is to foment agroecological 
production practices for debt-burdened, insolvent and thus ineligible, producers by 
having them access policies through working with eligible members in cooperatives 
(Interview: CONCRAB President, 9-1-2011). Concrete examples include selling 
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vegetables to neighborhood schools via these social programs where insolvent, yet active, 
producer members affiliate with already existing cooperatives that facilitate their means 
to sell their produce and access policies (Interview: COPERLAT Direção, 4-1-2011). 
Despite these initiatives, the vast majority – almost 90% of all settled families, as 
revealed in CONAB numbers from 2009 and 2010 – do not access public policies. 
The instrumental strategy involves using such government programs for the 
movement's alternative production project, which requires knowledge of how to navigate 
highly professionalized institutions such as MAPA. For example, accessing CONAB 
policies for small-holder agriculture involves regular meetings with the “grupo gestor 
(management group)” composed of not only movement leaders but representatives of 
Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS), Ministério da Fazenda, 
Ministério de Planejamento, Orçamento, e Gestão, and the Ministério de Educação (MEC, 
MAPA, and the MDA). The knowledge required at this level includes negotiation skills, 
which is new. In fact, these programs are Lula-era creations that the movement has only 
in the last five years begun planning to instrumentalize. 
 
Strategy Continued: A Focus on the MST's Problems in Creating a Coherent Identity 
The last complication that affects both the MST's direct-action and instrumental 
strategies concerns coherently and consistently articulating the nature of the movement 
and its relationship to its target, either agribusiness or governmental authorities. Here is 
where we see the latter elements of my theory of strategy – coherent elaboration of 
objectives and their consistent iteration. I demonstrate these latter components of my 
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theory of strategy through a focus on problems characterizing the MST's identity in 
agricultural production. All other policy areas where the movement is active, including 
education and agrarian reform, feature distinct identities promoted by the MST within 
their overall umbrella conception. Identities are diverse within the movement, as Wolford 
as already discussed (2010). In agricultural production, however, this diversity has given 
way to rifts and divisions. 
Historically, there have been intense – and fruitful – debates concerning divisions 
and divides, with the clearest being the 1985 national congress on whether or not families 
who receive land should remain in the movement. In this case, however, tensions create 
problems, specifically through the competing identities of “peasant,” “colono,” and 
“worker.” First, multiple movement documents note the existence of a “peasant” 
consciousness, not as something to cultivate, but as a form of production that needs to be 
replaced by “the worker (MST-CONCRAB: 1999, 2004).” In one interview, I was told 
how “the mentality of the colono” – a term used extensively in the south of Brazil to refer 
to all small producers and MST members – is “limited and needs to be trained to produce 
(Interview: Direção Regional-RS, 3-23-2011).” The “worker,” on the other hand, 
overcomes certain “ideological behaviors” that characterize “emerging classes like the 
peasant and artisan (MST-CONCRAB: 2004, 15-16).” Peasants and colonos, according to 
movement documents used to train members, are easily susceptible to manipulation, use 
simplified production practices, live in isolation, and hold reactionary beliefs. The goals 
are to form class consciousness and conceive of themselves as workers – overcoming 
their prior existences as colonos and peasants. 
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Strategic coherence is compromised by the MST's explicit privileging of a peasant 
form of production in their embrace of agroecology. The annual “Jornada de 
Agroecologia (Journey for Agroecology),” approaching its 12th year in the state of Paraná 
in 2013, focuses on disseminating – not overcoming or eliminating – production that 
explicitly favors peasant practices. The event is not small by any measure: at the 10
th
 
Jornada that I attended, workshops were attended by over 4,000 people on everything 
from bee-keeping to how to smoke one's own meat for preservation (Fieldnotes: Curitiba-
PR, 7-1-2011). The production practices encouraged throughout all workshops were 
oriented around creating artisans, small-producers who independently produce and use 
their knowledge to improve their lives and their families. Each jornada also features a 
notebook, or systematization of the movement's agroecological best practices and 
techniques, which functions throughout states to teach peasant production plans. 
Contradictions in identifying who is the subject of MST agricultural production 
are exacerbated by a relatively low number of documents and publications to foment the 
movement's oppositional project. At the time of my research, there were ten such 
“cartilhas (notebooks)” from the “jornada of agricultura,” as well as one “sistematização 
(systematization)” of agroecological experiences for distribution to movement producers 
(2006). At odds in terms of content, CONCRAB has published eleven notebooks for 
pedagogical use that feature advice on collective cooperative production – and usually the 
promotion of a worker consciousness over a peasant one – since 1993. The differences in 
publications show the different conceptions of the movement's identity, dividing 
resources for communication between identities in tension. 
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Problems concerning consistency and coherence in the movement's identity 
creation also appear in publications for internal distribution. The movement has 
consistently iterated the need for production in movement bulletins and publications, 
specifically in Journal dos Trahalhadores Sem Terra and Revista Sem Terra, which is 
illustrated by over 4,500 mentions since the 1980s. Cooperatives alone, however, have 
been discussed in publications only 742 times, and agroecology, just 209. In comparison, 
a search for “reforma agrarian (agrarian reform)” in the movement's two major internal 
publications yielded 7,789 hits. Simply put, the movement discusses and iterates its 
position on agrarian reform more than on production. The identity cultivated in the policy 
area that deals with agrarian reform is higher than in agricultural production, showing 
higher levels of internal movement communication on its practices and meaning. And the 
remainder – over 3,000 mentions – that do not specifically address agroecology or 
cooperatives shows a lack of specificity concerning production. When production is 
discussed and debated, the guiding identities of peasant and worker divide the focus and 
attention. Divisions impede the development of rules and procedures necessary to 
institutionalize resistance. 
Such tensions encourage different ways of organizing production, rendering not 
only internal communication but also planning difficult. In one case, I was told that 
efforts (ultimately unsuccessful) to standardize agroecological educational techniques 
outside of Paraná in all movement production training centers resulted in internal 
movement conflicts and stalemate (Fieldnotes: Escola Milton Santos, 7-6-2011). Who the 
movement represents – peasant or worker – and how it intends to institutionalize 
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resistance in production are in debate and have been since the movement's emergence. 
The differences between worker, producer, as well as activist, have generated 
considerable divisions within the movement that led 50 key leaders to feel that the MST's 
emphasis on agroecology and cooperatives compromised the struggle for socialism (see 
the Carta da Saida). For the last ten years or so, the movement calls the overall strategic 
shift an effort to “accumulate forces,” which is intended to “recover” movement control 
of settlements and production (MST: 2009). Yet who (and how) “recovery” will take 
place is not agreed upon, leading to problems in planning. 
The explanatory quality between strategic strength is revealed when we consider 
the inadequacy of alternative explanations. First, changes in the overall political economy 
or the shift to neoliberal governance may explain variation in movement 
institutionalization. Yashar's study of indigenous movements points to the potential that 
budget cuts have on weakening government's prior control over people, creating openings 
for mobilization (2005). The turn to neoliberalism – in both its “roll-back” and “roll-out” 
phases – potentially explains that to survive small-holders had to organize a cooperative 
form of production when prior state support was withdrawn. “Roll-out” neoliberalism, 
furthermore, would explain cooperatives not as resistance, but as indicative of 
decentralized policy implementation. Concerning the latter issue, MST cooperative 
planning and development precedes, temporally, neoliberalism's “roll-out.” To explain 
cooperative development, the movement's own plans – which begin in the early 1980s – 
provide a better causal explanation. And with respect to the explanatory potential of 
policy repeal and state withdrawal, this may provide the general background conditions 
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for the need to organize alternative production programs and policies, but not why we see 
such low levels of success in comparison to the policy areas of education and agrarian 
reform. 
Social movement theories provide alternative explanations for institutionalizing 
resistance, in particular concerning instrumentalization. Certain social movement 
approaches would predict that the level of movement institutionalization would vary with 
the presence or absence of elite allies. According to theorists such as Tarrow (1998) or 
McAdam (1999), elites would facilitate interaction with movement leaders, who then 
would enable mobilization to develop. The issue is that we see a growth of 
government/movement interaction – what we could call “openings” in the sense of 
creating PAA and PNAE – and persistent, stubbornly low levels of alternative agricultural 
production. The numbers of cooperatives, as well of agroecological developments, show 
change independent of governmental assistance or recognition. In fact, the MST adopted 
peasant-style production as a result of previous strategic efforts, failures, and learnings, 
not because of some array of contextual factors. 
If the movement had developed a coherent subject, institutionalization would be 
radically different. If a worker identity was adhered to, without the adoption of 
agroecological, peasant forms of production, then the movement would have ceased to 
exist as a force pressuring for oppositional agricultural production. Essentially, this would 
have meant forming cooperatives like “the large producers,” which most likely, would 
have led to a status quo, conventional form of production not grounded in resistance. This 
counter-factual scenario presupposes an additional feature discussed – adequate 
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knowledge preparation – which the movement would also have needed for this to develop. 
Assuming a coherent identity for the movement's base, rooted in a peasant form of 
production, could have led to greater success. The movement would have led different 
campaigns, perhaps even opposing the use of chemicals and the development of large-
scale monocultures much earlier. This would have also led to a dramatically different 
production structure: the focus on small-holders would most likely have caused the 
movement to pressure lawmakers for more access to credit policies. The path chosen by 
cooperatives such as COOPTAT and COPAVI wed both the cooperative and the 
agroecological. While they capture both, and oppose private property and state power, 
they are also few and far between, as well as relatively new. 
Strategic problems have led to the movement's low level of success in 
institutionalizing an alternative mode of agricultural production. This does not means that 
there are no instances of this alternative, or that it is a failure – collective cooperatives 
and examples of agroecological production exist. The movement hosts events, such as the 
Jornada de Agroecologia, which diseminate best practices and identities. The production 
of notebooks is used to train members and cultivate forms of identification. Content-wise, 
however, we see tensions. In general, tensions can be productive and lead to development. 
From the examples in Paraná, as well as the extreme stance adopted in certain training 
documents concerning peasant and worker production, such tensions are not productive. 
Rather, they impede cohesion and lead to conflicts, especially concerning who is the 
movement's “base.” While direct-action and instrumental strategies cause the movement's 
development of self-governmental resistance in agricultural production, the movement's 
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strength in each strategic orientation is low. For this reason, more than for contextual 
factors such as state strength, elite allies, or neoliberal transformation, the movement has 
a lower level of success. 
 
5.4 Conclusion: The Problem with Identity 
This chapter has two main purposes: (1) to show that the MST's organization of 
cooperatives and agroecological production exemplify this new mode of social movement 
resistance that I call self-governmental and (2) to explain and evaluate through my theory 
of strategy the movement's efforts to institutionalize this form of resistance. I emphasize 
strategy to highlight how all forms of social movement resistance originate from a plan. 
In the case of the MST and self-governmental resistance – as opposed to reform and 
revolutionary struggles – movements combine direct-action and instrumental strategies. 
In institutionalizing resistance in agricultural production policy, the MST institutionalizes 
resistance by forming collective forms of economic production, which localizes 
production, defies state efforts to centralize decision-making, and contests a rigid, role-
based, division of labor. While the MST's brand of resistance in agricultural production 
policy fits the self-governmental mold, it has not been as successful as efforts in 
education and agrarian reform. The reason, as I explored in this chapter, is the low level 
of strategic strength in direct-action and instrumental plans. 
This chapter also features an extended discussion of movement identity within my 
theory of strategy. Different identities exist in every movement. Malcolm X's brand of 
civil rights, and the kind of identity rooted in self-determination, differed substantially 
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from the version promoted by Martin Luther King Jr. Similarly, the MST contains many 
modes of identification. This is not necessarily a negative quality for mobilization. But 
when diversity turns to rifts, then the development of a coherent plan of action is 
imperiled. Identity situates movement membership with their targets, each other, and 
tactics. Their development, especially in self-governmental contention, comes out of past 
struggles in Latin America. Yet, if identities are in conflict with one another in a 
movement, then coordinated, sustained action – the definitive elements of collective 
action – cannot develop. The MST's troubles in agricultural production, with crafting a 
stable identity, reveal these stumbling blocks. 
Additionally, the meaning of trends in manifestations for agricultural production 
indicates similar developments in the areas of education and agrarian reform. As in those 
areas, consistent protests coupled with low levels of cooperatives and agroecological 
production practices, shows a movement potentially on the cusp of a change. Like in the 
other policy areas, the movement's novel mode of resistance – self-governmental 
contention – appears to be heading in a more conventional, reform-style direction. As 
seen in Figure 1 in Appendix 1, their protest and demand-making efforts in this area have 
remained fairly consistent over the last ten years. During this same time period, the 
majority of collective cooperatives had already been established. Or in other words, the 
main mode of challenging state power and private property – the CPA – had, for the most 
part, been established with few new additions. Comparing trends in protest among all 
policy areas where the movement is active – education, agrarian reform, and agricultural 
production – shows no correlation between pressure and level of institutionalization. 
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Persistent trends, however, show a decline in self-governmental contention with 
persistence of reform-like qualities. 
The low levels of strategic strength and the number of successful agricultural 
economic production plans and policies are concerning for the movement. In this area, 
more than others, the movement has been plagued by vague plans and low levels of 
preparation. When successful, the movement's efforts to collectivize production raise the 
overall standard of living for the entire settlement. They also show that governmental 
resources spent on agrarian reform policies are not a waste. But without clear proposals 
and directions, both from the government and the movement, success in this key area of 
the movement's struggle is in danger. 
A just as troubling finding is that nearly all the successful collective production 
cooperatives, the CPAs, were developed by movement members during the encampment 
phase of their struggle. I found no case during my fieldwork of a fully collectively 
organized cooperative that originated following de jure settlement recognition. And as the 
number of occupations and encampments has declined substantially over the last five 
years, as documented in Chapter 3, then so have the chances of forming economies of 
opposition that will in the future contest private property and state power. In this fashion, 
the MST's current strategy of accumulating forces, as discussed in previous chapters, 
limits the movement's actions in agricultural production as well as in agrarian reform. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Summary, Findings, and Limitations 
 
My case study of the MST was driven by the following question: how can a social 
movement successfully develop a self-governmental mode of institutionalizing resistance? 
I intentionally foregrounded the concept of institutionalization to draw attention to how 
resistance is not spontaneous, but deliberate and systematic. This idea, itself, is not new 
to social movement theory, e.g. definitions of contentious politics in Aminzade et al: 2001 
or McAdam et al: 2001 propose the notion of “episodic contention” as contrary to 
spontaneity. This conceptual point, however, has not found its way into much 
contemporary research. Most studies remain solely focused on the disruptive actions of 
movements by studying trends of protests, marches, and rallies. Many case studies and 
analyses tend to investigate the glitzy, attention-grabbing, more sporadic instances of 
resistance. 
Tarrow draws our attention to both sides of social movement resistance: 
disruption and stability. While not fully developing conceptually or theoretically his 
insight, the point is that sustained, coordinated collective defiance contains a paradox. 
Specifically, he notes that to persist in destabilizing actions, movements have to stabilize. 
Most research omits the latter and focuses on the former. Tarrow's paradox forces 
movements to devise ways to continue contention. His analysis, nonetheless, concentrates 
only on reform-style institutionalization, while others, notably Goldstone (1991) and Tilly 
(1978), examine how revolutionary resistance becomes regularized. 
The MST neither fits the reform nor the revolutionary mode of institutionalizing 
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resistance: the movement has not sought inclusion within existing power dynamics, as is 
characteristic of reformist movements, and it has not sought to occupy, or take, state 
power, as is characteristic of revolutionary struggles. Furthermore, the MST does not run 
candidates in elections, exist for profit-making, or primarily engage in illicit activities. 
Defying categorization as political party, business, or criminal syndicate, and persistently 
challenging dominant, status quo economic, political, and cultural relations, the MST is a 
social movement. Yet, how the MST is a social movement, defies classification as either 
reform or revolutionary. This forces us to come up with a new concept to characterize 
their form of resistance, which I call self-governmental. 
My study also exposes the conceptual tensions in the social movement literature 
concerning the differences between state and government. Tarrow's discussion, as well as 
most other research on contentious politics, considers states as unified and coherent 
entities. In adopting a discussion of powers – notably, centralizing decision-making, 
subordinating social actors to governmental elites, and homogenizing cultures – I relax 
the notion of unity and the common sense assumption that states exist as units (as if maps 
reveal the existence of states). Social science and common language – not reality – grant 
singularity to the collection of powers, which together, constitute what I repeatedly refer 
to throughout this dissertation as state power. I do not use the language of state/society 
relations, not only because this presupposes a classic liberal form of state, but also 
because self-governmental resistance problematizes this very separation. 
MST efforts to control specific policy areas differentiate their form of contention 
from the others. By policy, or policy area, I include the de facto practices, laws, and ideas 
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surrounding the delivery of a service that is typically considered the prerogative of 
government. In the areas of agrarian reform, education, and agricultural production, I 
explain and describe how the MST institutionalizes ways of controlling service design 
and implementation, from collectively-organized cooperatives that contest neoliberal 
economic policy directives promoted by the Brazilian government to occupations that 
decentralize the means to acquire land. 
For reform-style contention, movements demand inclusion into the exercise of 
state power as they demand or ignore the institution of private property. For revolutionary 
struggles, movements seek to occupy state power and oppose private property. The 
central problem is that both of these kinds of struggles reproduce state power through 
their very acts of resistance. In reform-style movement's challenge of state power, 
contention takes shape around seeking the inclusion of those previously excluded from 
the exercise of state power. Revolutionary movements, on the other hand, assume a kind 
of radical exteriority during their initial mobilization, yet plan to occupy state power 
without altering its fundamental design. They, too, ultimately reproduce state power 
while opposing the institution of private property. Self-governmental resistance differs in 
so far as movements such as the MST divide state power by vying for control of 
individual policy areas, rather than attempting to exercise state power in its entirety, 
while at the same time, contesting private property. Sharing with revolutionary contention 
the institutionalized opposition to private property, self-governmental resistance further 
differs by continuously constituting a challenge to state power. The continuous challenge 
to state power by self-governmental resistance also differentiates it from the kind of 
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defiance characteristic of reform style resistance. 
My causal explanation for the MST's variable success – measured by the 
movement's ability to mobilize people and create concrete sites under their control – in 
institutionalizing self-governmental resistance centers on strategy. I define strategy as a 
guiding plan that temporally and logically precedes all actions. It contains a movement's 
objectives and methods for engaging with targets and allies. Strategy is not found only in 
written documents or pamphlets. I discern movement strategic plans in written accounts, 
as well as in interviews with movement leaders and repeated interactions with targets. For 
the concept in general, I identified certain subcategories – mediated, direct-action, and 
instrumental. Each, in various combinations, led to different modes of institutionalizing 
resistance, e.g. reform, revolutionary, or self-governmental. Within each subcategory, I 
measure the strength of instrumentalist and direct-action strategic plans by assessing 
coherence, consistency, and level of knowledge preparation. Identity – which I find to be 
an intervening variable – impacts the institutionalization of resistance in terms of how the 
movement understands itself and its relationship to its objectives. 
In seeking an answer to my research question, I find that the main element that 
explains the MST's institutionalization of self-governmental resistance is strategic 
strength. More than any contextual factor – such as the presence/absence of elite allies, 
the strength of governmental institutions, or changes in the economy – strategy is the 
main explanatory factor that leads to the variations in the levels of successful movement 
institutionalized resistance in different policy areas. Contextual factors, as showcased by 
Tarrow (1998) and McAdam (1999) in their applications of the concept of political 
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opportunity structure or in Political Process Theorty, provide potential explanations for 
the origins of protest waves, but not for variations in kinds of resistance. For discussing 
the different trajectories, it is the movement, rather than elite allies or state strength, 
which launches and implements certain strategic plans that result in certain kinds of 
resistance. 
Another finding in my research concerns how identity and strategic planning 
work together to explain the institutionalization of resistance. The MST promotes a 
singular, uniform sense of identity, which is buttressed by more specific versions for each 
policy area. When the MST consistently and coherently iterates its identity in certain 
policy areas, e.g. in agrarian reform by communicating to its base and targets the meaning 
of “sem-terra,” then strategic plans are stronger and communicated more easily. Divisions, 
when they appear as salient cleavages within movement self-conceptions, stall plan-
making, and thus the institutionalization of resistance. This is nowhere more apparent 
than in the MST's efforts in agricultural production policy. Here, the movement lacked a 
coherent identity concerning the subject of production. Tensions between a “peasant” and 
a “worker” producer identity impeded the MST's ability to design and implement 
strategic plans. I find that diversity in a movement's self-understanding is not to blame for 
a lack of success. But when diverse identities become divergent and irreconcilable, then 
success is endangered. In this case, strategic plans cannot be consistently communicated, 
which also imperils knowledge preparation. The institutionalization of resistance, 
therefore, occurs at a low level. 
Identity plays a central role in my explanation and description of self-
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governmental resistance. Specifically, movement-centered identities challenge state 
power through defying one of its defining elements – the promotion of cultural 
homogenization. I uncover that in acting as a buffer between state-promoted forms, e.g 
nationalism, multiple identities enable diverse cultural practices in the areas of education 
and agrarian reform to develop. Thus, whereas states promote cultural homogeneity, self-
governmental movements promote heterogeneity. My analysis of state power, drawing on 
the work of Scott (1998), also draws attention – in addition to creating cultural 
homogeneity – to efforts to centralize decision-making authority and subordinate social 
actors to governmental elites in an administrative division of labor. MST self-
governmental resistance contests these elements of state power through decentralizing 
decision-making power and breaking down the division between government and society, 
between public and private. Their resistance against these two features of state power is 
apparent in their contentious institutionalization of counter agrarian reform practices. 
Land occupations, which typically are conceived as disruptive, also constitute an 
alternative decentralized manner to locate land that challenges the status quo, a 
government-supported policy alternative that relies on expert knowledge and presidential 
decree. Government-sanctioned agrarian reform relies on a stark institutional divide 
between certain bureaucratic entities and social actors. Administrative inequality is 
opposed through the MST's institutionalized nucleo (small group) structure that 
distributes tasks between members equally in places like their encampments. 
Institutionalizing the nucleo system of decision-making and role distribution 
characterizes all the areas where the MST implements self-governmental resistance. From 
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the administration of production cooperatives to organizing land occupations, the focus 
on groups – what the movement calls “organicidade” – is key to their resistance. This 
does not mean that the nucleo arrangement is the same in each area. Rather, while small 
groups are apparent in counter policy area design and implementation, its content varies 
in each respective area. This aspect of the MST's resistance speaks to concerns expressed 
by rational choice theorists, specifically Olson's discussion of large v. small groups. The 
MST appears to have learned from Olson that the chances to successfully organize 
collective action are facilitated in smaller groups because sanctions are easier to 
administer (1965). As I elaborated in each chapter, the movement institutionalizes their 
“organicity” within their larger movement institutional arrangement, a la Lenin's 
conception of democratic centralism. 
Small groups carry out the most work, from the encampment to the cooperatives. 
Cohesion has been maintained through a combination of delivering material and 
ideational goods to members. This is not to say that division and rifts have been avoided, 
or that the movement has been immune to defections. In fact, one of the main schisms 
took place during my research, when 50 key leaders left. Regardless of recent 
developments, the movement's mode of organizing resistance has retained a relatively 
high level of cohesion for most of the MST's 30 year existence. 
My project is limited in fully considering the role of private property in self-
governmental resistance. Locating the ways in which the MST contests private property 
is easy: collective cooperatives intentionally eschew demarcated individual land holdings, 
the movement demands that land ownership within agrarian reform settlements remain 
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with the government rather than individual families, and educational initiatives criticize 
wage-labor. In my account, however, I do not elaborate on the conceptual nature of 
private property and its potential relationship to state power. For example, is the state, 
itself, an instantiation of it? Do territorial divisions, managed by a centralizing elite, make 
states into private property? Are the recent sales of large swaths of territory in Brazil, as 
well as in the Ukraine, indicative of how states are nothing more than potential 
subdivisions for sale? Certain policy areas – specifically agrarian reform – show the 
direct connection between the practices of certain governmental institutions and private 
property. Private property is prominent in social movement resistance, especially in self-
governmental contention. While I establish this connection, its dynamics require 
additional attention. 
 
6.1 Comparisons with other Movements: Self-Governmental, Reform, and 
Revolutionary 
 
Another limitation of my project concerns applying my theory of strategy to other 
movements. Coherence, consistency, and knowledge preparation are all central to 
strategic planning. Applications to the other movements, however, could not appear in 
this dissertation due to space and time constraints. To make up for this limitation, in this 
section, I have documented trends in social movement resistance in other Latin America 
countries such as Nicaragua, Peru, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina. In this 
section, I compare these other movements with the MST in order to display how my 
theory of strategy explains the development of their respective modes of institutionalizing 
resistance. I do not elaborate on every indicator in my theory to the same degree as I did 
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with the MST in each chapter. My cursory study in this section is meant to show that my 
theory potentially applies and warrants further research. 
My classification of the three different movements appears in Chapter 2, which, 
reproduced below, shows my definitional rationale for each kind of movement. 
Table 1: Kinds of Movements, Defining Qualities, and Examples 
Kind Reform Revolutionary Self-Governmental 
Definition Initially challenges 
state power, yet later 
reproduces it. Seeks 
inclusion and 
incorporation into 
government. Ignores 
or promotes private 
property. 
Initially challenges state 
power, yet later reproduces 
it. Seeks parallel 
governments and excludes 
already-existing ones. 
Demands and abolishes 
private property. 
Continuously challenges state 
power. Governs particular services 
and does not desire a dual 
government. Demands and 
abolishes private property. 
Examples United States Civil 
Rights Movement, 
LGBT Movement, 
Environmental 
Movements, Anti-
Nuclear Movement. 
(Late) Confederación 
Identidades Indigenas 
de Ecuador 
(Confederation of 
Indigenous Identities 
of Ecuador or 
CONAIE), Cocalereo-
MAS 
Bolsheviks, Early 20
th
 
Century Fascists (e.g. Italian 
and German), Sendero 
Luminoso (Shining Path), 
July 26
th
 Movement, 
Sandinistas 
MST, Rondas Campesinas (Peasant 
Leagues), Zapatistas, Piqueteros, 
(Early) Confederación Identidades 
Indigenas de Ecuador 
(Confederation of Indigenous 
Identities of Ecuador or CONAIE) 
 
In this section I do not go through every one of the movements found in the chart. 
Rather, I focus on paired comparisons in three sub-sections: other self-governmental 
movements, reformist resistance, and revolutionary struggles. In the first sub-section, I 
compare the Piqueteros and Zapatistas in order to show how they each qualify as self-
governmental movements. Comparing them, while keeping in mind the MST, allows us 
to see the relevance of identity and instrumentalist strategic plans. Comparing indigenous 
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movements in the second sub-section foregrounds the decision to engage in strategies of 
mediation by forming political parties. Because the movements themselves formed 
parties, and remain integral in their administration, I refer to Bolivia's MAS and 
Ecuador's Pachakutik as movement-party alliances. I chose these two cases for 
comparison because they show differences in levels of success. In the third sub-section, I 
explore Sendero Luminoso's and the Sandinista's respective modes of revolutionary 
contention. I evaluate the former's failure and the latter's successful institutionalization of 
revolutionary resistance in light of my theory of strategy. While each movement in this 
section deserves chapter-length treatment, my discussion here provides a preliminary 
comparative study that shows the application of my theory to movements other than the 
MST. 
 
Other Examples of Self-Governmental Resistance: the Piqueteros and the Zapatistas 
The Zapatistas and the Piqueteros display similar modes of institutionalizing 
resistance that qualifies their form of contention as self-governmental. Both can be 
considered “least-likely cases (Eckstein: 1977)” because the Zapatistas are typically 
considered first and foremost an indigenous movement and the Piqueteros are an urban, 
unemployed workers movement. And even though both are found in middle-income 
countries, their respective member bases differ widely in terms of income levels and 
history. If my theory explains the development of their form of resistance, given such 
differences between them, then this would confirm my approach. If movements in 
Argentina and southern Mexico embrace direct-action and instrumental strategies, then 
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we should see self-governmental contention. And if within these strategic plans, we 
observe variations in coherence, consistency, and knowledge preparation, then, in some 
fashion, we should observe corresponding variations in levels of resistance. 
Born out of unemployed workers struggles in the Argentine state of Neuquén, the 
Piquetero movement gets its name from its distinct tactic – road blocks (in Spanish, 
piquetes). Since its origin, the movement has become national. While an exact count of 
members is difficult to find, at their height during the 2001-2002 economic crisis, the 
total number of piquetes reached 2,336, with usually between 500 and 1,000 individuals 
attending each one (Massetti: 2006). The roadblocks, while disruptive, also have 
constituting or stabilizing properties. In addition to drawing attention to the problem of 
unemployment and demands for social services, members charge a “toll” for passers-by. 
Piquetes also function to draw the attention of governmental authorities, who distribute 
resources to remove them from the streets. The money received goes towards a series of 
movement-run projects, from collectively-run soup kitchens to small craft production. 
Piquetes, like the MST's land occupations, have both disruptive and stabilizing qualities. 
Strategically, and in terms of identity formation, the Piqueteros have much in 
common with the MST. Relying on the movement members' own initiatives and pooling 
their collective knowledges – whatever they bring to the shantytowns where they live – 
reveals plans to design and implement policies in a direct-action fashion. Scholars who 
describe their activities as “autonomous” or “horizontal and participatory,” in fact, 
showcase how actions involves the movement's own indigenous leadership and member 
base (Masseti: 2004; Muñoz: 2008). Autonomy serves as a way to describe their form of 
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strategic planning, what I refer to as direct-action. 
We can also detect plans for using governmental resources for the movement's 
own objectives, indicating instrumentalist planning. The regularized engagement with 
state authorities to extract greater social services, for example, indicates not spontaneous 
actions, but carefully planned efforts. Not only are they planned, but the results are 
known in advance. The goal is not to take state power, or to improve service 
administration, but to take and use existing policies. Just as important, the movement has 
eschewed running candidates in elections. They prefer, like the MST, to avoid developing 
plans based in mediation. From this brief discussion, we see that in terms of strategic 
planning, the Piquetero movement has developed plans both in a direct-action and 
instrumentalist fashion. 
They have also worked on creating their identity, as an “unemployed workers 
organization.” This means that they feature people who are unemployed from the 
standpoint of the formal state-recognized economy and who are also workers from the 
perspective of their own productive capacities (Dinerstein: 2010). Their work on this 
identity establishes their opposition to the state-promoted form that would characterize 
their status as social service recipients – i.e. subordinating social to governmental elites – 
and as unproductive people. Their identity is derived from, as well as embodies, their 
strategic orientations, which includes direct-action and instrumentalist plans. 
We can connect the Piquetero movement's strategic plans to its institutionalization 
of resistance for control of certain policy areas. Specifically, the movement contests the 
manner through which welfare policies are administered. Rather than promoting 
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centralized decision-making authority as promoted in state power, the movement 
promotes collective decision-making practices concerning how to distribute material 
resources received from piquetes (Special Report: Clarin, 9-26-2002).
95
 The movement's 
small group formation and equitable distribution of social welfare resources challenges a 
strict separation between state and society by granting the movement a role in deciding 
how welfare is distributed. They use these resources to form community gardens and 
collectively-organized marketing networks for fruit and vegetables, as well as bakeries 
and facilities for textile and craft production. These economic activities are self-managed 
and cooperative, turning social welfare policy resources into a means to challenge private 
property, given their basis in principles of social economy and solidarity (Paomino: 2004). 
Their collective, cooperative brand of administration, thus, challenges private property, as 
well as how standard Argentine governmental social service administration occurs. 
Piquetero contention has also been described in ways akin to my 
conceptualization of self-governmental resistance. Dinerstein et al's characterization of 
their resistance as “conflictual institutionalization (2008),” draws attention to how the 
movement has regularized negotiations, protests, and roadblocks to confront 
governmental authorities, as well systematizing an alternative way to provide social 
services. Elsewhere, their contention is described as “inside and outside the state,” as they 
attempt to “re-appropriate social services (Dinerstein: 2010).” While recognizing the 
movement's claims to decision-making autonomy and self-management in policy – not 
only in demands, but in designing and implementing alternatives – scholars stop short of 
                                                 
95 For complete story, see http://edant.clarin.com/diario/especiales/piqueteros/. 
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conceiving of the Piquetero's activities as indicative of governance. My concept fits the 
case, and enables us to better describe the form of their contention. Self-governmental 
resistance, institutionalized by the Piqueteros and the MST, centers on a movement's 
alternative mode of service provision that contests state power and private property, while 
simultaneously constituting and destabilizing the form of order dictated in particular 
policy areas. As shown by the Piquetero's decentralized organization and regularized 
contention in the area of social welfare policy that opposes private property, their 
collective action is self-governmental. 
It is in their identity where we see problems in their institutionalization of 
resistance. Divisions have always marked the movement, from more radical wings that 
refuse any cooperation with political parties to others that have endorsed leftist parties 
(Special Report: Clarin, 9-26-2002). Especially since the recovery of the Argentine 
economy after the 2001-2002 economic crisis, as well as the election of the late Nestor 
Kirchner in 2003, certain sectors of the movement began to coordinate protests with the 
government and defect (Frey and Cross: 2007). Whereas the MST displays problems in 
crafting a coherent identity and plan of action in the policy area of agricultural production, 
the tensions between disparate Piquetero organizations show divides within the 
movement itself. Without a stable, coherent identity, the movement – or “self” at the 
center of their form of governance – has encountered problems coordinating and 
stabilizing the institutionalization of resistance. 
The problems revealed by rival identities are connected to issues in both direct-
action and instrumentalist strategic planning. Specifically, while the movement has plans 
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for using governmental resources from social services, they do not have plans for how to 
confront different kinds of governments. Their preparation of knowledge concerning how 
to instrumentalize governmental resources was better during the economic crisis and 
when an oppositional government occupied state power. Additionally, various movement 
members have begun to work at the discretion of a favorable government, hoping for 
rewards for their service as opposed to forming their own indigenous bases of resistance. 
They have thus ceded ground on direct-action planning and the worker component of 
their identity. For these reasons, we see the decline in Piquetero mobilization beginning 
in 2004 (Masseti: 2006). My theory of strategy, and in particular the place of identity, 
explains the nature of the Piquetero movement and its later problems. 
Like the Piqueteros, the Zapatista's struggle has been defined in terms of 
autonomy, which I call direct-action strategy. From schools to cooperatives, the 
movement trains its own members to implement and design their practices. Members are 
taught that social programs are nothing more than “limosnas (alms).” Inculcating this 
mentality illustrates a wider, direct-action plan that guides action. The movement also 
instrumentalizes the Mexican government and allies in important ways to develop their 
project. Relying on NGOs, rather than government for material resources, the Zapatistas 
have brought such non-movement actors as Enlace Civil into the institutionalization of 
their resistance (Barmeyer: 2009). Like the MST's use of the Brazilian Constitution, the 
Zapatistas legitimize their struggle with reference to the language of rights and the 
Mexican Constitution. Their identity, which features indigenous practices and customs, 
also cuts across all their strategic plans. 
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While the Zapatistas' official origin dates back to their armed insurrection on 
January 1
st
, 1994, to show opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) on the first day of its official introduction, a collection of Maoists, urban 
intellectuals, and Catholic Church-affiliated groups had been organizing indigenous 
peoples since the early 1980s. Barmeyer, in his in-depth study of the movement, 
describes their resistance as “taking on state roles” in their maintenance of an armed 
defense wing, schools for children, and collectively-organized cooperatives (2009). The 
Zapatistas showcase what they call the Caracoles (Spanish for “Snails,” common and 
significant in Mayan culture) and Juntas de Buen Gobierno (Councils of Good 
Government), which organize the movement's de facto social, economic, and political 
control over certain municipalities, los Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas (The 
Autonomous Zapatista Municipalities in Rebellion), that were first formed in 1994. 
Zapatista service provision in these municipalities shows qualities that challenge 
state power and private property, revealing the movement's deployment of direct-action 
and instrumentalist strategic plans. The movement's governance of social relations, 
including punishment, does not exist as an extension of already-existing practices of the 
Mexican government. In fact, indigenous (specifically Mayan) customs establish codes of 
conduct for movement members in their self-declared autonomous municipalities. A 
central element of such practices – especially for how they constitute resistance – is how 
they showcase collective forms of consensus decision-making practices (Tilly and 
Kennedy: 2006; Speed: 2007).
96
 Rather than centralizing power and subordinating 
                                                 
96 This is not always perfect, and women often do not have the same status as men. The 
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governmental elites to social actors, Zapatista order-providing security by groups 
includes many, previously marginalized people. This collapses the public/private divide. 
The content of the instruction taught in their schools, likewise, highlights indigenous 
languages and history. They oppose state practices directly through refusing to accept 
resources despite governmental attempts to provide, as well as indirectly through 
teaching students the history (and continuing necessity) of indigenous resistance 
(Baronnet: 2008; Stahler-Stolk: 2010). Also, collectively organized, administered, and 
owned cooperatives equally distribute earnings, challenging the neoliberal imperatives of 
individuality and profit-seeking, as well as private property (Swords: 2007, Hollinger: 
2012). 
The Zapatistas, more so than the Piqueteros, challenge state power's characteristic 
centralization of decision-making authority, subordination of social actors, and cultural 
homogenization in a variety of policy areas, from security to education. The Zapatistas 
also combine direct-action and instrumentalist strategies in their coordinated, sustained 
challenge to state power and private property. While they have been successful in 
developing their brand of self-governmental contention, their inability to extend their 
struggle beyond isolated places in Chiapas shows an overall limited level of achievement. 
The reason lies in the low level of strength found in their instrumentalist strategic 
orientation. The MST, especially in the area of agrarian reform, has instrumentalized 
                                                                                                                                                 
point, however, is that it challenges state power and government-promoted forms of 
order. The practices imminent to resistance are not necessarily emancipatory. For more 
on women and indigenous resistance, see Olivera, Mercedes. "Subordination and 
rebellion: Indigenous peasant women in Chiapas ten years after the Zapatista 
uprising." The Journal of Peasant Studies 32, no. 3-4 (2005): 608-628. 
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resources, organizational frameworks, and language from INCRA, the primary 
governmental institution in charge of agrarian reform. INCRA and its policy area are 
national in scope. This enables the MST to access policies with distribution networks and 
plans beyond any specific state and group. The Zapatistas, however, have not developed 
the same kind of relationship beyond Chiapas. They have linkages with allies 
internationally, but these have not established reliable, persistent connections. Likewise, 
their appeals to the Constitution and rights, while national, are not consistent and regular. 
Zapatista self-governmental resistance, while resting on both direct-action and 
instrumental strategies, is weak in terms of the latter. 
Both the Piqueteros and the Zapatistas are examples of self-governmental 
movements. They do not attempt to take state power and have not developed in ways to 
seek inclusion into the workings of state power. This means that they defy classification 
as either a revolutionary or reform-style movement. Like the MST, both movements rest 
on a combination of direct-action and instrumental strategies as they institutionalize 
resistance against state power and private property. In this cursory analysis of each 
movement, I could not analyze each respective movement's activities in particular policy 
areas. Conclusions from my “pathway” case study of the MST, regardless, illustrate 
certain weaknesses in the movement's respective struggles. When discussing other self-
governmental movements and applying my theory, I find the reasons for the Piquetero's 
and Zapatista's levels of successful resistance in strategy and identity. 
For the Zapatistas, their style of self-governmental contention draws our attention 
to the importance of instrumentalizing certain actors. The Piqueteros draw our attention 
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to the importance of identity. Essentially, easily divided ideologies and identities can be 
exploited by allied political parties. In a sense, this is akin to the dangers faced by the 
MST in the area of agricultural production. In the movement's coordinated contention in 
that policy area, divided and contentious modes of identification impeded successful 
development of resistance during the Lula administration (2002-2010). The Piqueteros 
illuminates the kinds of dangers a movement must navigate when contesting allied, so-
called “friendly” governments. Allied governments may be just as dangerous to social 
movements as administrations that directly oppose them through repression. If the 
movement's goal is to help a certain party win an election, then there is no problem. But, 
if their goals are more extensive, and include consistently challenging state power, 
neoliberalism, current property arrangements, economic inequality, etc., then allied 
governments actually lead to a movement's demise without addressing their grievances. 
 
From Self-Governmental Resistance to Reform: Indigenous Contention in Ecuador and 
Bolivia 
Indigenous resistance, as exemplified by CONAIE, the “Cocaleros (Coca-leaf 
growers union)” in Bolivia, as well as the Zapatistas in Mexico, is usually considered 
similar. Yashar groups them in her explanation of movement origins, claiming that a 
combination of neoliberalism, state retreat, and preexisting networks provided the 
adequate openings that facilitated their emergence (2005). While such studies see 
commonality between these movements for organizing people around an indigenous 
identity, my focus on kinds of resistance notes that they differ in fundamental ways. 
Specifically, the movements in Ecuador and Bolivia formed political parties and engaged 
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in reform-style contention. Each country's social movements have been instrumental in 
forming and staffing their respective indigenous-oriented political parties (Van Cott: 
2005). The creation of movement-party alliances reveals significant shifts in how 
indigenous resistance is conducted in the Andes. This change – from self-governmental 
resistance to reform – allows me to test my theory by presenting here a preliminary 
sketch of the shift from direct-action to mediated strategies. 
CONAIE's origins in Ecuador, like the self-governmental movements, took place 
during the late 1970s and 1980s. Unlike other movements, it is a confederation of 
separate indigenous organizations, most notably two other federations – la Confederación 
de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichuas del Ecuador (Confederation of Kichua People of 
Ecuador or ECUARUNARI) and la Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la 
Amazónia Ecuatoriana (Confederation of Indigenous Identities of the Amazon or 
CONFENAIE).
97
 CONAIE's respective member organizations number over 25. The 
confederation gained prominence, first, for their mass 1990 uprising that placed the 
movement on the national stage not as a “peasant,” or primarily class-based organization, 
but one built on “Indigenismo (Pallares: 2002).” This notion, as explained by Pallares, is 
not completely devoid of material elements. Rather, these movements blend – how they 
do so, as I discuss, has repercussions for their resistance – cultural and material demands. 
And second, the movement earned recognition for participating in the “Junta de 
Salvación Nacional (Junta for National Salvation),” where with the military and the 
                                                 
97 For a more complete history of various other indigenous organizations that came to 
form CONAIE, see Chapter 4, “Ecuador: Latin America's Strongest Indigenous 
Movement,” in Contesting Citizenship in Latin America (2005). 
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movement helped to depose then-president Jamil Mahuad with plans to create a 
Venezuela-style, socialist government (Barracca: 2007). International pressure from the 
United States to freeze investments ended this experiment after one day. 
This foray into government posed a break with the movement's more typical self-
governmental, and later, reform-style forms of contention. Initially, more self-
governmental practices of institutionalizing resistance characterized separate 
organizational practices in customary law and education. Concerning the former, the self-
governing legal arrangements – including practices such as flogging and community 
incarceration – constituted practices of Kichwa, Otalaveña communities in Ecuador's 
Sierra region. Even though customary law always existed, in some fashion, in indigenous 
communities, Otalvenã movements mobilized their own as a collective challenge to the 
government's efforts to extend developmental and national ideologies in the region in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s (Korovkin: 2001). In fact, such movement initiatives had been 
subordinated and severely repressed for decades. CONAIE also led efforts in the 1990s to 
assure bilingual education in local schools, where students would learn indigenous 
language and culture from movement teachers with governmental support (King: 2004). 
In each of these examples, movement member organizations went from demand-
making practices, to demand-implementing. They also, in self-governmental fashion, 
display movement strategic plans to use governmental resources in the process. Material 
resources for education and support were derived, after some initial opposition, in 1988 
for movement-administered bilingual education for the entire country. Occupying a 
managerial role in both customary law administration and education, indigenous 
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movements challenged state power through defying efforts to homogenize cultures and 
monopolize decision-making practices. Otavaleña community justice, like its counter-part 
in Zapatista Caracoles, collapses public and private roles, thereby contesting state power's 
subordination of social to governmental actors. And even though such practices have 
always characterized indigenous communities, in various regards their practices in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, were directed by organizations as part of a political project. 
These examples reveal traits that qualify these organizations that compose CONAIE as 
self-governmental, at least in their early stages. 
CONAIE's mode of institutionalizing self-governmental resistance, however, has 
changed over time to become reform-style. The main reason for this change arises from 
the movement's own strategic planning orientation. What indicates this is the movement's 
entry into electoral politics. Beginning in the mid-1990s, in what has been referred to as 
the movement's “strategic shift,” self-governmental action gave way to “collaboration 
with non-popular powers” through forming the political party, Pachakutik (Jameson: 
2011). For much of the 1990s, the movement actually discouraged electoral involvement, 
forbidding members to hold political office (Mijeski and Beck: 2011). This changed, 
when a focus on “integration and unity” began to characterize movement plans, and their 
strategy shifted from developing organizational autonomy and self-governance, to 
achieving policy changes by changing the constitution (Becker: 2011). Claiming a right 
to self-determination for indigenous people and communities has always been at the 
forefront of CONAIE's struggles. The emergence, however, of Pachakutik in the mid-
1990s signaled a shift in strategic planning that involved running candidates in elections 
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at various levels of government, culminating in attempts in 2008 to declare the 
plurinational nature of the country by revising the Constitution. Self-determination and 
governance have always constituted indigenous struggles. The means to achieve these 
demands, however, have changed. 
Ecuador's indigenous movement's strategic shift to institutionalizing reformist 
contention brought changes in terms of the kind of resistance that became 
institutionalized. First, the movement's decision to enter electoral politics came at the 
same time as opposition to private property declined. The challenge to neoliberalism, 
which took place through protests and demanding concessions from multinational 
investors became less characteristic over time of mobilization (Jameson: 2011). The 
result was a shift in policy area focus: rather than isolating certain areas where the 
government exerted influence, e.g. security, education, etc., the movement sought 
inclusion into state power through delegating decision-making power to another entity – a 
political party. That some of the movement's own leaders, for instance Luis Macas, would 
occupy positions of governmental authority and run for office, does not matter when 
considering the shift from self-governmental to reform-style resistance. What is important 
is not the individual, but the means through which a movement attempts to practice 
opposition to dominant, status quo powers. By forming a political party, the movement 
delegated decision-making power to a non-movement organization that sought inclusion 
and unity with state power. 
We can evaluate the movement's shift because my theory of strategy applies to all 
strategic subcategories, including instrumental, direct-action, as well as mediation plans. 
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In Ecuador, the level of successful institutionalization is low. We can measure success 
with similar indicators used to document MST institutionalization – number and 
percentages of participants. In this regard, Pachakutik has disappointed. In fact, the 
movement's political party had its highest level of success in its first inroad into electoral 
politics in 1996. In this year, 17% of the country voted Macas for president, while the 
party earned 8% of the national deputies and averaged 5% nationally of each provincial 
legislature (Mijeski and Beck: 2011). The party has seen stark declines in support since 
then, as the movement and the party have been divided in terms of identity and tactics. 
Indeed, the confederations that compose CONAIE's base have been divided since the 
decision to enter electoral politics. 
Strategic cohesion and identity are two problems that the movement-party alliance, 
CONAIE-Pachakukik, has not resolved. What we find is that embracing “Indigenismo” 
in opposition to state-forced, more class-based modes of identification, did not entail a 
coherent, positive indigenous set of practices. As more of a rallying cry for self-
determination, positive content of this “self” remained in a kind of radical plurality, held 
together in self-governmental contention but not reform. The MST's privileging of 
diverse forms of practicing education and production, allowing for heterogeneity where 
state power forwards homogeneity, always took place under the movement's overarching 
form of identity that works as a shield against state-promoted alternatives. Only in 
agricultural production do we find rival identities, not diversity. In a similar fashion, the 
rival confederations within CONAIE could not unify forces under a common identity 
adequately. One result was poor planning, evidenced in deals with the military junta to 
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leave power and support for the failed presidency of Gutierrez in 2003. Divisions among 
confederations concerning how to engage with the government – and even whether to run 
candidates – have consistently split member organizations. This lack of a coherent 
strategic vision generated a weak presence as a governmental entity, leaving movement 
organizations susceptible to clientelist politics and diluting their demands and positions 
(Mijeski and Beck: 2011). A lack of unity translated into strategic planning problems and 
thus difficulties in institutionalizing resistance, in this case, of the reform variety. 
Reform-style contention has also characterized indigenous movement efforts in 
Bolivia. One notable difference between Ecuador and Bolivia, however, is the apparent 
success of reformist efforts in the latter case. Whereas Pachakukik has never gained a 
substantial number of seats, Bolivia's main indigenous political party MAS – al 
Movimiento a Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism) – retained the presidency, with 
Evo Morales winning re-election as the country's first indigenous president, and clear 
majorities in both houses of the national legislature in 2009. Despite “socialism” in the 
name of the party, voters and members are not mobilized on the basis of class. Rather, 
like in Ecuador, “Indigenismo” remains the ultimate guiding identity regardless of Evo 
Morales's roots in the Cocaleros (Coca-leaf growers union). 
MAS, and the movements that comprise it, show the signs of reformist contention. 
Besides developing a political party, the recent goal was to change the Constitution in 
2009 in order to enshrine greater rights to indigenous peoples, recognize Bolivia as 
plurinational, and institutionalize land reform. The latter issue would seem to indicate a 
challenge to property relations, specifically private property, and thus place MAS in the 
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camp of self-governmental contention. The reality is that the institutionalization of land 
reform in the Constitution has not resulted in any substantive changes (Kohl: 2010). In 
what some have called “twenty-first century socialism,” MAS actually accepts existing 
property relations, while using the state power to redistribute resources in a more 
equitable fashion (Kennemore and Weeks: 2011). The plan is to use state power to build a 
more equitable kind of welfare state for all Bolivians, not institutionalize resistance 
through claiming certain policy areas for movement control and design. As we saw in 
Ecuador, the party's efforts to change the Constitution illustrate an attempt to find 
inclusion for indigenous peoples within state power. Neither MAS' movements nor the 
party vie for control of individual policy areas, like the MST or Zapatistas. Their 
formation of a political party indicates the adoption of a mediation strategy that also does 
not contain a coordinated, sustained challenge to private property or capitalism. 
While the number of elected representatives shows a greater level of electoral 
success than what characterizes Ecuador, opposition from civil society groups and 
problems with knowledge preparation have resulted in limited achievements. The 
nationalization of the country's hydrocarbon sector, as well as renegotiation of contracts 
with oil and gas companies, do not collectivize or promote alternative property 
arrangements (Kennemore and Weeks: 2011). Although inroads in economics are limited 
in their impact, traditional economic elites have still continually mobilized protests in 
opposition (Postero: 2010a). Furthermore, economic and political crises have been 
mismanaged by a new political party whose base membership and support comes from 
social movements (Kohl: 2010). The members, because they come from a tradition of 
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opposing government and not participating within it, have limited experience. As a result, 
their level of knowledge preparation concerning how to govern and work with 
oppositional interests is low. 
In Bolivia, the party-movement alliance has retained a coherent, consistent 
strategic approach that explains its higher level of success with respect to Ecuador. 
Postero calls MAS's project “hegemonic,” in the sense that indigenous rights, economic 
redistribution, and political reforms are becoming dominant in the changing Bolivian 
political landscape (2010b). These parts of MAS' platform, despite avoiding direct 
challenges to economic power and property arrangements, have retained a high level of 
coherence and consistency since Morales' first election in 2006. Morales' election allows 
for coherence to take root by consistently proclaiming objectives. Coherence and 
consistency are strong, as is displayed by MAS' ability to retain unity amongst the 
different social movements that compose its base. Challenges remain, however, because 
MAS is composed primarily of social movements with little to no prior experience 
navigating electoral politics (Garcia: 2007). 
Both the indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia have adopted reform-
style contention. As is indicative of this kind of institutionalized resistance, these 
movements have eschewed contentious activities with respect to private property. 
Constitutional reform efforts in both countries reveal, as well, that each movement and 
their party desire to constitute government and find inclusion into state power, not 
challenge it. Applying my theory of strategy to developments in each respective country 
provides explanations for the variable success. Particularly, in Ecuador, a low level of 
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preparation and problems concerning cohesion among different organizations has led to 
serious difficulties in institutionalizing reform-style contention. Bolivia is more 
successful, despite problems with knowledge preparation. Comparing MAS' efforts with 
Pachakukik in Ecuador shows the former's greater level of coherence and consistency in 
strategic planning. Oppositional elites, while not part of my theory, also have made 
institutionalizing reform difficult in Bolivia. 
Another implication from my comparison of kinds of institutionalized resistance – 
in this section, between self-governmental and reformist kinds of opposition – is the 
nature of policy area opposition. What we find in reform-style resistance is a general 
jettisoning of economic policy. The most successful case – Bolivia's movement-party 
linkages that have produced MAS – is characterized by efforts to push for an improved 
social democracy, or rather, a welfare state. These goals are valuable and have positively 
impacted members’ lives. They have not, however, consistently and coherently launched 
campaigns, or institutionalized a mode of resistance that strikes at private property. Land 
reform – a demand of movements and parties in both Ecuador and Bolivia – has not been 
taken up in earnest, remaining more of a rallying cry and demand. Reform-style 
contention, as shown in these examples, for the most part, ignores patterns of property 
ownership. Economic or agricultural policy is mainly left off the agenda of these 
movements and their parties. Collective, or cooperative, modes of production receive 
little attention. 
Collier and Handlin note that current movements mobilizing in the post-neoliberal 
era tend to extend their influence in social policies – e.g. health care, welfare, and 
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education – because economic policy has become insulated (2009). While inflation and 
monetary policies are not opposed in self-governmental resistance, the examples of the 
MST, Zapatistas, and Piqueteros reveal how contention continues within economic policy 
over property arrangements and the ways to organize production. A comparison between 
reform and self-governmental resistance shows that Collier and Handlin's finding is true, 
but only for a certain kind of movement. Or rather, economic policy has not been 
fundamentally altered by reformist movements. Yet for movements that resist through 
promoting self-governance, contesting and posing alternatives to neoliberal economic 
policy is constitutive of their very nature. 
 
Revolutionary Struggles: the Sandinistas and the Shining Path 
The Zapatista's initial armed insurrection and CONAIE's one day occupation of 
state power with the Ecuadorian military, while hinting at revolutionary tendencies, were 
in actuality radical departures from their respective self-governmental and reform-style 
forms of resistance. Revolutionary contention differs from these two other forms of 
institutionalizing resistance because the movements occupy state power – not divide it – 
or are included within it. The reason why we see this kind of resistance is the movement's 
strict focus on direct-action planning. While direct-action usually characterizes all forms 
of struggle in some fashion, in revolutionary struggle this takes an extreme form. 
Revolutionary institutionalized contention opposes state power as practiced by a 
movement's respective government, as well as opposing private property. Reform 
movements, on the other hand, are initially caused by direct-action strategies, but 
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ultimately transition to mediation, while self-governmental contention arises from a mix 
of direct-action with instrumentalist strategic plans. Concrete manifestations of 
revolutionary institutionalized resistance appear in the development of worker councils, 
autonomous schools and clinics, as well as armed insurrections. Governing practices 
(excluding armed struggle) are independent from already-existing structures or power and 
authority. This extreme exteriority is different from self-governmental resistance. As we 
saw through the MST, they may appear revolutionary, but they actually use governmental 
resources to oppose state power and private property. 
La Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation 
Front or FSLN) is the last revolutionary movement in Latin America that has been 
successful. The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, while mobilizing at roughly 
the same time, displayed a relatively lower level of success than its counterpart in 
Nicaragua. One way to measure success is to count the people mobilized. While both 
organizations were vanguardist in nature and thus directed by a dozen or so leaders, the 
Shining Path, in one estimate, boasted between 2,000 and 8,000 people (Scheina: 2003), 
while a principal organization within the FSLN – Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo 
(Association of Rural Workers or ATC) – counted over 58,000 active members at the time 
of seizing state power in 1979. In addition to this wide disparity in the number of 
participants, another crucial mark of success is that the Sandinistas took power and the 
Shining Path did not. Despite their downfall, the Shining Path, at certain times during the 
1980s, controlled around 40% of Peru's territory (Dietz: 1990). The Shining Path, in 
comparison to the Sandinistas, shows an overall lower level of resistance. 
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The Sandinistas and Shining Path emerged at roughly the same time and with 
similar objectives. They also shared a general adoption of Marxist-Leninist principles as 
the basis for their identity. While the FSLN opposed an autocratic, United States-
supported Somoza dictatorship in the 1970s, Sendero Luminoso's origins and 
development mainly occurred during Peru's democratic transition post-1980. The plan to 
take state power by force was planned and mainly performed by the movement's own 
membership, which for the FSLN, was in part funded by Cuba (Prevost: 1990). 
Both movements engaged in their respective struggles on their own terms, under 
their own direction. Or in other words, each movement engaged in revolutionary struggle 
because of the direct-action strategic plans they developed. The exclusion of already-
existing governmental authority, as well as the implementation of an alternative form of 
order, was central to direct-action plans to take state power in its entirety, differentiating 
these movements' form of contention from self-governmental opposition that focuses on 
policy areas separately. Reform-style resistance does not attempt to take state power, but 
rather – as seen in the Ecuadorian and Bolivian movements' development into political 
parties – to find inclusion within existing state power practices. The FSLN and Sendero 
Luminoso crafted plans for their organizations, guided by certain Marxist-Leninist 
principles, to occupy and take state power alone. Neither planned to use governmental or 
ally resources nor planned on delegating power to an already-existing agent in their 
respective governments. A slight aberration from this style of strategic planning is the 
FSLN's use of Cuban resources in their struggle. This is not a major problem because 
Cuba was extremely peripheral in the actual execution of movement plans. 
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The manner through which these respective movements institutionalized indicates 
their revolutionary, rather than self-governmental or reformist character. Armed 
insurrection characterized both struggles, drawing a stark contrast between adherents and 
opponents. The FSLN, principally through the ATC, engaged in large scale land 
occupations and efforts to redistribute land owned by the then reigning Somoza family 
(Deere and Marchetti: 1981). Sendero Luminoso challenged state power by occupying 
territories and later taking up such mundane activities as conducting marriages, 
regularizing exchange relations, and punishing thieves (Burt: 2004). The FSLN, also, 
established schools to train and conduct literacy campaigns for militants – often with 
Cuban support – while taking territory and occupying the Somoza family's large estates. 
Such regularized activities, practiced by both movements, excluded already-existing 
governments in their entirety. These movements sought to govern, but as parallel entities, 
what Lenin called, “dual power.” 
These movements also displayed similar organizational patterns that characterize 
their proto-state-ness. Shining Path's organization was incredibly centralized: the 
movement's leader, Abimael Guzmán, stood atop a rigid, top-down hierarchy where cells 
of four or five members had leaders who made decisions, without connections to other 
cells that operated in the same way (McClintock: 1989). A similar model, molded on 
Lenin's idea of “democratic centralism” dictated the FSLN internal organization, with the 
national directorate on top and separate committees disseminating decisions taken by the 
leadership to local areas (Cuzán: 1991). The MST, also, boasts the same kind of internal 
organization. While nowhere near as secretive as the Shining Path, the MST's version of 
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democratic centralism also differs because of institutionalized, compulsory two-year 
elections and more local decision-making autonomy for nucleos. In comparison with 
other, more vanguardist movements, the MST is simply less hierarchical. The other 
movements show how they were extremely centralized – a key element to state power – 
within their organizations prior to overthrowing their respective governments. 
Furthermore, the Marxist-Leninst identity served as the basis for the FSLN's government 
upon seeking power, homogenizing cultures and identities following the revolution. 
An application of my theory of strategy to each movement helps shed light on 
why the Shining Path's efforts were met with limited success, whereas the Sandinistas 
took power in 1979. A major problem in the Shining Path's struggle was the identity they 
promoted. On one hand, it was coherent, yet too much. Its appeals to Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism were very doctrinaire, but ethereal and difficult for potential adherents to 
understand (Dietz: 1990). On the other hand, the movement's decision to enter Lima and 
engage in urban armed insurrection does not fit with Maoism's focus on the peasantry 
(Graves: 1992). Coherence, for the Shining Path, was compromised by abstract ideas that 
were detached from the people it meant to convince and also by some of the movement's 
key tactical choices. Direct-action planning explains the form of contention they 
institutionalized. Flaws within its plan tell us why they had limited success. 
The Sandinistas, conversely, maintained a clear and coherent adherence to 
Marxism-Leninism throughout their struggle. Years of studying and directly learning 
from Cuban revolutionaries assisted to cohere their identity, as did their embrace of 
Liberation Theology (Luciak: 1990). Especially after the 1972 earthquake that exposed 
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corruption within the Somoza regime, the FSLN prepared rural and urban workers, 
artisans, and students in revolutionary politics and identity. The FSLN, more so than the 
Shining Path, displayed a coherent Marxist identity with which they prepared their 
members consistently throughout their institutionalization of revolutionary contention. 
The Shining Path, as evaluated against my theory, shows how coherence with the 
base is necessary. They show that strategic coherence and consistency can exist with no 
concrete tie to the people the movement seeks to mobilize. When the plans and identity 
promoted do not resonate and connect with the people the movement intends to mobilize, 
then the chances of success decrease. Direct-action plans, while apparent in both 
movements, were stronger for the FSLN. For this reason, they had more success in 
institutionalizing revolutionary contention. The FSLN ultimately took power in 1979 (to 
cede power in open elections in 1990), whereas the Shining Path was riddled with 
problems up to the time when its leader was jailed in 1992. 
One of my goals in this section is to analyze certain self-governmental 
movements other than the MST, reform-style movements, and revolutionary struggles 
against my theory of strategic action. Given space restrictions, I could only cursorily 
scrutinize each movement's plans and actual ways they institutionalized contention. My 
case study of the MST, which consumed the bulk of this dissertation, allowed me to fine 
tune my theory conceptually and analytically. As a pathway case, my study allowed me to 
analyze a new form of social movement resistance and develop a new theory to explain it. 
This new, more agentic theory, is intended to shift focus away from mechanical, 
contextual factors that consume most research. 
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The focus on the Zapatistas and Piqueteros did not disclose any new 
developments. The cases served more to further highlight the role of identity and 
instrumentalization in my theory, as well as illustrate the nature of self-governmental 
contention for movements outside Brazil. Both count as “least-likely cases” because their 
differences on many counts would seem to defy a common explanation, something my 
theory provides. Concerning the reformist contention in Ecuador and Bolivia, the most 
salient issue concerned the movement-party alliances' lack of attention to economic 
policy. I selected these cases not only because of the displayed qualities of reformist 
resistance but also because of the displayed variations in terms of success. For the latter 
kind of movement – revolutionary – identity assumed a more crucial factor than in the 
other modes of institutionalization. As in my discussion of reform-style movements, I 
chose these cases based on success rates. Pairing cases in terms of success allowed me to 
pinpoint parts of my theory that worked as a “treatment,” as if they existed in 
experimental conditions. 
 
6.2 Further Implications and the Meaning of Resistance 
It's worth asking after analyzing the three kinds of movements, if the nature of 
self-governmental resistance is territorially confined to Latin America. I believe that 
although currently it is mainly found on the continent, it could spread to other locations. 
The components of strategic action I lay out – coherence, consistency, and preparation – 
as well as the differences between the subcategories of direct-action, mediation, and 
instrumentalization, are by no means unique to Latin America. What does make the 
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continent different is the history of revolutionary struggles (Cuba remains particularly 
salient). Their centralized, presidential forms of leadership and organization, as well as 
Marxist-Leninist identity, have left a mark on the strategic choices made by current 
movements. In fact, the question of inequality and class relations remains central to all 
kinds of movements analyzed in this conclusion, with indigenous actors challenging its 
hegemony and other self-governmental movements tweaking it. 
In conversation with some colleagues, I have been asked if self-governmental 
resistance is apparent in organizations in the Middle East, such as Hamas or the Muslim 
Brotherhood. While a couple years ago, I always stated that I was unsure, I am more 
confident after observing Hamas' efforts to enter into parliament in Palestine, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood's creation of a political party to participate in elections in Egypt, 
that these organizations are akin to reform-style contention. Hamas' armed resistance 
would seem to indicate their revolutionary aspirations, but because they run candidates in 
open elections, I imagine that they would also accept private property relations. They fit 
awkwardly within the reformist category because their struggle is one of national 
independence and self-determination, which the Muslim Brotherhood also claims. In this 
sense, they are akin to Latin America's indigenous movement's demands and ideals. 
Regardless, I am not familiar – nor comfortable – reaching definitive conclusions about 
the region and the organizations found there. These are conjectures that require more 
discussion at a later time. 
A final curiosity concerning my study of each of these modes of 
institutionalization is the time period. Most research on Latin American social 
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movements focus on changes brought by post-1980s neoliberal structural adjustment. The 
movements that I discuss – with the MST as the primary example but shadowed by the 
Piqueteros, Zapatistas, as well as Rondas Campesinas in Peru and early CONAIE 
member organization’s practices – all developed their mode of institutionalizing 
contention at or around the time of neoliberal transitions. While I recognize the temporal 
commonality, I also notice how each movement has connections – from Maoists in 
southern Mexico to Cubans in Brazil – to revolutionary struggles and modes of resistance. 
In fact, with the potential exception of the Rondas Campesinas – who likely took cues on 
what not to do from their resident revolutionary movement, Sendero Luminoso – many 
leaders in their respective self-governmental movements partook in revolutionary 
struggles, or trained with others who had. For this reason, the kind of movement that they 
developed adopted certain strategic approaches that were learned from revolutionary 
experiences. 
I am not claiming that revolutionary contention is no longer possible. I think, 
however, that movements plan for success, and the revolutionary option to institutionalize 
struggle has been decided against in the last twenty years. Goals, I also believe, have 
changed. Taking state power, occupying the apparatuses of government to execute policy 
for all, is not considered the most viable way to gain resources or alter social relations. 
Like the MST members who work at COOPAN, the collectively organized and owned 
cooperative, movements learned by trial and error. And the strategic approach that 
features instrumentalizing allies and governments was developed over the course of years. 
The identities, as well, were crafted in such a fashion to orient members to their targets in 
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a certain way. Their planned opposition to state power and private property, likewise, has 
been developed after years of careful reflection, discussion, and internal debate. 
In Power and Movement, Tarrow recognizes that social movements are 
historically contingent. Or in other words, they have emerged at a certain point in time, 
and thus, may also eventually disappear. I agree, yet also believe that the stark terms 
through which he defines social movement resistance presents an inadequate “either/or” 
differentiation between coordinated resistance or demobilization-through-
institutionalization. As my classification of movements reveals, the differences are not so 
stark. There are different kinds of movements, which, as we saw in the case of indigenous 
struggles, can even morph into one another. Changes in kinds of resistance are where we 
could refocus our attention, rather than posing the question of whether or not social 
movements will endure. 
Lastly, the MST teaches us the meaning of self-governmental resistance. But its 
lessons concerning this mode of institutionalizing social movement contention may be 
ending as the movement approaches a unique conjunction in its history. In 2010, after 
presenting at a conference on this new form of resistance that the MST exemplifies, I was 
asked if the movement would disappear if they stopped conducting land occupations. I 
responded that, if occupations would cease, the movement would not cease. While I still 
stand by my response, after more analysis, I think now that the movement would change 
substantially. And we are seeing those changes, especially as the number of occupations 
and encampments in Brazil currently number in the dozens. The movement itself, shortly 
after my fieldwork in 2011, decided to halt land occupations in the south of the country. 
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This, as the CPT numbers on demonstrations show, does not mean that the movement is 
demobilized. It does mean that the movement has changed course, opting to exchange 
contentious activities concerning private property for street protests. We are left to 
believe that the MST is becoming, at least according to my theory, more and more a 
reform-style movement. This does not entail, as is often mentioned in the Brazilian press, 
that the movement has lost its course or purpose. Rather, it is showing that the innovative 
nature of its struggle – the reason I went to Brazil and researched the movement in the 
first place – may be ending. 
One central lesson, especially from my analysis of strategy, is that the direction of 
resistance – not only of the self-governmental variety, but in general – ultimately lies 
with the movement itself. More than other factors, or “waiting for the time to be right” to 
organize, it is the agency of the movement that dictates the terms of coordinated struggles. 
Careful attention to plans and identity formation leads to certain outcomes and modes of 
resistance. Without plans, there is no movement, and thus, no resistance. The most 
important element in coordinating social movement contention is the actual coordination, 
or strategic planning, that leads movements to engage their membership and targets in 
certain ways. This does not mean that social movement resistance takes place over night 
or at the whim of elites.  Rather, strategic planning takes years to develop and implement.  
Despite the long, hard disciplining work that goes into strategic planning and creation, 
coordinated resistance, in any form, can take place anywhere. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1, for Chapter 3 
Figure 1: Total Land Occupations v MST Occupations 
 
Source: CPT: 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 2008, 2009, 2010. Organized by 
Author. 
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Figure 2: Total Manifestations v Agrarian Reform Manifestations v MST Agrarian 
Reform Manifestations 
 
 
Source: CPT: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010. Organized by Author. 
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Figure 3: Total Occupations v Manifestations 
 
 
 
Source: CPT: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010. Organized by Author. 
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Figure 4: Evolution of INCRA's Budget, 1995-2010 
Pink is initially estimated expenses 
Blue is authorized expenses 
Teal is actual expenses 
 
Source: INCRA 2010, Organized by Robert Kiel, INCRA. 
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Appendix 2, for Chapter 4 
Figure 1: MST Schools and Students v State Schools and Students 
 MST 
State RS (2003) PR (2010) SP (2010) 
 
Elementary 
(Students/ 
Schools) 
952/5 125 1/2 0/0 
 
Secondary 
(Students/ 
Schools) 
134/5 220/5 280/4 
 
 
 State 
State RS (2010) PR (2010) SP (2010) 
 
Elementary 
(Rural/ 
Urban 
Students) 
(Rural/ 
Urban 
Schools 
256,517/ 2,644,743 160,853/ 2,687,406 112,695/  
5,985,884 
4,447/10,790 1,688/9,112 1,469/ 26,888 
 
Secondary 
(Students/ 
Schools) 
5,491 /4602 28,240 /3013 28,873 /1188 
 
 
Source: INEP 2003, 2010. MST: 2005, 2010. Organized by Author. 
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Figure 2: PRONERA Beneficiaries, 2010 
 
Source: INCRA, 2011 (Clarice Aparecida dos Santos). 
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Figure 3: Total Mobilizations for Education v MST Mobilizations 
 
Source: CPT, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010. Organized by 
Author. 
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Appendix 3, for Chapter 5 
 
Figure 1: Total Manifestations v Agricultural Production Manifestations v MST 
Agricultural Production Manifestations 
 
 
 
Source: CPT 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010. Organized by 
Author. 
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Figure 2: MST Agrarian Reform Manifestations v Education Manifestations v 
Agricultural Production Manifestations 
 
 
 
Source: CPT, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010. Organized by 
Author. 
 
